- Prometheus: Science Policy: General Archives

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July 31, 2008

Science and Technology Policy Researchers and Practice: Do They Inform Each Other?

I wanted to note for our readers the essay titled "History of Science and American Science Policy" from the current (June 2008) issue of Isis, the journal of the History of Science Society. Full citation:

Wang, Zuoyue and Naomi Oreskes. 2008. "History of Science and American Science Policy," Isis, 99:2 (June), 365-373.

The essay is part of the journal's Focus section, which in this issue asks "What is the Value of History of Science?" The other essays explore how the History of Science has or could influence other areas of scientific activity. While I found value in each of the essays, there are two things I wanted to post related to this particular example.

One thing that struck me as I read about the work of historians of science in the policy sphere in the late 1950s and 1980s is their absence in the 22 years since the 1986 study sponsored by the House. Add to that relative absence of other scholars dealing with science and technology policy in the practice of same, and I'm persuaded there's a whole lot of knowledge transfer not going on that could.

That it doesn't happen (or isn't obvious) in science and technology policy research makes me wonder if the academic field is doing much more than perpetuating itself. Since only a small percentage of their students need go into academic careers to sustain their numbers, they don't have to work that hard.

If I'm wrong about this, what should I be reading and where should I be looking? I'm not talking about government reports like those produced by the Congressional Research Service or the deified Office of Technology Assessment; nor do I mean reports written by think tanks, the National Academies or other non-academic, non-governmental bodies. They are written in a process and with a goal distinct from that of most academic research. I am looking for scholarship from science and technology policy researchers that has been effectively transferred to practitioners? In my work conducting policy analysis related to computer science, I'm rarely asked or encouraged to go to the academic literature unless it's in computer science. There are many scholars who conduct evaluation work of science and technology programs for various agencies, but that work rarely places specific programs into larger contexts or provides critical analyses beyond the specific program in question.

Now, I don't place this issue squarely at the feet of academic researchers. I've seen little indication from practitioners that they are seeking information that academic research can provide, or even know much about the bodies of knowledge that they can use for their work. I doubt there's a sole cause behind this, as the pressure to perform or produce, the difference between policy-relevant and academic knowledge, the lack of awareness of what's going on in academic research, and the time-scale differences between the two sectors all have some influence on why these two groups don't talk that much. But it seems to me a screaming inefficiency that there isn't some greater effort to transfer knowledge, or communicate ongoing research and ongoing questions between the two groups.

As an aside, in the essay by Zuoyue and Oreskes, I see yet again this revelation to at least one of the authors that policymaking is oh so different from what they do and/or what they expected. As somebody who attempts to work in both policy research and policy practice, my expectations may be too high. But it just strikes me as really naive that congressional hearings or similar activities are such an eye-opening experience to highly educated people ostensibly interested in policy. That they haven't bothered to at least take a peak at what they might be getting into before testifying or researching congressional decision-making really reinforces all those isolationist stereotypes associated with the ivory tower. It's politics, for crying out loud. You expected it to resemble a judicial trial or a research workshop? Maybe I shouldn't be so surprised that knowledge isn't flowing between science and technology policy researchers and practitioners.

Posted on July 31, 2008 06:30 PM View this article | Comments (2)
Posted to Author: Bruggeman, D. | Science Policy: General

July 15, 2008

Too Many Atmospheric Scientists . . . Surprise, Surprise

In the current issue of the Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society John Knox concludes (PDF):

. . . if the projections are accurate: the number of undergraduate meteorology degree recipients will increasingly exceed the number of meteorology employment opportunities into the next decade. Thus, given recent trends and future projections, the growth of the U.S. undergraduate meteorology population is potentially unsustainable in terms of bachelor’s degree–level employment within meteorology.

With respect to the job market for meteorologists he finds another solid indication of a glut:

Meteorology graduates’ salaries in this national database are much closer to those in the traditionally glutted and underpaid humanities fields than to salaries for graduates with computer science, physics, geology, or mathematics degrees.

Knox indicates that this situation has developed because the atmospheric sciences community has ignored the demand side of the equation when pressing for an ever increasing supply of students, and may foreshadow a similar glut at the graduate level:

the quantitative results of this article can be construed to indicate that we have entered a period of chronic oversupply of undergraduate meteorologists. This oversupply has arguably come about because the mechanisms that generate interest in our field (e.g., unprecedented media emphasis on weather) are mostly uncoupled to the mechanisms of demand. Media coverage of weather and climate topics can inspire throngs of students to pursue meteorology as a career; it is specifically cited by UNC Charlotte meteorologists as a reason for their program’s spectacular growth (www.charlotte. com/274/story/103334.html). But widespread media attention does not magically create future employment opportunities for these students within meteorology. If, in turn, this situation translates into a future boom in graduate school enrollments and Ph.D. production, the current parlous state of “grantsmanship” in our science as described by the critiques of Carlson (2006) and Roulston (2006) would seem tame by comparison.

In the same issue, Jeff Rosenfield, Editor-in-Chief of BAMS editorializes (not online, at p. 773) that he was “surprised” by the data. He should not have been. In 2002 I engaged in a series of exchanges on the pages of BAMS on exactly this question in response to a paper by Vali, Anthes, et al. warning of a shortage of PhD atmospheric scientists. They argued that one solution was to boost the undergraduate ranks in the atmospheric sciences:

we as a community should seek ways to increase the number of qualified applicants. Because the number of atmospheric scientists required under any reasonable scenario is small compared to the total number of students in undergraduate education, a modest increase in the effort to recruit students from other disciplines could have a major impact in a relatively short period of time.

In response, I argued that any discussion of a shortfall in supply of atmospheric sciences professionals needed also to be accompanied by some understanding of the market demand for people trained with this expertise, something that Vali , Anthes, et al. neglected to discuss, and Knox identifies as a root factor in the present mismatch of supply and demand. I argued that the atmospheric sciences were risking committing the exact same mistake made by the NSF when it proclaimed a looming shortage of scientists in the 1990s. I concluded:

The science and technology community generally experienced loss of credibility in the 1990s when a number of prominent figures claimed a looming shortage of scientists. Leaders in the atmospheric sciences are in a position to use experience to avoid such errors in future assessments of the labor market. In particular, considerable care must be taken in raising expectations of potential students and policymakers about the future prospects for employment.

In reply, Vali and Anthes dismissed the importance of any consideration of demand, raised the "idealistic" vision of the free pursuit of knowledge, and ended with a jingoistic appeal to the need for more native U.S. scientists. To this I rejoined that there was indeed data available that portended a potential oversupply of atmospheric scientists, and this data was ignored at some risk. No one should be surprised at the current labor market situation for atmospheric scientists.

Now it turns out that the community faces an oversupply of undergraduates, depressed salaries, and a potential loss of credibility. Of course, the entirely predictable next step in this situation will be for the atmospheric sciences community to bemoan the fact that research budgets have not kept pace with the supply of trained atmospheric scientists, and call for an increase in federal R&D to create new opportunities. And in this way, the politics of science funding go round and round.

July 10, 2008

Accountability and Federally Funded Research - Not Mutually Exculsive

Among the many different old, ill-formed, and just plain inaccurate tenets found in science and technology policy rhetoric is the notion that accountability for federal research funds only means one thing: an overly simplistic metric of dollars per discovery (much, much easier said than done). The most recent example of this can be found in the August 2008 issue of Seed magazine. In an interview found on pages 22 and 24 of that issue (titled "Foundation Building," not yet available online), Dr. Colwell notes, in response to a question about difficulties in building support for curiosity-driven basic research, answered:

Well, I didn't really get the question, "How many discoveries are you going to make this year if we give you the money?" but there was an implication too often that they wanted to have some sort of accountability. That is, if you spent x number of dollars, you would get y number of discoveries. Fortunately good sense and intelligence prevailed.

Accountability is a good thing, particularly accountability where taxpayer money is involved. But the way Colwell defines accountability forces her to speak of it as though it is a bad thing. Not a great example of good sense. And not an isolated incident.

So, agreeing that a measure of dollars per discovery is an ineffective measure of the impact of research spending (and probably a difficult metric to capture), how should we consider accountability for federal research money?

My first observation is that this discussion is usually framed in terms of what accountability should not be. Another relevant point is that what the scientific communities would consider as being accountable for their money or using it effectively will not completely overlap with what the federal government will consider accountable or effective.

All that said, the NSF, like all federal agencies, is obligated to submit Performance Reports with each Budget Request. So the FY 2007 Report was submitted with the FY 2009 Request. You can access it through the NSF website.

Reviewing the FY 2007 Performance Report Highlights, many of the research and education goals are handled through external expert review, per recommendations from a 2001 National Academies report, Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act for Research: A Status Report (full disclosure: I helped staff the report). The recommendations in that report encouraged that scientific research be evaluating on criteria of quality, relevance and leadership. Now there are assumptions behind those criteria that have not been really debated or questioned outside of the scientific community. But this is a measure of accountability, so for Colwell to suggest that there isn't is odd, and to not mention the means by which NSF tries to assess its effectiveness is to miss an opportunity to boost the perception of those scientists and engineers beating their tin Ehrlemeyer flasks for federal research dollars.

To the extent practical, democratic government functions better for its citizens the more transparent it is. Scientific communities fight this for fear of micromanagement. To celebrate and advertise the assessment measures for scientific research can help strengthen the perception of those politicians and policymakers outside the House Science and Technology Committee that are at best indifferent to the fate of the scientific and technological enterprise in the U.S.

I don't expect such a recognition of assessment to purge the linear model from the halls of Congress, nor do I expect it to open the eyes of people to the point that science funding is no longer an afterthought in the appropriations process (the deficit model is an even bigger cognitive block than the linear model). I do expect a better ability of people to see what is happening with scientific research dollars, and perhaps detect changes to the workforce (grant trends - including personnel support - are probably the easiest metrics to capture about research) in a way that can move policy arguments past the collections of anecdotes that often pass for data.

Posted on July 10, 2008 05:17 AM View this article | Comments (0)
Posted to Author: Bruggeman, D. | Science Policy: General

July 07, 2008

What U.S Competitiveness Crisis?

For some time we have noted the tendency of some in the S&T community to claim that a crisis exists in United States Competitiveness, with the solution being large and immediate government investments in R&D budgets. Others, including Paul Krugman and Amar Bhidé argue that the notion of "competitiveness" is itself incoherent placing claims of a crisis on dubious claims.

A new report out by The Rand Corporation, titled U.S. Competitiveness in Science and Technology (PDF), seeks to shed some light on this debate, asking : "So, who is right? Is U.S. leadership in S&T in jeopardy?"

The answer they come up with is "No":

The United States continues to lead the world in science and technology. . .
Taken in concert, these statistics suggest that the United States is still a premier performer in S&T and grew faster in many measures of S&T prowess than did Japan and Europe. Developing nations such as China, India, and South Korea, though starting from a small base, showed rapid growth in S&T, and, if that growth continues, the United States should expect its share of world S&T output to diminish.

High growth in R&D expenditures, triadic patents, and S&E employment, combined with low unemployment of S&E workers, suggest that the United States has not been losing S&E positions to other countries through outsourcing and offshoring.

It is an interesting report and a valuable contribution to the debate. My view of the long series of claims that the U.S. is experiencing a competitiveness crisis reflect a flawed understanding of data and analysis in this area, a willingness to exploit jingoistic rhetoric for political gain, or a crass effort to boost R&D budgets based on an argument that sells well in Washington. The reality is probably a combination of all three.

But even if the U.S. is not experiencing a competitiveness crisis, complacency is not really an option. The Rand report makes a number of sensible suggestions:

* Establish a permanent commitment 􀁴􀀁 to a funded, chartered entity responsible for periodically monitoring, critically reviewing, and analyzing U.S. S&T performance and the condition of the S&E workforce.
* Facilitate the temporary and indefinite stay of foreigners who
graduated in S&E from U.S. universities . . .

* Facilitate the immigration of highly skilled labor, in particular
in S&E, to ensure that the benefits of expanded innovation,
including spillovers, accrue to the United States and to ensure
the United States remains competitive in research and innovation.

* Increase capacity to learn from science centers in Europe, Japan,
China, India, and other countries to benefit from scientific and
technological advances made elsewhere.

* Continue to improve K–12 􀁴􀀁 education in general and S&T education
in particular, as human capital is a main driver of economic
growth and well-being.

June 29, 2008

Science and Technology Receive Money in Supplemental

A casualty of the budget 'compromise' for fiscal year 2008 (October 1, 2007-September 30, 2008), funding for science and technology agencies like the National Science Foundation, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the Department of Energy's Office of Science, may get a reprieve in the supplemental funding legislation that just passed the House of Representatives.

Supplemental funding bills, at least for the last few years, have focused on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. This time, $161.8 billion of the bill will focus on those wars, and there will be $24.7 billion of discretionary spending, covering things like flood relief for the Midwest, and continued levee repair in that area and the Gulf Coast.

Part of the bill will cover science and technology funding, not completely making up for the cuts to the FY 2008 requested totals these agencies suffered in this year's failure to pass the federal budget on time. Per ASTRA, a science advocacy organization focused on the physical sciences, the totals in this bill for science are approximately $400 million (first item as of this writing). AAAS places the total figure at $338 million (probably due to differences in what the groups count in their research and development funding totals).

However, what was once abnormal, irregular budgetary practice has become the norm. I would not expect the FY 2009 budget to be passed by the beginning of that fiscal year, and the budget may not be approved until after the election.

Frustrated? Disappointed? Contact your Senators and Representatives and complain. Then do it again in a few weeks.

Posted on June 29, 2008 03:39 PM View this article | Comments (0)
Posted to Author: Bruggeman, D. | Science Policy: General

June 24, 2008

Science and Technology Policy Report Roundup

A perfectly non-scientific sampling of reports on science and technology policy in the United States, some from organizations that may not be familiar to everyone.

The RAND Corporation - A long-standing science and technology research company, RAND started with national security issues and has branched out into many different areas. Until the early part of this decade, they ran the Science and Technology Policy Institute, and its predecessor, the Critical Technologies Institute, for the Office of Science and Technology Policy.

U.S. Competitiveness in Science and Technology - This monograph is a nice contrast to the occasionally overheated rhetoric about the impending collapse of the U.S. science and engineering enterprise. It notes the continued strengths of American research and development, noting that our leadership should not be taken for granted. Another interesting note (at least to me) was the notion that globalization can work both ways. from the research summary at the link above:

Counterintuitively, globalization and the rise of science and technology capability in other nations may prove to be economically beneficial to the United States overall. A future with more technologies invented abroad can benefit the United States, since domestic use of new technology, whether invented in the United States or elsewhere, can result in greater efficiency, economic growth, and higher living standards.

Adapting and adopting new technology - whether developed in the United States or elsewhere - is a useful skill in maintaining a competitive edge. That's an idea worth exploring and repeating.

The American Academy of Arts and Sciences - Not to be confused with that other AAAS, this Academy is based in Cambridge, Massachusetts, is nearly 70 years older, and draws from all fields when selecting its members.

The ARISE Report - ARISE stands for Advancing Research in Science and Engineering. The report is from the Academy's Initiative on Science, Engineering and Technology which is concerned about science literacy and the interactions of science, technology and society. The report's recommendation focus on encouraging high-risk research and supporting young researchers. While the second one may seem a no-brainer, I appreciate the attention provided the first concern. As forward thinking as universities can be, they are still very conservative institutions (in the traditional sense, not the contemporary left-right sense). The same can be said of the scientific communities that provide reviewers for government proposals. I think this report could have been stronger in its recommendations to peer reviewers about being more responsive to high-risk or transformative research, as well as being more supportive of early career researchers.

Woodrow Wilson Center - Named for the president, the center hosts a number of different projects meant to encourage policy scholarship in a number of areas.

OSTP 2.0 - Critical Upgrade A report from earlier this month that urges that the Office of Science and Technology Policy be better utilized. The recommendations are mostly nothing new: appoint a national leader in science and engineering as the OSTP Director, make the appointment quickly, and make high quality appointments to PCAST and related advisory boards. The new recommendation is to establish a Federal-State Science and Technology Council to share information between the states and the federal government. Two of the report's authors are former OSTP staffers.

Funding the Foundation: Basic Science at the Crossroads - A conference report from the center's Science, Technology, America and the Global Economy project. The report is based on an address by Dr. Shirley Ann Jackson, President of Renssalaer Polytechnic Institute, and a panel discussion of academic and industrial leaders in physical sciences. If you've followed the arguments before, during and after the release of Rising Above the Gathering Storm, the basic arguments here will be familiar to you.

Posted on June 24, 2008 09:00 PM View this article | Comments (1)
Posted to Author: Bruggeman, D. | Science Policy: General | Technology Policy

May 15, 2008

Comparing Candidate Policies on Science and Technology

Over the next week I intend to make some posts about the science and technology policies of the three remaining major party candidates. With an eye toward generating discussion, I want to take a moment and note links to the candidates' policies on science and technology. I am focusing on the candidates' own statements or position papers from their websites. There are plenty of comparison websites, and they have their own perspective on the issues (and what 'counts' as science and technology issues).

This is intended as only a starting point. If I'm missing some resource that should be in the list below, please let us know in the comments.

Links after the jump, but two points worth noting. It's rare to see all of a candidate's positions related to science and technology all in one place. It's even more rare to see them categorized as such. You're more likely to see references to innovation and competitiveness or more issue specific areas (such as climate change and economic competitiveness).

Additionally, many campaign speeches and press releases are ill-described in search results or lists of media on these websites. I may very well have missed a relevant speech because the tagline was "Senator X Remarks at Iowa Jefferson-Jackson/Lincoln Day Dinner" and not "Senator X Remarks on Federal Research and Development Budgets"

Warning: Links to main sites for the candidates may redirect to a contribution form. If this happens, look for the skip button.

Senator McCain:
Remarks on climate change
Climate Change Plan
Remarks on energy policy

Senator Clinton:
Hillary Clinton's Innovation Agenda
Innovation Agenda press release
Ending the War on Science
Speech on Scientific Integrity and Innovation
Remarks on energy and the environment
Speech on improving infrastructure
Food Safety Plan

Senator Obama:
Energy and the Environment
Speech on Energy, October 2007
Speech on Energy, May 2007
Speech on Energy Independence, September 2006
Speech on Energy, February 2006
Speech on Energy, September 2005
Speech on Energy and Climate Change
Technology and Innovation
Science
Remarks on Innovation and Education
Transportation

Posted on May 15, 2008 11:06 PM View this article | Comments (0)
Posted to Author: Bruggeman, D. | Science + Politics | Science Policy: General

May 12, 2008

NCAR Downsizes Social Science and Policy Research

I spent 8 years as a staff scientist at the National Center for Atmospheric Research in their social science group, where I saw little support for this important area of research. So the news that NCAR has decided to downgrade and scatter its meager social science resources comes as no surprise. Though at a time that the world more than ever needs such research, the decision is clearly short sighted. Because NCAR is base-funded by the National Science Foundation, it certainly would be appropriate for NSF to investigate the decision to diminish the role of social science and policy research at NCAR, and why it has been deemphasized at a time when policy makers more than ever need such knowledge.

Here is how NCAR announced the news in an email last week, which one insider characterized to me as being "blindsided":

To All Staff,
NCAR is facing significant financial challenges. The NSF base budget has risen at a rate less than the cost of business in each of the past six years. Increasingly, this has put major stresses on the NCAR budget. In response to this prolonged budget stress, NCAR and UCAR management have been taking measures to allocate budgets based on NCAR strategic priorities and NSF mandates. We have also had to reduce direct and indirect costs. This included the reduction in staff of 36 NCAR positions over the past four years.

Even with these adjustments, we continue to face significant budget pressures. In response to immediate FY08 budget shortfalls and the outlook for FY09, additional actions are required to address the problem. One important move that we will be taking this week is to dissolve the Societal-Environmental Research and Education Laboratory (SERE) and administratively move the Advanced Study Program (ASP), Institute for the Study of Society and the Environment (ISSE), an Center for Capacity Building (CCB) into other parts of NCAR. This will save immediate and recurring direct and indirect costs, capitalize on economies of scale in other labs, and enhance synergy and collaboration through new partnerships. Unfortunately, this will result in reductions in staff in the SERE Director's Office.

Next steps include:

* ISSE will receive administrative and management support through the Research Applications Laboratory (RAL).
* ASP will become a stand-alone Program that reports to the NCAR Director's Office.
* CCB will also become a stand-alone Program that reports to the NCAR Director's Office

We want to emphasize that these changes in no way diminish UCAR's and NCAR's commitment to ASP, ISSE, and CCB. Despite the current budget challenges, we remain dedicated to our vision of developing leadership in the social science components of climate and weather research, creating societal and policy-relevant research and information products, and conducting research on human-environment interactions.

Rick Anthes and Tim Killeen

Posted on May 12, 2008 12:44 AM View this article | Comments (0)
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | R&D Funding | Science Policy: General

March 10, 2008

State Science and Technology Policy Advice

I wanted to make note of a National Academies report, State Science and Technology Policy Advice: Issues, Opportunities, and Challenges: Summary of a National Convocation, recently released in pre-publication form. (Essentially, this is an early draft of the report, uncorrected proofs.)

As the title says, this is the summary of a national convocation on providing science and technology policy advice to the states. It was held last October, and from the looks of the project website, it was the first of a planned series of convocations. The 2007 event focused on energy, the environment and economic development.

Personally, I welcome projects like this, which emphasize that science and technology policy in this country is not limited to the federal government. It is arguably more complicated at the state level, in part due to a relative lack of infrastrucutre and the intermingling with economic development policy. But with continued pressure on federal science and technology budgets, and states taking a lead on various science and technology issues (see California with stem cells and the Northeast with its emissions compact), state capacity in science and technology policy is more and more important.

My only caution is that this project focuses on what Harvey Brooks called "science for policy" - scientific and technological advice for various policies. An equally important part of science and technology policy is developing, analyzing and assessing policies for science and technology - "policy for science." It's not so easily separable from science for policy - unless you're an academic.

Posted on March 10, 2008 06:38 PM View this article | Comments (0)
Posted to Author: Bruggeman, D. | Science Policy: General

March 06, 2008

Blogging - Even Daniel Greenberg Does It

The Chronicle of Higher Education has a blog connected with its Review section. Called Brainstorn: Lives of the Mind, it collects the wisdom and musings of scholars in several fields. Among them is Daniel Greenberg.

If you're a scholar of science policy, his name should be familiar. If it isn't, stop reading blogs and check out his books. Perhaps best known for his book The Politics of Pure Science, Greenberg has written several books and articles about the American system of scientific research, mostly about how it is funded (or not) at the federal level.

If you're still not sure about whom I speak, titles of his recent posts should suggest the tenor of his work:

Would a Department of Science Be an Improvement?"
Delusions on the Frontiers of Science
We've Got a Monster on the Loose: It's Called the Internet

Whether you agree with him or not, Greenberg is worth reading. We could all use a contrarian viewpoint from time to time.

Posted on March 6, 2008 08:26 PM View this article | Comments (0)
Posted to Author: Bruggeman, D. | Science Policy: General

March 02, 2008

Information Request - NSF and a Lack of Data Protection

Update - 3/3 I managed to find the relevant GAO report. It turns out that I was mistaken to assume that the report was released within a few days of the news report. The GAO document was released in late January. However, the relevant agencies are only listed in the report. They are not singled out.

Original Post

When a issue involving science and technology policy - if only slightly - makes the local news in DC, my ears perk up (sometimes even literally). Last weekend there was a local news report about government agencies' general failure to implement Office of Management and Budget recommended procedures for protecting the data they keep. The Washington Post and other news providers picked up the story.

(For the record, this is one of many things I keep an eye on for my day job. If I could confirm what's alleged below, I'd probably blog about it for the job, but it's worth posting here for a couple of reasons.)

First, while most of the 24 agencies surveyed did poorly, only two failed to implement any of the recommended policies for securing information: the Small Business Administration and the National Science Foundation. I'm not raising a hue and cry on this point right now because I've run into a block - I can't find the underlying documentation from the Government Accountability Office confirming the scorecard referenced in the report. So if there are readers that can speak to the source of the claims by GAO that the NSF failed to implement any of the recommendations, I'd love to see it.

Additionally, it's quite possible that the problem has been addressed. The NSF Chief Information Officer, George Strawn, is quoted by the Post as saying "contrary to the GAO report, his agency has implemented all or part of all five measures."

Of course, the problem with the scorecard demonstrates how ill-prepared most agencies are to protect the information they keep. I do not single out the government here, the rash of data breaches over the last few years has hit the private sector as hard as the public sector.

What's annoying is that the recent GAO testimony on information security doesn't have this information (or I'm looking in the wrong place), and the NSF website has absolutely nothing on this report (and I am looking in the right places there). It may have been several years since NSF has had to deal with negative publicity (or wanted to try), but the way to do it is not by keeping silent. It appears that the public face of the agency - on the website anyway - is all about the results of research funding. Personally, some publicity about how well the agency operates would go a long way to reminding people that not only does NSF fund good work, but also that it does a good job administering the operation. We - the science, science policy and science advocacy communities - may accept without question that science is done right and above board. But the public doesn't know us, and frequent reminders are common courtesy and good government.

Posted on March 2, 2008 10:42 PM View this article | Comments (0)
Posted to Author: Bruggeman, D. | Science Policy: General

February 29, 2008

A new blog on water policy and science, technology, law and so on

So many blogs, so little time! Here's another interesting blog from our students, this one on water policy and its intersection with a myriad of scientific and other issues. Recent posts have addressed riparian issues, acid mine drainage, and "National Science Day". Check it out here. Comments welcome!

Posted on February 29, 2008 04:33 AM View this article | Comments (0)
Posted to Science Policy: General

New blog on the Endangered Species Act and science policy

Introducing you to a blog from one of our students on the science policy of the Endangered Species Act. The blog asks questions such as "how much science do we need?" and "how do we balance different values"? Check it out here. Comments welcome!

Posted on February 29, 2008 04:27 AM View this article | Comments (0)
Posted to Science Policy: General

January 28, 2008

Two New Blogs to Check Out

Like anyone needs a longer personal blogroll, but here are two that might be worth a look.

William Briggs is a statistician, a delightful writer, and provocatively skeptical about all sort of subjects in exactly the way that scientists should be skeptical. His new blog is extremely thoughtful. For example, he has a post up today titled, "Is climatology a pseudoscience?" and provides a nuanced, and yes, provocative answer.

A new group blog called Science Policy Development has just started up on the heels of the recent NAS Science and Technology Policy Graduate Student Forum. There is plenty of room in the blogosphere for more discussions of science policy and I am hopeful that this group maintains an active presence in science policy discussions.

Posted on January 28, 2008 03:22 AM View this article | Comments (0)
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Hodge Podge | Science Policy: General

January 17, 2008

2008 Edition of Science and Engineering Indicators Out Now

Yesterday I attended the official release of the 2008 edition of Science and Engineering Indicators, the biennial compendium of facts, figures, charts and graphs on the U.S. science and engineering enterprise (there is international data, but its typically presented for context). It's produced by a subcommittee of the National Science Board, with the support of the NSF Statistics staff. You can read the press release and wade through the online version to see all the details.

As part of their effort to continually adjust (I don't want to judge whether it's improved or not) the message presented by the Indicators, this edition was accompanied by two additional documents. One of them is a Digest of charts and graphs that various science advocacy groups will flog over the next two years to argue how badly their disciplines are being screwed in the research budget. (They are, but that's for another post - tune in Friday). There is also a policy document about R&D and international competitiveness. Those who have followed the discussions in this area won't see a lot of new material, simply updated arguments with the perpetual sky is falling perspective. The policy document is a relatively new addition to Indicators. This follows a similar document with the 2006 edition that focused on STEM education.

While the document is presented as a policy-neutral object, there are always hidden assumptions and presumptions that are useful to tease out. Just ask some questions, like what's missing? For example...

One of the charts in Chapter 7, Science and Engineering: Public Attitudes and Understanding, reports on the responses to a survey question. The bottom chart in Figure 7-11 (page 7-26 in Chapter 7)covers how well people think government is funding basic research. (Let's put aside for the moment the problems with the idea of "basic research").

The data indicate an upward trend in the percentage of people who think government is funding too little basic research and a downward trend in the percentage who think government is funding too much.

What's missing is that the percentages over the timeframe reported never add up to more than 50-52 percentage points. So while more people are getting behind the idea of more government funding of basic research, nothing is said in the figure or the associated text about half the people either not knowing about government funding of basic research or not caring.

I'm sure this isn't the only part of Indicators where what isn't there can be as important (or at least as interesting) as what is included. In other places this could be attributed to selective research and criticized as such. But since this information is considered a significant resources in framing science and technology policy arguments, it is perhaps more important to review, critique, and provide feedback on the data and statistics found in Indicators.

Posted on January 17, 2008 10:36 AM View this article | Comments (2)
Posted to Author: Bruggeman, D. | Science Policy: General

January 07, 2008

Deja Vu All Over Again

The Washington Post had a excellent story yesterday by Marc Kaufman describing NASA’s intentions to increase the flight rate of the Space Shuttle program. This is remarkable, and as good an indication as any that NASA has not yet learned the lessons of its past.

According to the Post:

Although NASA has many new safety procedures in place as a result of the Columbia accident, the schedule has raised fears that the space agency, pressured by budgetary and political considerations, might again find itself tempting fate with the shuttles, which some say were always too high-maintenance for the real world of space flight.

A NASA official is quoted in the story:

"The schedule we've made is very achievable in the big scheme of things. That is, unless we get some unforeseen problems."

The Post has exactly the right follow up to this comment:

The history of the program, however, is filled with such problems -- including a rare and damaging hailstorm at the Kennedy Space Center last year as well as the shedding of foam insulation that led to the destruction of Columbia and its crew in 2003. . . "This pressure feels so familiar," said Alex Roland, a professor at Duke University and a former NASA historian. "It was the same before the Challenger and Columbia disasters: this push to do more with a spaceship that is inherently unpredictable because it is so complex."

John Logsdon, dean of space policy experts and longtime supporter of NASA, recognizes the risks that NASA is taking:

Every time we launch a shuttle, we risk the future of the human space flight program. The sooner we stop flying this risky vehicle, the better it is for the program.

Duke University’s Alex Roland also hit the nail on the head;

Duke professor Roland said that based on the shuttle program's history, he sees virtually no possibility of NASA completing 13 flights by the deadline. He predicted that the agency would ultimately cut some of the launches but still declare the space station completed.
"NASA is filled with can-do people who I really admire, and they will try their best to fulfill the missions they are given," he said. "What I worry about is when this approach comes into conflict with basically impossible demands. Something has to give."

It is instructive to look at the 1987 report of the investigation of the House Science Committee into the 1986 Challenger disaster, which you can find online here in PDF (thanks to Rad Byerly and Ami Nacu-Schmidt). That report contains lessons that apparently have yet to be fully appreciated, even after the loss of Columbia in 2003. Here is an excerpt from the Executive Summary (emphasis added, see also pp. 119-124):

The Committee found that NASA’s drive to achieve a launch schedule of 24 flights per year created pressure throughout the agency that directly contributed to unsafe launch operations. The Committee believes that the pressure to push for an unrealistic number of flights continues to exist in some sectors of NASA and jeopardizes the promotion of a "safety first" attitude throughout the Shuttle program.
The Committee, Congress, and the Administration have played a contributing role in creating this pressure. . . NASA management and the Congress must remember the lessons learned from the Challenger accident and never again set unreasonable goals which stress the system beyond its safe functioning.

One would hope that the House Science Committee has these lessons in mind and is paying close attention to decision making in NASA. It would certainly be appropriate for some greater public oversight of NASA decision making about the Shuttle flight rate and eventual termination. Otherwise, there is a good chance that such oversight will take place after another tragedy and the complete wreckage of the U.S. civilian space program.

For further reading:

Pielke Jr., R. A., 1993: A Reappraisal of the Space Shuttle Program. Space Policy, May, 133-157. (PDF)

Pielke Jr., R.A., and R. Byerly Jr., 1992: The Space Shuttle Program: Performance versus Promise in Space Policy Alternatives, edited by R. Byerly, Westview Press, Boulder, pp. 223-245. (PDF)

Posted on January 7, 2008 12:21 AM View this article | Comments (0)
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Risk & Uncertainty | Science Policy: General | Space Policy

January 05, 2008

My Comments to Science on Hillary Clinton's Science Policy Plans

I was recently asked by Eli Kintisch at Science to comment on Hillary Clinton's recent discussion of science policies. Eli quotes a few of my comments in this week's Science, which has a special focus on the presidential candidates. My full reaction to Eli is below:

Hi Eli-
The document seems typical for this early stage of the campaign -- that is, it blends a heavy dose of political red meat, with the entirely vacuous, with hints of some innovative and perhaps even revolutionary new ideas, accompanied with a range of budget promises that almost certainly can't be met. But most significantly is the fact that she has put some science policy ideas forward to be discussed, which is far more than most other candidates of either party have done related to science.

*The red meat is all of the "I'm not George Bush" type statements, such as the stem cell proposal and re-elevation of the science advisor position.

*The vacuous includes the comment that you starred on political appointees. The meaning of this statement depends entirely on the definition of "legitimate basis" and "unwarranted supression" -- well, what is "legitimate" and "unwarranted"? -- as written it is a political Rorschach test, which can be good politics but certainly does nothing to clarify the specific science policies she would enact. Also, the idea that civil servants and scientists are free from politics in regulatory decision making probably needs more thinking through -- but balancing accountability and expertise probably requires more wonky discussion than a campaign sound bite can provide.

*The most innovative idea is the $50 billion strategic energy fund, which is short on details, but promises real money to an area desperately in need of support. This stands out as something really new and potentially very exciting.

*The promises that probably can't be met include keeping the Shuttle contractors in business while pursuing a new human spaceflight program, while at the same time fully funding earth sciences research and a new space-based climate research program, while putting NIH on a doubling trajectory over the next 10 years, not to mention a bit for aeronautics and the $50 billion for energy research. Good luck finding room in the R&D budget for all of that. But again, more politics than science policy, this time aimed at more specific constituencies looking to see that their concerns get some play.

The biggest criticism I have is the comment about the NIH budget, which her husband set on a doubling trajectory and which was completed under Bush. To suggest that NIH has suffered a lack of support is not a great argument. Also, a minor criticism, the part about the U.S. national assessment on climate change says that Bush hasn't released one for 6.5 years, but Clinton/Gore took more than 7 years to release theirs. The national assessment is more political red meat, and probably tangential to where the action is on climate issues anyway.

Hope this helps, please follow up if clarification is needed . . .

Best regards,

Roger

Roger Pielke, Jr.
University of Colorado

Posted on January 5, 2008 10:16 AM View this article | Comments (0)
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science + Politics | Science Policy: General | Technology Policy

December 07, 2007

STS Acting with Science, Technology and Policy

The title refers to the theme of the 2008 joint meeting of the Society for the Social Studies of Science (4S) and the European Association for the Study of Science and Technology (EASST). The two associations hold joint meetings every four years. The conference is scheduled for August 20-23 in Rotterdam , the Netherlands . The call is available online.

I’m a member of 4S (actually I was, I apparently let my subscription lapse without notice), but have yet to attend one of their conferences. Budget considerations are the prime reason, but the other factor has been what I see as a lack of attention to science and/or technology policy (which is common to the other STS societies I belong to), save for occasional analyses focusing on Europe . I’d encourage those who disagree with my characterization to comment and help me plumb the depths of my ignorance.

I did give this event extra consideration – even with the added travel expense – from the following passage in the call:

STS-approaches are no longer only relevant for understanding the production of science, technology and innovation; they also are relevant for understanding the co-production of science and technology with policy, democracy, law, and the organization of health care, among other major institutional matters. Similarly STS researchers have become increasingly involved with practices of technology development, policymaking, legal decision-making and governance in different fields, such as science and technology policy, environmental regulation, and health care. The balance between observation and participation seems to have changed in these consequential practices of ‘acting with’. Such engagement is currently a major topic of discussion within the STS field. Several workshops, editorials and special issues have already been published or are under way. The ‘acting with’, or interventionist approach is likely to have consequences for research methodologies, for researchers’ obligations toward different publics, and for the kind of products STS-researchers deliver. In addition, like other aspects of science and technology, interventions by STS researchers are themselves subject to contingencies and negotiations that can lead to unanticipated consequences.

I think the first sentence is false...

STS was always relevant to the interactions of science, technology, policy, and all the other forces mentioned in the second part of the sentence. So I am pleased to see mention of this trend. In my opinion, it hasn’t ‘crossed the pond’ very well, so I would not be surprised to see this focus on participation – on ‘acting with’ – to be driven by the European membership of these organizations.

I am concerned by how this interventionist approach is demonstrated. In conversations I’ve had with STS scholars (one of which you can read at The World’s Fair blog (scroll down to the comments to find the conversation), I find that we can be talking past each other about what it means to be ‘acting with.’ I hope to figure out why this happens in future discussions (and blog posts), but I suspect there are some ideological differences at play, as well as an interesting difference of perspectives on what is and isn’t (and what should and shouldn’t be) political in this ‘acting with.’

Where the 4S/EASST conference is concerned, I'll be interested to see what happens. But as for me going, there's a U.S. conference that overlaps, so I will probably not be going to the Netherlands.

Posted on December 7, 2007 04:37 PM View this article | Comments (0)
Posted to Author: Bruggeman, D. | Science Policy: General

November 15, 2007

The Science Advisor at 50

I've got a Commentary in this week's Nature on the President's science advisor. Here is a link to the PDF.

Tomorrow I'll be appearing on NPR's Science Friday to discuss the piece and the past 50 years of presidential science advice. Please tune in at 3PM EST!

Posted on November 15, 2007 02:07 AM View this article | Comments (1)
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | R&D Funding | Science + Politics | Science Policy: General

November 13, 2007

More Intellectual Disrobing, Please

No calls for burlesque here…the phrase is a quote from John Dewey in his book Experience and Nature (1925, Chicago: Open Court):

"An empirical philosophy…is an intellectual disrobing. We cannot permanently divest ourselves of the intellectual habits we take on and wear when we assimilate the culture of our own time and place. But intelligent furthering of culture demands that we take some of them off, that we inspect them critically."

In my last post, and some of my others on Prometheus, I have – if only implicitly – been encouraging such periodic, if not perpetual, divestiture and inspection. I want to do the same with this post. Instead of a call to rethink the perpetual appeals for a president that pays attention to science, I want to look at calls for revisiting science policy. I am in favor, but I think such proposals are, ironically, in need of the very intellectual disrobing they are advocating.

As an example, I point out this New York Times profile of former National Academy of Engineering President Bill Wulf on the occasion of his departure from that post earlier this year. (I should note that I did work for the National Academies, and staffed two different panels Dr. Wulf participated in.) While much of his comments focus on what he calls the ecology of innovation (something I may visit in a subsequent post), I want to point out some of his complaints about technology policy that could use some intellectual disrobing. That they take place in the midst of calls for essentially the same thing is not unique in policy.

Wulf is interested in revisiting various innovation policies, and while it may not be the intellectual disrobing Dewey had in mind, acknowledging changing times and circumstances should be encouraged, even more generally than in the following:

"At least every once in a while we should stand back and say what was the intent of intellectual property protection, what was the intent of the export control regime, what was the intent of antitrust? And in the light of today’s technology, what’s the best way to achieve that?"

Great questions, and my experience and study with each of these policies demonstrates that the intents behind these policies can change over time. Their consequences certainly do. We see some skin here. But we're only going from t-shirt and long pants to tank top and board shorts (or a evening gown to a blouse and pencil skirt). Another Wulf quote shows an intellectual habit worth examining.

"Or take what he called “the idiocy” of enacting short-term tax credits for research and development. “R and D takes many years,” he said. “If companies invested this year to take advantage of the R and D credit and then the next year it went away, they would have to stop the research and they would have wasted money.”
He says this is why corporate leaders tell him “with near unanimity” that tax credits have little influence on their decisions."

The habit here is the tendency to presume that policies that affect science and technology were designed, developed or implemented with science and technology in mind. This is tax policy, and while no more of a rational area than any other part of policy, it does not necessarily follow that encouraging research is the first or only intention of such a policy. If the last sentence of this quote is any indication, the R and D tax credit does not influence corporate R and D policy. That seems unlikely (and groups such as the Business Roundtable would take issue), but it does not make such policies "idiocy."

What Wulf, and all of us, ought to do to properly disrobe - intellectually, of course - is not only to ask about the intent, consequences and outcomes of science and technology policies, but of interests that would influence relevant policies. This influence isn't always obvious, because it is often indirect - the policy is designed for goals outside of science and technology.

When I write interests I am thinking a bit differently than when Roger spoke of values when he suggested that we ask "So What?" in a recent Bridges column. He was writing about political disputes involving science, but particularly where appeals to truth were involved. The interests I speak of can include contested values, but also disputes about the purpose of various policies and the consequences of policy choices. Unintended consequences don't have to connect to any particular values to affect the outcomes of science, technology, or innovation. But our intellectual habits often presume intention or purpose where there may be none. To better understand those circumstances we need to question our presumptions, interests and values, to shed our intellectual clothes and scrutinize the surroundings.

Anybody know a good tailor?

Posted on November 13, 2007 09:13 PM View this article | Comments (1)
Posted to Author: Bruggeman, D. | Science + Politics | Science Policy: General

November 07, 2007

NAS Student Forum on Science and Technology Policy

Full details here . . .

On January 4-5, 2008, the National Academies are sponsoring a two-day public forum intended for students, postdoctoral fellows, and recent graduates interested in studying and careers in science and technology policy.

The forum will feature both invited presentations and interactive discussions that will bring together a cross-section of government, academia, and industry to address practice and opportunities of the science and technology profession.

Apply here!

Have questions or comments? Email us at studentforum@nas.edu

Posted on November 7, 2007 06:50 AM View this article | Comments (1)
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

September 06, 2007

Atlanta Conference on Science, Technology, and Innovation Policy 2007

Do you know what governments need when they turn to the science, technology, and innovation policy research community for models and research results? Can you tell them what works, what doesn’t, and under what circumstance?

Are you scratching your head for answers as you adjust to the shifting landscape of global innovation? Georgia Tech invites you to learn from leading experts at the Atlanta Conference on Science, Technology, and Innovation Policy 2007 in October.

Test models of innovation. Explore emerging STI policy issues. Share research results through

Keynote addresses—Sheila Jasanoff of the Kennedy School at Harvard University and Luc Soete of UNU-MERIT, Maastricht;
State of the Field Plenary speakers—Kaye Husbands Fealing of the National Science Foundation and Philippe Larédo, ManchesterBusiness School and ENPC, Paris;
research by the innovation studies community, and
networking opportunities.

Topics focus on emerging issues of science, technology, and innovation in global economy and society and include:

Innovation in new forms and formats; markets, organizations, and industries in transition;
Emerging global networks of scientific communication;
Workforces and workplaces of science and technology; career opportunities for scientists and engineers; and
Government policies for encouraging knowledge based—and learning economies, North and South.

Explore the Challenges and Opportunities for Innovation in the Changing Global Economy on Friday-Saturday, Oct. 19-20, at Georgia Tech Global Learning Center.

Click here for the most up-to-date information.

Posted on September 6, 2007 02:06 PM View this article | Comments (1)
Posted to Science Policy: General

August 20, 2007

Center interim Director Dr. William Lewis testifies before House Committee

Center interim Director Dr. William (Bill) Lewis testified at an oversight hearing before the House Committee on Natural Resources on July 31. The topic was "Crisis of Confidence: The Political Influence of the Bush Administration on Agency Science and Decision-Making". Dr. Lewis testified about his experience as chair of the Committee on Endangered and Threatened Fishes in the Klamath River Basin ("Klamath Committee"). His testimony is available here.

Posted on August 20, 2007 11:26 AM View this article | Comments (0)
Posted to Science Policy: General | government

August 17, 2007

A Technology Assessment Revival?

A recent Issue of the American Institute of Physics' Science Policy News revisited a topic addressed in one of the earliest Prometheus posts - the Office of Technology Assessment, or OTA. You can review a brief history and archived reports online. Ever since its demise in the mid 90s there has been a regular attempt to revive the body, which provide technology assessment and related policy analysis to Congress. Legislation has been introduced on more than one occasion to revive the body, or some similar capacity, but the bills have not gotten very far in Congress.

The AIP piece notes that in the House and Senate Appropriations Committee Reports that accompanied their respective Legislative Branch Appropriations bills, there is language to provide the Government Accountability Office with technology assessment capacity. As usual, the amounts differ between the two chambers, but it is a relatively small amount ($2.5 million in the House report, $750,000 plus four full-time employees in the Senate report). Read the relevant sections of the Senate report (pages 42-43) for a better idea of what this technology assessment function might resemble.

Given limited budget resources, and lingering baggage from the demise of the OTA, placing technology assessment in the GAO has its advantages. The agency has a strong reputation for non-partisanship and independence. It has a small group of expertise within its Center for Technology and Engineering. It has tested a pilot technology assessment program since 2002, with at least 3 reports produced so far:

Technology Assessment: Protecting Structures and Improving Communications during Wildland Fires. GAO-05-380. Washington, D.C.: April 2005
Technology Assessment: Cybersecurity for Critical Infrastructure Protection. GAO-04-321. Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2004.
Technology Assessment: Using Biometrics for Border Security. GAO-03-
174. Washington, D.C.: November 15, 2002.

Please don't pop the champagne corks just yet. The language is connected to appropriations bills that have not been approved - yet. Previous efforts to provide similar resources to GAO have met with limited success. This kind of approach has been tried since at least the FY 2002 budget, usually getting cut from the final appropriations bill. The House Science Committee hearing from last July showed few serious Congressional signs of interest in developing a new body for technology assessment, or a technology assessment function for an existing body. And this committee is the closest thing to a consistent source of support the science and technology policy community has on the Hill.

So again, a policy outcome desired by many in the science and technology policy fields could fail. Unlike the recently passed competitiveness legislation (which took two sessions and a concerted behind the scenes effort with industry), it would be especially self-serving to generate a National Academies Report arguing for increased technology assessment capacity. If this is truly needed, how should the community make its case (its tactics), and what is the case to make (its argument)?

Posted on August 17, 2007 10:43 AM View this article | Comments (0)
Posted to Author: Bruggeman, D. | Science Policy: General

July 04, 2007

To go from RAGS to legislation

[David Bruggeman is a frequent contributor so we finally gave him an author tag. Click on his name to see all his posts. -eds]

One of the less publicized legislative efforts this year is the second attempt to pass parts of the American Competitiveness Initiative (ACI), introduced by President Bush in his 2006 State of the Union address. Many of the pieces of the ACI were recommended in the widely cited National Academies Report Rising Above the Gathering Storm. The parts of ACI that attracted the most attention of science and technology community were the goals of doubling the budgets for NSF, the Department of Energy's Office of Science, and the research accounts of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Those increases were part of the President's FY 2007 Budget Request, but failed due to the inability of Congress to pass most of the budget for that year. The FY 2008 request shows the Administration still committed to doubling those budgets over 10 years. But the Executive Branch cannot implement the full ACI without legislative action.

Efforts to enact other parts of the ACI have not been as forthcoming. Three bills introduced in 2006 (two in the House, one in the Senate) to strenghten and expand federal programs to encourage more students to major in Science, Technoogy, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) disciplines, as well as expand early career awards for researchers, withered on the legislative vine (although the House legislation did make it out of committee). Very similar legislation was introduced again this year, and as the Democrats have made some noise about an innovation agenda, there has been some progress. Currently both the House and Senate have passed legislation which awaits a conference to hammer out the differences. Both bills can be examined in detail through the THOMAS website maintained by the Library of Congress.

The House legislation, HR2272, is an omnibus bill containing pieces of earlier legislation. HR2272 includes reauthorization legislation for both NSF and NIST, reauthorization of the High Performance Computing Act, and language to increase education programs encouraging more majors in STEM disciplines (and for more of those majors to teach at the K-12 level) and programs to support early career researchers in physical science disciplines. The early career research awards would be through both the NSF and the Department of Energy.

The Senate bill, S761, would include most of the same provisions. The differences, to the extent I can discern them, have to do with specific numbers - funding, number of grants/fellowships/etc. Both bills also mandate various studies on STEM education and innovation, as well as some kind of coordinating mechanism for the federal government with respect to improving innovation. Hopefully those efforts, if enacted, could be informed by (and help guide) the nascent federal research programs on the science of science policy and innovation. But I'm a dreamer.

Each bill contains a previously discontinued federal technology program administered by NIST. (If some readers find this sufficiently interesting, it may be worth a separate post). The Senate bill reinstates the Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Technology, a kindred program to EPSCoR, the Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research. In each case, the program aims to improve the competitiveness of states that have historically received fewer federal dollars. The House bill creates what they call the Technology Innovation Program (TIP), but this appears to be a renaming of the Advanced Technology Program (ATP). ATP has been heavily criticized as ineffective, corporate welfare, or both. It is intended to help bridge a funding gap - the so-called 'valley of death' between initial development and commercialization. ATP would have been fully defunded by now, but the failure to enact the FY 2007 budget for NIST gave ATP another year of life - and forced NIST to continue a program it had prepared to dismantle. A surface comparison shows little difference betwen the TIP and ATP, and language allows for continuation of current ATP awards under the TIP.

While this legislation is much further along compared to this time last year, there is no guarantee that there will be a bill to sign by the end of the year. A conference has yet to be scheduled, while both bills have been ready since late May. As science and technology policy have rarely, if ever, been a high legislative priority, these bills may take a long time to get to the President's desk. While the Administration is generally supportive of the doubling, they have expressed dissatisfaction with the new programs and additional costs in the legislation. As President Bush rarely uses the veto pen, this may be an empty threat. But this is not yet a finished project.

Posted on July 4, 2007 06:49 AM View this article | Comments (0)
Posted to Author: Bruggeman, D. | R&D Funding | Science Policy: General

May 04, 2007

Proxmire alive and well reports Enquirer

There was a minor storm in the science community over the past couple of days as two Republican House members offered amendments (here's one, here's the other) to the NSF authorization bill (H.R. 1867) to strip funding for existing projects.

This kind of debate has been going on for decades, really since the beginning of post-WWII science policy, but it's important to revisit the issue. Should Congress step in for peer-review panels of experts in determining project funding? Maybe. It's an open values question that we are constantly rehashing, and for good reason. Elected politicians should constantly question how the taxpayer's money is spent. That's their job. But should individual Members perhaps read past the title and abstract of a project they object to when speaking on the House floor? Probably.

The latest iteration of this long-running fight is covered well by Jeffery Brainard in a Chronicle of Higher Ed story posted today.

Posted on May 4, 2007 10:31 AM View this article | Comments (0)
Posted to Author: Vranes, K. | Science Policy: General

April 13, 2007

Baby Steps Toward a Science of Science Policy

Two events in February demonstrated an effort to revisit the assumptions behind the processes and study of innovation. The NSF announced aProgram Solicitation in their new program on the Science of Science and Innovation Policy. Submissions are due May 22. This has been in the works at NSF since 2006, and is at least in part a response to the Office of Science and Technology Policy Director John Marburger's call for a 'science of science policy.' This idea was explored previously on Prometheus. Besides the NSF program, there is a Department of Commerce advisory committee I posted about earlier that is working on how to better measure innovation.

I think both programs are good steps toward a better understanding of science policy, but are at best preliminary steps. (Any judgments about a program that has yet to receive its first grant proposals are by their nature preliminary, so please bear with me). I'll address this in just a bit, but first some details on the two programs.

The Advisory Committee on Measuring Innovation in the 21st Century held their first meeting February 22 in Washington, D.C. The agenda, members, and other relevant documents can be found online. The group is focused on business and economic measures, as befits a Department of Commerce work. Much of the meeting was thinking out loud, working out what exactly the committee would develop. After discussion encompassing the different kinds of innovation, as well as the different ways companies measure that innovation, the group came to some preliminary points of consensus:

The committee will develop a group of metrics, the core of which will focus on productivity - total output per unit of total input, not the traditional output per hour measurement.

The committee will examine changes to the system of national accounts - the series of economic statistics gathered by several different agencies.

Measures will cover the different kinds of innovation: user centered, firm focused, incremental, radical, process, product, etc.

The NSF Program Solicitation for the Science of Science and Innovation Policy (SciSIP) Program anticipates granting 20-30 awards in this cycle. Located in the Directorate for Social, Behavioral and Economic Sciences, "SciSIP will underwrite fundamental research that creates new explanatory models and analytic tools designed to inform the nation‚Äôs public and private sectors about the processes through which investments in science and engineering (S&E) research are transformed into social and economic outcomes. SciSIP‚Äôs goals are to understand the contexts, structures and processes of S&E research, to evaluate reliably the tangible and intangible returns from investments in research and development (R&D), and to predict the likely returns from future R&D investments within tolerable margins of error and with attention to the full spectrum of potential consequences."

A tall order, and this solicitation will hopefully be the first of many to really pull all of these pieces together (and support all those innovation scholars casting about for grant money). This iteration of the program focuses on Analytical Tools and Model Building, appropriate first steps for what could be an long-term exploration. There are also two special criteria for proposals: Fit to SciSIP (how the project will add to the fundamental knowledge base and Multidisciplinarity and Interdisciplinarity (encouraged but not required).

The NSF solicitation is, in my opinion, written as though they are trying to build a new body of scholarship. But such a body of knowledge and scholars is out there, and could use a solid aggregation and synthesis. But that's not breakthrough research, and by conventional wisdom not the Foundation's business. The NSF has also been burned (or is at the very least timid) when engaging with policy relevant research (see their workforce estimates from the early nineties). Because of those points, I am concerned that this program won't go as far as it needs to accomplish its ultimate goals: "developing usable knowledge and theories of creative processes and their transformation into social and economic outcomes as well as developing, improving and expanding models and analytical tools that can be applied in the science policy decision making process". (Boldface mine) Research without consideration of policy applications is one thing. But this solicitation states that policy considerations are relevant, and the NSF does not have a history of making those connections very well. How will this play out in grant applications, proposal review and awards? I'm skeptical the NSF, or the researchers applying to it, will be quick to adjust.

Both the NSF and Department of Commerce efforts are good programs that could change the way we consider innovation and policies meant to encourage it (although the implementation of the NSF program could fail to meet its intended goals - its early). But the effort to better understand investments in scientific and technological research goes beyond innovation, even beyond science and technology research. It also involves policy research, and without having that as part of the entire process, we will not have a science of science policy, but more science of innovation. It's unclear that this is being considered. I asked Dr. Marburger what the next steps were in developing the science of science policy, and he referred me to ongoing efforts in Europe. I hope that enterprising institutions and individuals can take the work done here and grow it into a true science of science policy.

Posted on April 13, 2007 07:49 AM View this article | Comments (0)
Posted to Author: Bruggeman, D. | R&D Funding | Science Policy: General

The House Science and Technology Committee - More than Just a Name Change

With a reputation for bipartisan cooperation, the House Science and Technology Committee (formerly the House Science Committee) continues to be a strong supporter of federal research and development. But things have changed with the new Congress. Rep. Bart Gordon (D-TN), the new chair, finalized the changes in late Januray. Rep. Ralph Hall (R-TX) is the new Ranking Member.

Per a press release available on the committee's website the Science and Technology Committee now has 5 subcommittees during the 110th Congress. This is one more than in the previous Congress. The new addition is the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, which is chaired by Rep. Miller (D-N.C.), and Rep. Sensenbrenner (R-WI, and former committee chairman) is the ranking member. They have already held hearings on Office of Management and Budget involvement in agency regulatory development and the influence of agency media policies on scientists. The full committee has already demonstrated its interest in oversight with its own hearings and other activities focused on the executive branch.

The other four committees remain essentially the same as before, with slight name changes to better reflect their jurisdictions. They are as follows:

Subcommittee on Technology & Innovation
Chairman David Wu (D-OR)
Ranking Member Phil Gingrey (R-GA)

Subcommittee on Research & Science Education
Chairman Brian Baird (D-WA)
Ranking Member Vern Ehlers (R-MI)

Subcommittee on Space & Aeronautics
Chairman Mark Udall (D-CO - Boulder)
Ranking Member Ken Calvert (R-CA)

The committee website is still getting its sea legs, so to speak (as are many Congressional websites), so some pages will link to old or outdated information. In fact, the header for the current webpage still reads as though it were the Democratic minority's website from the 109th Congress. A list of current committee members online.

Posted on April 13, 2007 07:46 AM View this article | Comments (0)
Posted to Author: Bruggeman, D. | Science Policy: General | government

February 04, 2007

Implementing Science of Science Policy: Different Approaches

Sparked in part by remarks from the president's science adviser (noted in Prometheus), the National Science Foundation has made some efforts to develop a program addressing the "science of science policy." While not the top priority of the Foundation, and like much of its work, delayed by federal budgetary issues, it doesn't appear to be much more than a research program focused on innovation studies (you can read a program prospectus online. While useful, such studies are arguably only part of what might constitute a "science of science policy"

Something more on point to the initial request (based in a concern for finding out how well the research investment has paid off) has emerged from the Department of Commerce. In early December the Secretary of Commerce formed an advisory panel on measuring innovation (the initial press release, Supplementary Information File, and Charter are available online.

From the Recent Activities webpage of the Economics and Statistics Administration (the panel's home within the Department - even separate from the Technology Administration)

"The Measuring Innovation in the 21st Century Economy Advisory Committee will help develop ways to measure innovation so that the public and policy makers can understand better its impact on economic growth and productivity. The committee will study metrics on effectiveness of innovation in various businesses and sectors, and work to identify which data can be used to develop a broader measure of innovation's impact on the economy."

So the commercial/financial considerations that underly research investments will apparently have a hearing in this panel. Not to say that they couldn't in whatever NSF proposal eventually emerges, but the relevant research community seems a bit allergic to such things. It also brings to the discussion a group many Prometheus readers may not recognize at all (Dale Jorgensen and Donald Siegel are the academics I recognized, and Steve Ballmer and Sam Palmisano were the CEOs I knew).

While advisory panels have their own trials and tribulations (which I observed many times when I worked at the National Academies), I'm encouraged to see other parts of the government enter the discussion.

The Advisory Committee is schedule to hold its first hearing on February 22nd. I'm cautiously optimistic.

Posted on February 4, 2007 09:51 AM View this article | Comments (0)
Posted to Author: Bruggeman, D. | Science Policy: General

January 05, 2007

Lahsen and Nobre (2007)

A Summary, by Myanna Lahsen

Lahsen, Myanna and Carlos A. Nobre (2007), "The Challenge of Connecting International Science and Local Level Sustainability: The Case of the LBA," Environmental Science and Policy 10(1) 62-74. (PDF)

This paper identifies some central challenges involved in bringing about applications-oriented research and associated institutions related to sustainability on the basis of “global change science”, using the Large Scale Biosphere-Atmosphere Experiment in Amazonia (LBA) as an example. The LBA is an integrated regional study carried out by an international science program – indeed, the largest program in international scientific cooperation ever focused on the Amazon region. Over the last decade, the LBA has carried out over 120 studies and contributed quantitative and qualitative understanding of the functioning of tropical ecosystems and their linkages to the Earth System. It has produced over 700 peer-reviewed publications, the vast majority in international science journals. Additionally, LBA has trained hundreds of young scientists, most of them from Amazonia. In this and other ways, it has self-consciously sought to improve past models of “scientific colonialism” involving Northern-funded science experiments in less developed countries which did little, and usually nothing at all, to improve the knowledge and infrastructure in the latter (note: henceforth, “North” and “South” refer to the global North and South unless otherwise specified).

The LBA fell short in other respects, however, in particular in its explicit goal to produce sound scientific understanding in support of sustainable development. Deforestation of the tropical forests of Amazonia has increased to clearly unsustainable levels and at great social and environmental cost. Sustainable management of ecosystems requires appropriate public policies and regulatory frameworks. Yet translating the scientific knowledge created in LBA into public policies has proven to be much more difficult than its planners anticipated. Key to overcoming the obstacles is greater knowledge and capacity to develop and disseminate appropriate technologies and methodologies for sustainable management of the environment. Few developing countries are making substantial investment to develop this capacity. This is of huge consequence as the funding-structures, interests and incentive structures – and even the knowledge base – of developed-country-dominated international scientific efforts are inadequate to meet present challenges. The LBA serves to illustrate this inadequacy.

Aside from merely identifying humans’ environmental impact, the LBA’s mission, as stated in its planning document, was to help safeguard the Amazon’s basic ecological processes. In addition to its scientific capacity building component, the sustainability dimension is the most obvious point where LBA research could bring benefits at the national and local levels. It is also the least developed dimension of the LBA. An independent mid-term review concluded that the program had performed weakly in the area of identifying and developing social, political and economic implications of the findings, especially as concerns sustainable development in the Amazon region.

One may trace part of the root problem to resource disparities between the global North and South at the levels of human and material resources related to knowledge production and mobilization. These disparities complicate the science-policy interface in less developed countries (Lahsen in press; Lahsen forthcoming (a); Lahsen forthcoming (b) and as such can weaken the effectiveness of efforts to assess and combat human-induced climate and associated effects. It also limits the level of participation and input of less developed countries in international scientific programs and policy efforts, allowing Northern nations, and especially the United States, to overwhelmingly dominate the production and framing of science underpinning international environmental negotiations. Studies suggest that this dominance can translate into political gain and that it at times weakens less developed country representatives’ trust and regard for international environmental assessment and negotiation processes (ibid).

Simply modeling science agendas in the South on those in the North would be a mistake to the extent that this would perpetuate the evaluation criteria and incentive structures that result in high quality research, yes, but without the necessary connection to applications at the regional, national and local levels. Had an Amazon-based institution led the LBA from the planning stages on, for instance, this would not have guaranteed that sustainability concerns would have been more central. Brazilian scientists – especially in the richer South of the country but also those in the Amazon – are increasingly hooked into international science and subject to the same incentive structures as their Northern peers.

Ways must be found to link excellence in research more tightly to urgent environmental and societal problems, attending to the perverse effects of presents incentive structures and heeding insights captured in calls for “sustainability science” (Cash, et al., 2003; Clark 2003; Clark and Dickson 2003; National Research Council 1999).

References:

Cash, David W., William C. Clark, Frank Alcock, Nancy M. Dickson, Noelle Eckley, David H. Guston, Jill Jäger and Ronald B. Mitchell (2003), `Knowledge Systems for Sustainable Development,' Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 100, No. 14, 8 July, pp. 8086-8091.

Clark, William C. (2003), Institutional Needs for Sustainability Science link in PDDF

Clark, William C. and Nancy M. Dickson (2003), `Sustainability Science: The Emerging Research Program,' Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 100, No. 14, 8 July, pp. 8059-8061.

Fogel, Catheleen A. (2002), `Greening The Earth With Trees: Science, Storylines And The Construction Of International Climate Change Institutions,' Doctoral Dissertation (Environmental Studies: University of California, Santa Cruz).

Lahsen, Myanna (in press), `Distrust and Participation in International Science and Environmental Decision Making: Knowledge Gaps to Overcome,' in Mary Pettinger (Ed.), The Social Construction of Climate Change (Ashgate Publishing).

Lahsen, Myanna (forthcoming (a), `Knowledge, Democracy and Uneven Playing Fields: Insights from Climate Politics in - and Between - the U.S. and Brazil,' in Nico Stehr (Ed.), Knowledge and Democracy (Transactions Publishers).

Lahsen, Myanna (forthcoming (b), dependent on acceptance of completed revisions). "Science and Brazilian environmental policy: The case of the LBA and carbon sink science" Climatic Change.

Posted on January 5, 2007 01:33 AM View this article | Comments (8)
Posted to Author: Others | Climate Change | Science Policy: General

January 04, 2007

New Publications: Reconciling the Supply of and Demand for Science

Dan Sarewitz, Steve Dovers, and I have guest edited a special issue of Environmental Science & Policy which is titled Reconciling the Supply of and Demand for Science, with a focus on carbon cycle research. The papers in this special issue have just been published, and since each of the papers has an author or co-author here at our Center we are happy to provide links below to the full set of papers in the order that they appear in the special issue. Over coming days and weeks we may prepare focused posts on a few of the papers. Meantime, have a look, feedback appreciated!

Dilling, L., 2007. The opportunities and responsibility for carbon cycle science in the U.S., Environmental Science & Policy, Vol. 10, pp. 1-4. (PDF)

Sarewitz, D. and R. A. Pielke, Jr., 2007. The neglected heart of science policy: reconciling supply of and demand for science, Environmental Science & Policy, Vol. 10, pp. 5-16. (PDF)

McNie, E., 2007. Reconciling the supply of scientific information with user demands: an analysis of the problem and review of the literature, Environmental Science & Policy, Vol. 10, pp. 17-38. (PDF)

Lövbrand, E., 2007. Pure science or policy involvement? Ambiguous boundary-work for Swedish carbon cycle science, Environmental Science & Policy, Vol. 10, pp. 39-47. (PDF)

Dilling, L., 2007. Towards science in support of decision making: characterizing the supply of carbon cycle science, Environmental Science & Policy, Vol. 10, pp. 48-61.(PDF)

Lahsen, M. and C. A. Nobre, 2007. Challenges of connecting international science and local level sustainability efforts: the case of the Large-Scale Biosphere–Atmosphere Experiment in Amazonia, Environmental Science & Policy, Vol. 10, pp. 62-74. (PDF)

Logar, N. J. and R. T. Conant, 2007. Reconciling the supply of and demand for carbon cycle science in the U.S. agricultural sector, Environmental Science & Policy, Vol. 10, pp. 75-84.(PDF)

Posted on January 4, 2007 07:38 AM View this article | Comments (0)
Posted to Climate Change | Science Policy: General

December 15, 2006

The Importance of Evaluation

A story in the New York Times today on the effectiveness of colonoscopy highlights the importance of evaluating the effectiveness of action. One of the biggest areas of study in academic policy research is evaluation, and the federal government has an entire agency that focuses on evaluation in the Government Accountability Office.

But in policy as in medicine – as the colonoscopy case illustrates -- it is amazing how often evaluation of the effectiveness of action is overlooked or simply not done. Evaluation matters because it indicates what is working and what works. In the case of colonoscopy, improved health outcomes are apparently achieved with only a minor change in medical practice.

Posted on December 15, 2006 12:26 AM View this article | Comments (1)
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Health | Science Policy: General

December 14, 2006

New Bridges Article on 110th Congress

The December issue of Bridges is out, and it includes my column, this time on what we might expect on science and technology policy from the 110th Congress.

But do read the whole issue. Bridges is one of the top publications you'll find anywhere on science and technology policy.

Posted on December 14, 2006 11:12 AM View this article | Comments (2)
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | R&D Funding | Science + Politics | Science Policy: General

December 08, 2006

Inside the IPCC's Dead Zone

Climate scientist James Annan has related a tale of angst and suffering as a result of peer reviews that will, in broad terms, sound familiar to most academics. His experience raises a question that I’d like to ask of the folks familiar with the IPCC.

I have no idea what James’ paper is about, except that it argues that very high values of climate sensitivity can be ruled out, which I take it is contrary to the views of some others in the field. This situation leads me to consider several general questions about the IPCC:

How does the IPCC handle information that appears after its deadline for citation of peer-reviewed papers that may contradict literature which appears before that deadline?

Doesn’t this create a potential conflict of interest for contributors to the IPCC who are reviewing papers that appear during the drafting process?

Take hurricanes and climate change for example. Whatever the IPCC reports next March, it certainly won’t be as current as the recent WMO consensus report because the IPCC cannot cite literature that appeared after some point early in 2006, and the WMO can. And I'd bet there will be more studies released between now and march. On hurricanes the IPCC may wind up creating confusion by taking the scientific discussion back to early 2006 when in reality much has happened since. Similarly, its discussion of climate sensitivity and other areas could, in principle, suffer from the same lag effects. Now James’ paper was rejected, and for all I know, correctly. But on highly sensitive topics, I find myself agreeing with the AAAS – trust alone is no longer enough.

Posted on December 8, 2006 09:18 AM View this article | Comments (13)
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Climate Change | Science Policy: General | Scientific Assessments

November 29, 2006

AAAS Report on Standards of Peer Review

The AAAS has released a report motivated by several recent fraudulent papers that have been published in Science. The report suggests tightening the review process for certain types of papers. Here is an excerpt from the report (available here in PDF):

Science (and Nature) have reached a special status. Publication in Science has a significance that goes beyond that of 'normal' publication. Consequently, the value to some authors of publishing in Science, including enhanced reputation, visibility, position or cash rewards, is sufficiently high that some may not adhere to the usual scientific standards in order to achieve publication. Thus, the cachet of publishing in Science can be an incentive not to follow the rules. This problem has a significant impact on all of science, since trust in the system is essential, and since Science and Nature are seen to speak for the best in science. Furthermore, false information in the literature leads to an enormous waste of time and money in an effort to correct and clarify the science.
Science as a journal tries to select papers that will have high impact on both science and society. Some papers will be highly visible and attract considerable attention. Many of these papers purport to be major breakthroughs and claim to change fields in a significant way. However, because the content is so new or startling, it is often more difficult to evaluate the quality or veracity of the work than would be the case for a more conventional paper.

Papers in this class, particularly those that will receive public attention, can influence public policy or contribute to personal or institutional financial gain and thus warrant special scrutiny. In the immediate future, examples will likely come from the areas of climate change, human health, and particular issues in commercial biomedicine and nanotechnology. Progress in science depends on breakthroughs and in taking risks, both in research and in publishing. Nevertheless, it is essential to develop a process by which papers that have the likelihood of attracting attention are examined particularly closely for errors, misrepresentation, deception, or outright fraud. This examination should include especially high standards for providing primary data, a clear understanding of all of the authors' and coauthors’ contributions to the paper and a careful examination of data presented in the papers.

There is a major issue in the report left unaddressed, and this has to do with the following statement– "Science as a journal tries to select papers that will have high impact on both science and society." How does this selection process work? What are the criteria of “high impact”? What is the relationship of political positions taken by the Science editorial staff and the selection of papers for peer review and publication? If greater transparency makes sense for authors, then does greater transparency make sense for editors as well?

Posted on November 29, 2006 10:42 AM View this article | Comments (5)
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science + Politics | Science Policy: General

October 27, 2006

Origin of Phrase --Basic Research--?

I am looking for the earliest reference to the phrase "basic research."

I'll start off the bidding with:

J. Huxley. 1935. Science and Social Needs. Harper & Bros. Publishers, New York.

Posted on October 27, 2006 04:04 PM View this article | Comments (6)
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

October 26, 2006

Conference for Grad Students on Science Policy

Science & Technology in Society:
An International Multidisciplinary Graduate Student Conference

Sponsored by:
The American Association for the Advancement of Science
Arizona State University, Consortium for Science, Policy & Outcomes
George Mason University
The George Washington University
Virginia Tech

When: March 31 - April 1, 2007
Where: American Association for the Advancement of Science, Headquarters,
Washington, DC

Abstract Deadline: January 16, 2007

This annual conference provides a venue for graduate students from Science & Technology Studies, Science & Technology Policy, Environmental Studies/Policy and related fields to present and receive constructive feedback on their research. In developing the agenda for the conference, the organizing committee's primary goal is to create a forum that encourages intellectual exchange between STS, S&T Policy and Environmental Studies/Policy by assembling diverse and exciting panels around similar themes. As such, the committee will accept the strongest proposals on issues relevant to either field, and build the agenda around them. The agenda for last year's conference (www.stglobal.org) provides examples of common themes
and topics that may be covered this year. In addition to presenting papers, students will have the opportunity to interact with each other and prominent scholars and professionals related to their field(s) of interest. Every year we invite prominent figures from both STS and S&T Policy to deliver keynote addresses. Because we draw participants from all over the world, this conference is an excellent opportunity for young scholars aspiring to work in academic, governmental, or non-governmental settings to build both national and international networks for future research and collaborations.

The conference organizing committee welcomes submissions of abstracts (up to 250 words) for a 15-minute presentation. Please submit abstracts and contact information to our website at www.stglobal.org by January 16, 2007. Notification of abstract acceptance will be given by February 7, 2007.

Information concerning area lodging and registration is posted on the conference website. Travel funds are available for a limited number of presenters. Indicate your need for travel funds when submitting your abstract. For further information, either e-mail abstract@stglobal.org or visit the conference website at www.stglobal.org.

Posted on October 26, 2006 11:24 AM View this article | Comments (0)
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

October 12, 2006

Expertise in Biodiversity Governance

Last week I had the opportunity to participate in an excellent workshop on the role of expertise in biodiversity governance. The workshop was an exercise in the design of a new science-policy organization/institution. The workshop was titled "International Science-Policy Interfaces for Biodiversity Governance" and was held at the UFZ Centre for Environmental Research in Leipzig, Germany. At the workshop participants produced a set of consensus recommendations for the role of an institution that would provide expert advice in the international arena of biodiversity policy.

The main motivation for the workshop is a current consultation seeking such recommendations, called IMoSEB, organized by the French government. You can find our workshop recommendations here in PDF, and also below in HTML. Your comments on the recommendations and the more general challenge of exert advice in the area of biodiversity would be welcomed.

Leipzig Workshop Recommendations for a Knowledge-Policy Interface for Biodiversity Governance

4 October 2006

This document contributes to ongoing debates, including the IMoSEB consultation process, seeking to identify the optimal niche and conditions for the creation of an independent and effective international knowledge-policy interface1 for biodiversity governance. A knowledge-policy interface is essential to support more effective biodiversity-related decision making and societal responses to the challenges of achieving sustainable development.

Mandate:

• Synthesize and communicate a knowledge base on biodiversity in support of decision making and implementation
• Bring together and acknowledge diverse understandings, perspectives, and values regarding biodiversity loss and change
• Create a mechanism for dialogue and exchange among holders of diverse knowledge and knowledge systems (i.e., all forms of traditional and modern knowledge and science)
• Foster deeper understanding of the ways in which biodiversity loss and change transcend scales (spatial, temporal, etc.) and jurisdictional boundaries
• Through its activities enhance and improve abilities to collect, exchange and disseminate knowledge and information, and promote actions in favor of better biodiversity management at all levels
Outputs and outcomes:
• Scenarios of human futures and biodiversity loss and change, in relation to poverty, food security, economic growth, water security, conflict, human health, energy, climate change, etc. illuminating policy options, choices, and strategies available to diverse actors
• Periodic assessments of:

o existing biodiversity knowledges, including identification of gaps in existing assessments,
o status and trends on biodiversity,
o strategies and options for response,
o policy effectiveness,
o capacity at all levels of decision making
o biodiversity knowledge-policy interfaces, and
o cross-issue linkages (e.g., poverty, food security, economic growth, water security, conflict, human health, energy, climate change)

• Analyses of the causes of biodiversity loss and change, including key aspects of political economies2, and the necessary elements of societal transformation to redress these causes
• Stock-taking and management of biodiversity knowledge, including for global trends, indicators, and monitoring systems

1 We use the phrase “knowledge-policy interface” to acknowledge that information and expertise relevant to policy must include all forms of knowledge.

2 In this context we understand political economy as the analysis of economic and political dynamics, power structures, regulations, policies and dominant ideologies that affect biodiversity and people’s relation to it.

• Comprehensive outreach and communication strategy in support of dialogue and action
• Identification of knowledge gaps and feedback into research policies and priorities
• Identification of gaps in capacity for linking biodiversity knowledge to action at all levels of decision making and implementation
• Creation and dissemination of tools and methodologies for assessments, analyses, and other means of connecting knowledge and policy

Process:

• Ongoing, dynamic, and independent process that brings together diverse forms of knowledge, expertise, and science
• Ensure that process is legitimate and has appropriate institutional support and authorizing environment
• Establish secure funding stream from multiple sources
• Engage governments, private sector, civil society, scientific community, indigenous communities, international organizations and conventions, etc., in the design and operation of the mechanism
• Networking process that links and builds upon—and does not reinvent or duplicate—diverse existing networks of biodiversity expertise and policy
• Innovating process that identifies and seeks to fill gaps in existing networks of biodiversity expertise and policy
• Catalyze nested networks and activities at national and sub-global (e.g., local, regional, trans-jurisdictional) levels
• Process that ensures interpretation and translation among relevant languages, cultures, and knowledge traditions
• Provide regular opportunities for appropriate internal and external evaluation and review
• Establish small and effective coordinating mechanism (e.g., governing board) that includes appropriate balance and diversity across geography, sectors, stakeholders, expertise, etc.

Questions requiring further reflection

Participants agreed that future consultations will require careful consideration of the following key questions given the reality of trade-offs among democratization of expertise, stakeholder involvement, political legitimacy and accountability, funding mandates, scientific excellence, trust and credibility, etc.:

• What is the appropriate form of funding, institutional framework, and authorization of the mechanism by governments, international conventions, and the United Nations system while maintaining independence?
• What are the appropriate means for developing the network described above?
• How to link the mechanism to the needs of the various international conventions?

Further information

More information on the Leipzig workshop, including a full report is available at http://www.ufz.de/spi-workshop

Posted on October 12, 2006 05:58 AM View this article | Comments (6)
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Biodiversity | Science Policy: General

September 26, 2006

Follow Up on Royal Society Letter

Last week we discussed a letter from the Royal Society to ExxonMobil. The interesting discussion that followed focused on the role of scientists in general and national academies specifically in contested political issues that involve science. The issue continues to devleop. Apparently, according to Benny Peiser, the author of the Royal Society letter to ExxonMobil is no longer employed by the Royal Society. The Royal Soceity has not said anything publicly that I am aware of -- eagle-eyed readers please share what you learn.

David Whitehouse, formerly with the BBC, has shared another letter with Benny Peiser, which Benny included in his CCNet mailing list today. I have reproduced Dr. Whitehouse's letter below which provides an overview and analysis of the events of the past week.

Dear Benny,

I confess to having pulled the occasional media stunt in my time (all in the cause of good journalism of course) to get a story aired but I think that the climate change debate over the past week is a good example of how manipulating the media can result in unexpected consequences for those who hang on to the tail of this particular tiger, and frankly how some people ought to be a bit more accurate when they pontificate to the public.

As far as I can see it went like this:

Tuesday 19th September.

Posted on George Monbiot's website and the Guardian's website
(http://www.monbiot.com/archives/2006/09/19/the-smoke-behind-the-deniers
-fire-3/) was a column which reported that the Royal Society had had enough of those spreading misinformation about climate change. Monbiot adds, "As I reveal on Newsnight (a BBC TV Current Affairs Programme) tonight, the Society has now attempted to strike at the heart of this campaign by sending its first official letter of complaint to a corporation - the oil company Exxon. And yesterday its president, Lord Rees, sent the Telegraph what must be one of the most damning letters it has ever received."

However, Monbiot's polemic did not air on Newsnight on Tuesday but went out on Wednesday instead. Personally, I thought it was sloppy and lacked intellectual rigour. It was what is termed an "authored" piece which means it is a personal view and not dictated by the BBC's standards of fairness and impartiality. Nethertheless, Exxon's request to have a similar time to put its case was turned down by Newsnight. Monbiot's piece included a brief interview with Bob Ward, filmed at the Royal Society. It was followed by a fruitless discussion hosted by Jeremy Paxman between a scientist and a representative of a US lobby group. The most memorable thing about it was Paxman's repeatedly telling the American chap that "you are not a
scientist." I was rather disappointed not to see an interview with Lord Rees about his letter to the Telegraph.

Oh, by the way, Monbiot has a book to plug, "Heat - How to Stop the Planet Burning." (I think the title is all I need to know but I will read it.)

Now I wonder if the fact that Monbiot's Newsnight rant was a day later than he said it would be upset the choreography of this story's emergence?

Wednesday 20th September.

The front page of the Guardian carried details of the now infamous letter by Bob Ward (Senior Manager, Policy Communication, Royal Society) referred to in Monbiot's column which was sent to Exxon on 4th September. The Guardian Science Podcast available later described this story as an 'exclusive!' On the front page the Guardian mentioned no qualms about the ethics of the Royal Society's actions.

On the BBC Today radio programme that morning there was a discussion about GM technology that involved Lord May, former Chief Scientific Advisor to H.M. Government and past President of the Royal Society. After this debate the presenter asked him about the Guardian story. To my mind Lord May's response was extraordinary and demonstrated the problem in the debate. I wasn't impressed by his accuracy.

Lord May said that in 2005 the science academies of the G8 nations plus India, China and Brazil said that the "basic facts of climate change are certain." Actually they did no such thing. As Bob Ward pointed out in his letter to Exxon what the G8+ actually said was "it is likely that most of the warming in recent decades can be attributed to human activities." To my mind the words "likely" and "most" do not equate with certainty. Lord May went on to chastise those who "misrepresent the certainties of science" presumably unaware that he had done exactly that! [For reference the IPCC say the same thing - "most of the global warming over the past 50 years is likely due to the increase in greenhouse gases - note the key words "most" and "likely."]

Lord May went on to say that the fact that "humans are changing the climate" is as certain as gravitation or evolution. I find this statement surprising even though it is an obvious one as it is recognised by all that humans are changing the climate - what is in debate is the question is the magnitude of the change. Then a spokesman for Exxon, Nick Thomas (Director Public Affairs Exxon) was brought into the discussion who stated Exxon's position which, to my mind, sounded like a fair summary of the G8+ position and the IPCC position (we agree that the word is warming, that CO2 concentrations are increasing, that glaciers are shrinking and that CO2 emissions are certainly one of the contributors to climate change, we recognise man's activities are responsible for climate change.) This statement didn't quite go as far as many would wish but, given the uncertainties in the science, it was OK, I thought.

But Lord May was unconvinced. He maintained that this contradicted the US National Academy of Sciences and that what he had heard from Nick Thomas was a "misrepresentation of the facts." Having listened to the exchange several times I have to say I think Lord May is wrong about that.

The Guardian story aired on BBC News TV throughout the day (Wednesday 20th) pretty much in the form that the Guardian had used, i.e. the Royal Society - upholder of the consensus - had had enough of lies and misinformation spread by the likes of a big bad energy company like Exxon. There the story would perhaps have lain except for the next edition of the BBC's Today radio programme.

Thursday 21st September.

The Today programme asked if the Royal Society was right to police the scientific consensus this way. Bob Ward defended his actions. You can read the transcript of that discussion in a recent CCNet.

Later.

The coverage thereafter was different, as those who have read CCNet in recent days have seen. Dominic Lawson writing in the Independent on the 22nd wondered if the release of the Royal Society's letter on the 20th was anything to do with Monbiot's book?

Heaven forfend, Bob Ward wrote in a letter to the Independent on the 25th in which he says, "I can absolutely refute Lawson's laughable suggestion that it (presumable the letter) was part of a campaign to promote George Monbiot's new book."

I think this is another example of the sleight of hand that Bob Ward employed in his letter to Exxon. Even if the initial impetus for the letter had nothing to do with Monbiot, it is surely stretching belief beyond credulity that its appearance on the front page of the Guardian at the same time as Monbiot's column and Newsnight piece was unrelated!

So what was achieved?

Bob Ward made the big mistake of writing such a letter to Exxon in completely the wrong way, allowing it to be made public and becoming the topic of discussion. When a senior manager of policy communication becomes the story and not the policy itself, it is, as Alistair Campbell discovered, not a good thing. The Royal Society looks bad having tried to enforce a consensus even though, as many have pointed out, they must have been aware of the role of consensus in science. It also looks bad having sent such disgraceful (and counterproductive) letters to journalists. We also learnt that even those authorities who have scaled the august heights of science and are laden with honours are not immune to being sloppy with the facts and with a false impression of the "certainties of science."

But perhaps the cause of science has been advanced during this week for it has forced a discussion and appraisal of how so-called sceptics are being treated in this important debate and steered the global warming debate towards a scientific course and away from the rocky shoals of you are either for us or against us. It has made many examine the role of the Royal Society in scientific debate and public relations and, perhaps most importantly, once again we have been reminded that as far a science is concerned being an authority, individual or corporate, ultimately means little.

Also Monbiot does have some words of wisdom one can take away from this mess: "Be wary of self-appointed experts." Exactly.

David Whitehouse

Posted on September 26, 2006 07:21 AM View this article | Comments (25)
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

September 25, 2006

Interview and Podcast

"Are you a climate skeptic?"

This is how the Daily Camera, our local Boulder paper, opened an interview with me, parts of which appeared in today's paper. You can hear my answer to this question, and many better questions (but maybe not better answers;-), in a 20 minute podcast of the entire interview, available here (mp3). The reporter, Todd Neff, did a nice job. He was quite familar with some of the recent discussions on Prometheus and his questions in the interview reflected that.

Posted on September 25, 2006 01:44 AM View this article | Comments (2)
Posted to Science Policy: General

August 29, 2006

Revisiting an Old Steve Schneider Quote

All of this discussion of ends-means reminds me of an inscrutable quote from Stanford's Steve Schneider:

On the one hand, as scientists we are ethically bound to the scientific method, in effect promising to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but – which means that we must include all the doubts, the caveats, the ifs, ands, and buts. On the other hand, we are not just scientists but human beings as well. And like most people we’d like to see the world a better place, which in this context translates into our working to reduce the risk of potentially disastrous climatic change. To do that we need to get some broadbased support, to capture the public’s imagination. That, of course, entails getting loads of media coverage. So we have to offer up scary scenarios, make simplified, dramatic statements, and make little mention of any doubts we might have. This "double ethical bind" we frequently find ourselves in cannot be solved by any formula. Each of us has to decide what the right balance is between being effective and being honest. I hope that means being both.
Schell, J. 1989. Our fragile earth, Discover 10:44-50.

For some people this quote has been interpreted as providing a green light for making bad policy arguments (in Schneider's terms not being "honest") in support of desired political ends (in Schneider's language being "effective"). Others have pointed to the last sentence and emphasized Schneider's personal hope for honesty and effectiveness to coexist. In my view the quote is underdetermined, and thus it makes little sense to try to adjudicate these differnt perspectvies.

For my part the action is in fact in the second-to-last sentence -- "Each of us has to decide what the right balance is between being effective and being honest." By acknowledging a balance between effectiveness and honesty, Schneider clearly recognized that his hope for honesty and effectiveness to happily coexist would in reality not always be the case, and trade-offs would have to be made. This is the nature of Schneider's "double ethical bind" - how to balance means or ends when both cannot be championed at once? Schneider says that resolving this bind is a personal decision for each scientist.

In large part, my recent posts on ends-means address this exact same "double ethical bind" between ends and means. It is my perception that in contemporary science policy -- including but not limited to climate policy -- many scientist have decided to resolve the double ethical bind in favor of championing ends over means. Given that science deals with means and not ends, if my perception bears anything close to an accurate assessment of the current state of science in politics, then it would seem of concern to the sustainability of the scientific enterprise. The thoughtful and respectful exchanges with a few leading scientists in the comments of relevant posts here have not changed my perceptions.

Posted on August 29, 2006 10:06 PM View this article | Comments (24)
Posted to Science Policy: General

August 25, 2006

Pop Quiz

Some friday fun:

The follow quote refers to what:

"I guess this is just people holding the correct [political] opinion for the wrong [science/intelligence] reasons and let's accept it with gratitude."

A. Dick Cheney commenting upon learning that a majority of Americans believe that 9/11 is related to Saddam Hussein and Iraq.

B. A commentator at Real Climate upon learning that a majority of Americans believe that the Katrina disaster was caused by global warming.

Hey what is a little public misunderstanding of policy arguments so long as it helps your political agenda?! ;-)

Posted on August 25, 2006 09:21 AM View this article | Comments (37)
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

August 24, 2006

Scientific Advice at NASA

The recent resignation of three scientists on the NASA Advisory Panel raises some interesting questions about the nature of advice versus decision making and the interests of those providing the advice in the outcomes of the decisions by those receiving their input. Science magazine makes this all a bit more concrete with some of the details of the brouhaha:

NASA Administrator Michael Griffin yesterday read the riot act to the outside scientists who advise him, accusing them of thinking more of themselves and their research than of the agency's mission. Griffin's harsh comments come on the heels of the resignation of three distinguished scientists from the NASA Advisory Council (NAC), two of whom have questioned Griffin's plan to dramatically scale back a host of science projects (Science, 12 May, p. 824). "The scientific community ... expects to have far too large a role in prescribing what work NASA should do," Griffin wrote council members in a blistering 21 August message. "By 'effectiveness,' what the scientific community really means is 'the extent to which we are able to get NASA to do what we want to do. "
The outside engineers, scientists, and educators on the council traditionally offer advice on the agency's policies, budget, and projects. Placed in limbo for nearly a year after Griffin took over as NASA chief in spring 2005, the NAC was reorganized this spring under the leadership of geologist Harrison Schmitt, a former U.S. senator and Apollo astronaut who is gung ho about President George W. Bush's plans to send humans back to the moon and to Mars. Schmitt replaced Charles Kennel, director of the Scripps Institution of Oceanography in San Diego, California, who resigned last week from his post as chair of the council's science committee. Two other NAC members--former NASA space science chief Wesley Huntress and Rice University Provost Eugene Levy--resigned last week in response to a direct request from Griffin that they step down.

Schmitt and members of that committee have clashed repeatedly in recent months over the role of science at the space agency. In a pointed 24 July memo to science committee members, Schmitt complained that they lacked "willingness to provide the best advice possible to Mike," refused to back Griffin's decision to cut research funds for astrobiology or recommend an alternative cut, and resisted considering the science component of future human missions to the moon. "Some members of the committee," he concluded, "are not willing to offer positive assistance to Mike."

Both Levy, a physicist, and Huntress, an astrochemist now at the Carnegie Institution of Washington, say they support human space exploration but fear that science is now taking a back seat after years of a careful balance between human and robotic efforts. NASA spokesman Dean Acosta acknowledged that the scientists and Schmitt "weren't working well together," and that Griffin telephoned Huntress and Levy last week to ask for their resignations. Griffin's memo points to what he calls "the inherent and long-standing conflict-of-interest" by scientists giving advice to an agency on which they depend for funding. And he gives them a clear way out. "The most appropriate recourse for NAC members who believe the NASA program should be something other than what it is, is to resign."

Huntress says Griffin told him that his advice exceeded the council's charge. "This is a different NAC. Our advice was simply not required nor desired," Huntress told Science. The current council, he adds, "has no understanding or patience for the science community process." Kennel, who had been named chair of the NAC's science committee, was unavailable for comment, but Norine Noonan, a former NAC member and dean of math and science at South Carolina's College of Charleston, called Griffin's action "very distressing" for scientists. "If we can't have a robust debate at the NAC level," she says, "then where in the heck is it supposed to happen?"

Posted on August 24, 2006 07:23 AM View this article | Comments (7)
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General | Space Policy

August 23, 2006

Dan Sarewitz on Research Questions for Science of Science Policy

Anything Dan Sarewitz writes is worth reading. Here (PDF) is a short essay he prepared for a recent NSF workshop on the "Science of Science Policy" in which he discusses what such a research agenda might look like. Here is an excerpt:

1. We need a conceptual framework, perhaps analogous to "national innovation systems," that can help put some boundaries around, and illuminate structure and dynamics within, the complex institutional setting for knowledge creation and use aimed at goals other than wealth creation.
2. Given that public investments in research are usually justified in terms of particular, desirable outcomes, we need to develop generalized approaches for systems-based institutional analysis and mapping that would allow such justifications to be contextualized and tested simply for plausibility. (For example, we might want to test the idea that more fundamental knowledge about the climate system is important for catalyzing a global technological shift to a decarbonized energy system.)

3. As Toulmin realized 40 years ago, science policy discourse often focuses on trade-offs between various scientific fields, rather than between science and other approaches to a particular social need or goal. Because we don’t understand research institutions ecologically, we still lack a decent analytical basis for understanding the role of research within a broad portfolio of potential policy interventions aimed at some goal. Mapping institutional ecologies of knowledge creation, use, and value could provide a foundation for developing new decision tools that allow policy makers to confront fundamental questions, such as: When is "more research" the right prescription? When is it unlikely to make a difference? What other factors are necessary for it to make a difference? When would a different intervention offer a more efficient or plausible route to a desired outcome? (For example, California voters might have benefited from a discussion of the variety of ways that the $5 billion allocated for CIRM might be applied to improving public health in the state.)

4. We do know that "institutions that do research" are embedded in different ways in broader institutional ecologies. In particular, certain types of research settings—e.g., agriculture; private sector software development; clinical medicine—have been identified as sites where feedback between knowledge creation and use is supposed to be strong. We need many, many more institutional case studies to help map out the variety of designs that are available, and to develop comparative frameworks and metrics based on the relations among institutional design, and knowledge creation, use, and value.

5. And of course we also need to reflect on where our own efforts fit in. "Bring back OTA" is not an adequate prescription. What are the loci of decision making where better understanding of, and discussion about, the institutional ecology of knowledge creation, use and value might make a difference? What types of insights, tools and products might decision makers find useful? This workshop strikes me as a huge opportunity to begin to enhance the public value of science policy and science studies research, but we need to start, needless to say, by attending to the institutional ecologies within which we now operate.

Posted on August 23, 2006 07:31 AM View this article | Comments (0)
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

August 14, 2006

If “Science of Science Policy” is the answer, then what is the question?

In June, the Bush Administration issued guidance (PDF) for R&D in the FY 2008 federal budget, observing,

The combination of finite resources, the commitment to the American Competitiveness Initiative, and a multitude of new research opportunities requires careful attention to funding priorities and wise choices by agency managers.

OK, then, what does it mean for people who make decisions about science funding to make “wise choices”? The memo continues, explaining that “wise choices” refers to R&D programs that advance national goals through agency missions and priorities. In other words, R&D investments are a means to other ends:

As has been reiterated previously in these annual memos, agencies must rigorously evaluate existing programs and, wherever possible, consider them for modification, redirection, reduction or termination, in keeping with national needs and priorities. They must justify new programs with rigorous analysis demonstrating their merit, quality, importance and consistency with national priorities. Agencies may propose new, high-priority activities, but these requests should identify potential offsets by elimination or reductions in less effective or lower priority programs or programs where Federal involvement is no longer needed or appropriate.
In general, the Administration favors Federal R&D investments that:

• advance fundamental scientific discovery to improve future quality of life;
• support high-leverage basic research to spur technological innovation, economic competitiveness and new job growth;
• align with the efforts of the Academic Competitiveness Council and the National Math Panel to enable superior performance in science, mathematics and engineering education;
• enable potentially high-payoff activities that require a Federal presence to attain long-term national goals, including national security, energy security, and a next generation air transportation system;
• sustain specifically authorized agency missions and support the missions of other agencies through stewardship of user facilities;
• enhance the health of our Nation’s people to reduce the burden of illness and increase productivity;
• ensure a scientifically literate population and a supply of qualified technical personnel commensurate with national need;
• strengthen our ability to understand and respond to global environmental issues and natural disasters through better observation, data, analysis, models, and basic and social science research;
• maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of the science and technology (S&T) enterprise through expansion of competitive, merit-based peer-review processes and phase-out of programs that are only marginally productive or are not important to an agency’s mission; and
• encourage interdisciplinary research efforts that foster advancement, collaboration and innovation on complex scientific frontiers and strengthen international partnerships that accelerate the progress of science across borders.

That is all fine and good, but how does a decision maker looking at alternative possible research portfolios determine if choosing one possible approach represents a “wiser” approach than another possible approach? The Administration memo answers this question by highlighting the importance of a “new science of science policy”:

Determining the effectiveness of Federal science policy requires an understanding of the complex linkages between R&D investments and economic and other variables that lead to innovation, competitiveness, and societal benefits. An interagency process has been established and is now encouraged to promote and coordinate individual agency and collaborative actions needed to develop “new science of science policy” for better assessing the impact of R&D investments, defining appropriate metrics for measuring this impact, understanding the effect of the globalization of science and technology, and improving the basis for national science policy decisions.

The question to be addressed by a “science of science policy” is thus:

What choices do we have in comprising R&D portfolios (from the national - or even international - aggregate to that of the individual program manager in a particular agency, company, or other organization) and what are the expected societal (and more parochial) outcomes associated with each alternative?

Posted on August 14, 2006 10:35 AM View this article | Comments (3)
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

June 27, 2006

The Is-Ought Problem

Al Gore obviously hasn't read Andrew Dessler's book:

. . . if you accept the truth of what the scientific community is saying, it gives you a moral imperative to start to rein in the 70 million tons of global warming pollution that human civilization is putting into the atmosphere every day.

This is a fine example of the is-ought problem described by philospoher David Hume. ASU's Brad Allenby has explained why we should care about the is-ought problem in science:

. . . the elite that has been created by practice of the scientific method uses the concomitant power not just to express the results of particular research initiatives, but to create, support, and implement policy responses affecting many non-scientific communities and intellectual domains in myriad ways. In doing so, they are not exercising expertise in these non-scientific domains, but rather transforming their privilege in the scientific domains into authority in non-scientific domains.

Posted on June 27, 2006 03:55 PM View this article | Comments (11)
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Climate Change | Science Policy: General

June 15, 2006

Oversight Exemptions for NOAA?

Yesterday the House Science Committee, while passing an act formally codifying the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration into law (President Nixon created the agency via Executive Order), dealt with amendments over scientific integrity.

According to CQ.com, Rep. Brad Miller (D-NC) offered an amendment providing whistleblower protection for scientists and punishment for employees who tampered with science. The amendment would have also exempted NOAA from the Information Quality Act - legislation that allows the public to petition the government over flawed data. Another amendment, by Rep. Costello (D-IL) would have barred the White House from editing reports prior to submitting them to Congress.

Both amendments failed. Chairman Boehlert released a statement addressing his opposition to the amendments, which can be found here. He argues that the amendments would have prompted some difficult jurisdicitional scrambles (mainly with the Government Reform Committee and the Resources Committee - which also has NOAA oversight). He also argues, I think convincingly, that the amendment is written somewhat broadly, and placed in a bill related to an agency that is not, in the eyes of many, a particularly egregious offender in the debates over political interference in science.

While I understand the sentiments behind the amendments, I'm not in favor of potentially sabotaging legislation that is necessary. A large government agency without formal statutory authority? That needs to be addressed. And adding arguably tangential amendments makes it harder to pass such legislation. A desire for better science should not trump the need for good law.

Posted on June 15, 2006 10:10 PM View this article | Comments (5)
Posted to Author: Bruggeman, D. | Science Policy: General

June 08, 2006

Confusion on Science Censorship in US Federal Agencies

There may be a good explanation, but Warren Washington has expressed apparently conflicting views on science censorship in U.S. federal agencies. In today’s Rocky Mountain News Warren Washington, outgoing chairman of the National Science Board (which oversees the National Science Foundation), is quoted as follows:

The American public is not hearing the full story on global warming because Bush administration officials are muzzling government scientists, a top climate researcher said Wednesday.
Warren Washington, a senior scientist at the National Center for Atmospheric Research in Boulder, said that Bush appointees are suppressing information about climate change, restricting journalists' access to federal scientists and rewriting agency news releases to stress global warming uncertainties.

"The news media is not getting the full story, especially from government scientists," Washington told about 160 people attending the first day of "Climate Change and the Future of the American West," a three-day conference sponsored by the University of Colorado's Natural Resources Law Center. . .

Washington said in an interview that the climate cover-up is occurring at several federal agencies, including NASA, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the U.S. Forest Service. NOAA operates several Boulder laboratories that conduct climate and weather research.

I was in attendance at the workshop and heard Dr. Washington’s allegations. But unless he has some new information (which he might), but has not released, it is difficult to square these allegations with a recent report of the NSB on this issue. A report (available here in PDF, relevant section begins at p. 6) which was chaired by Dr. Washington found no evidence of suppression. Here is an excerpt:

. . . the Board has reviewed statutes, regulations, agency statements and internal documents related to this issue for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), and the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Energy (DOE), and Health and Human Services (HHS). In addition, the Board requested that the Inspector General (IG) of the National Science Foundation (NSF) poll her counterparts at these agencies for additional relevant information.
The Board would like to acknowledge and thank EPA, NASA, NIH, NOAA, USGS, USDA, and DOE for their responses to our request for information. . .

The survey of the agencies’ IGs indicated that no reports were issued to indicate scientific information was suppressed or distorted at the agencies involved with the Board’s review.

It may be that while there are no formal reports from within various agencies, suppression is nonetheless ongoing. However, I would hope that Dr. Washington would provide the evidence of such continuing suppression if he has it. Otherwise, the allegations of suppression risk undermining the credibility of countless hard-working government scientists and their agencies. As a NOAA spokesman said,

Jordan St. John, a NOAA spokesman, said the allegations against his agency are false.
"NOAA is an open and transparent agency," he said. "It's unfair to the people who work at this agency that this kind of characterization keeps being made. Hansen said it once, and it took on a life of its own and just keeps getting repeated."

But Washington insisted that government officials are "trying to confuse the public" about climate change and the scientific consensus that global warming is a real problem.

The only way to reconcile these different points of view is with data. Without data that suppression continues (beyond the well documented cases of Jim Hansen and the NOAA hurricane press release) it is hard to know what is being referred to. If I see Warren today at the conference, I’ll ask him. The NSB does offer a number of useful recommendations, which I provide here in full:

RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on our analysis, we offer the following recommendations:

• A Government-wide directive should be issued by the Administration that provides overarching principles and clearly articulates the requirement for all agencies to develop unambiguous policies and procedures to encourage open exchange of data and results of research conducted by agency scientists, while preventing the intentional or unintentional suppression or distortion of research findings and accommodating appropriate agency review. A developed set of principles should also state the concomitant responsibility of agency employees regarding the advocacy of public policy that might be implied by their research.

• Agency-wide policies covering the public disclosure of an agency’s research results should be issued and uniformly applied, widely communicated, and readily accessible to all employees and the general public. Like those recently released by NASA, these policies should unambiguously describe what is and is not permitted or recommended. Responsibilities for communicating research results by researchers, public affairs officers, policy makers, and other agency employees should be clearly described. A clear distinction should be made between communicating professional research results and data versus the interpretation of data and results in a context that seeks to influence, through the injection of personal viewpoints, public opinion or formulation of public policy.

• An objective dispute resolution mechanism for disagreements involving the public dissemination of agency research findings should be implemented. This will help ensure the public has access to the research and that scientific findings presented are credible and of the highest quality.

• A Government-wide review should be established to ensure that implementation of these recommendations is conducted in a manner that meets the high standards expected and is consistent across agencies.

From where I sit these make good sense, however, I will point out that this aspiration will forever be problematic: “A clear distinction should be made between communicating professional research results and data versus the interpretation of data and results in a context that seeks to influence, through the injection of personal viewpoints, public opinion or formulation of public policy.”

Posted on June 8, 2006 07:15 AM View this article | Comments (3)
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

May 27, 2006

Playground! After School!

Does Science really need to devote letter space to content-free testosterone-laden exchanges that involve no science or science policy?

Donald Kennedy's Editorial "The new gag rules" (17 Feb., p. 917) was quite disturbing. I was offended, not by the unfounded allegations of conspiracy at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), but by the Editorial's reckless disregard for the truth.
Dean Acosta, NASA

His letter is short on facts but rich in rhetoric, presumably to support his central point: that public affairs types need to collaborate with scientists because the latter can't write well.
Donald Kennedy, Science

Posted on May 27, 2006 09:31 AM View this article | Comments (1)
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

Appropriate Advocacy by a Science Association

We have at times here at Prometheus taken issue with scientific organizations that take advocacy positions on certain issues. Today we’d like to highlight a situation where the American Association for the Advancement of Science is engaging in advocacy quite appropriate to its mission and expertise – from its press release:

AAAS, the world’s largest general science society, is urging a British teachers association to withdraw a motion calling on its members to boycott Israeli scholars and academic institutions that do not publicly declare their opposition to Israel’s policies in the territories.
The boycott proposal is scheduled for consideration during the 27-29 May annual conference of the National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education, the largest trade union and professional association for lecturers, researchers and others working in higher education and adult education in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. A vote is expected Monday.

What is the difference between the AAAS advocating for a withdrawal of the British teachers association boycott and, say, our previous criticisms of national science academies arguing for certain climate policies? There are three differences:

1. The boycott is a matter of “policy for science”. As the AAAS observes in its statement,

Free scientific inquiry and associated international collaborations should not be compromised in order to advance a political agenda unrelated to scientific and scholarly matters.

The governance of the scientific enterprise is squarely within the expertise and mission of the AAAS.

2. The statement from the science academies on climate change that I referred to went well beyond issues of the governance of science into issues of the governance of the economy, and even more broadly, the governance of global society. Science, and the expertise contained within science academies, which is a subset of expertise and opinion of relevance to climate change, is not a sufficient basis for arguing one course of action over another on climate change.

3. Climate change does not need more advocacy, but more options. When science academies engage in advocacy they eschew the role of honest brokers of policy options – a role that is sorely needed on climate policy because just about everyone n the skeptic-mainstream debate has decided to take sides rather than work toward creating new options that might break down opposition. In the case of the boycott the AAAS is very clear about its value commitments and the basis for its advocacy. It is not claiming that its position is grounded in science and suggests that its perspective is that of a special interest – that of an association interested on the advancement of science. This is entirely appropriate.

Good for the AAAS!

PS. This is my first blog posting from an airplane. Pretty damn cool.

Posted on May 27, 2006 08:43 AM View this article | Comments (0)
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

May 24, 2006

Juice or No Juice? Who Decides?

With Barry Bonds under the specter of steroids allegations on the brink of passing Babe Ruth in home runs, on another subject of sports and technology Arthur Caplan has a thought-provoking op-ed in the San Jose Mercury News about a new effort to classify sleeping in oxygen tents as a doping violation. He writes:

Should the bureaucrats who set the rules for the use of performance-enhancing drugs in sports extend their critical eye to where athletes are allowed to sleep? This past weekend in Montreal, the bureaucrats, otherwise known as the World Anti-Doping Association, indicated that they are going to try to do exactly that. Bad idea. . .
Many athletes in amateur endurance sports such as skiing, running and cycling use altitude tents. These tents simulate thin mountain air. By sleeping in them, athletes who live at sea-level can get the benefits enjoyed by those who live in mountainous areas. Mountain air has less oxygen, so the body makes more red blood cells to compensate. Those extra red blood cells can provide a slight boost if you are running a marathon or skiing cross-country for 15 miles. That is one of the reasons the U.S. Olympic training facility is located in the Rocky Mountains at Colorado Springs, Colo.

So why is WADA worried about tents? There seems to be one main reason -- sleeping in a tent is a passive activity producing benefits that athletes do not "earn" or "merit." The idea that athletes ought to train to gain improvements in performance, not just lie snoozing in an artificial environment while their bodies make more red blood cells, is at the core of WADA's concern. WADA is worrying about tents not for reasons of safety or even fairness but on ethical grounds -- athletes should strive, not snooze, to succeed.

Linking the virtues to athletic success has some appeal. But when WADA uses a moral view of what makes sport worthwhile it is imposing a set of values rather than reflecting what athletes or the public want. Moreover, drawing a line at high-altitude tents is a boundary that cannot hold.

It is not possible to know who is sleeping in a tent unless WADA officials are prepared to get a lot more up close and personal with athletes than they are likely to tolerate. And if you ban altitude tents, are saunas, steam rooms, massages, ankle wraps and vitamins soon to follow?

Modern athletes long ago brought technology into their lives, and WADA holding its breath and pouting about those who are lazing around in altitude tents will not change that fact. We need to keep an eye on technology and its impact on sports. WADA has, however, nodded off at the switch with its threat to ban sleeping in altitude tents.

It would be a meaningless exhortation to say that athletics should be “pure,” and an unregulated playing field seems undesirable. How then should decisions be made about the role of science and technology in athletic achievements? Should some S&T sport policies be made democratically by government institutions, e.g., such as those focused on the Olympics or NCAA? Or should sport be a private affair internally policed, leaving open the possibility of competing professional sport leagues – the JMLB (Juiced- MLB) vs. the JFMLB (Juice-Free MLB)? (Though there is that anti-trust thing.)

I’m not sure what I’d recommend on where and how to draw lines in sport, but it does seem clear that the processed used to make decisions about S&T in sport are at least as important as the outcomes that result from such processes.

Posted on May 24, 2006 03:24 AM View this article | Comments (5)
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

May 19, 2006

Tinkering at the edges of NSF (again)

I got two interesting emails from a high-traffic list I'm on. I'm not going to identify the list or the email authors, but the list includes lots of beltway and former beltway types that also have connections to science. First, parts of the emails, then some scintillating science policy discussion.

email 1:

Your help is needed in stopping an amendment that Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX) is planning to offer TODAY that would direct the National Science Foundation (NSF) to make "physical science, technology, engineering and mathematics" priorities in its funding decisions.

In addition to being unprecedented Congressional interference into NSF functions that have for more than 50 years been set by scientists, the amendment would de facto set low priority for BIOLOGICAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, and SOCIAL SCIENCES, as well as SCIENCE EDUCATION PROGRAMS. If adopted, this amendment could limit funding for these important fields.
The amendment is to be offered on Thursday May 18 during the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation's mark up of S. 2802 the "American Innovation and Competitiveness Act of 2006." A "mark-up" is when the committee considers amendments to legislation prior to sending a measure to the full Senate for a vote.

We urge you to contact your Senator's office right away (see below) and ask that your Senator oppose the Hutchison amendment and instead support an amendment from Senator Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ), which would remove the section about priority-setting at NSF from the bill. Lautenberg's amendment would be a positive change as it would allow the NSF the greatest latitude in making sound investments in fundamental research.

email 2:

I'm happy to report that this situation has improved.
In an attempt to increase America's economic competitiveness, Sen. Kay
Bailey Hutchinson (R-Tex.) originally proposed an amendment to Senate
Bill 2802 that would require NSF to give priority to research in the
physical sciences, engineering and mathematics. However, before
yesterday's markup, Senators Hutchinson and Lautenberg reached a
compromise. The final language encourages NSF to give priority to
research that contributes to innovation and competitiveness, but
recognizes that NSF should not be restricted from funding other areas of
research.

AAAS wrote to the members of the Senate Commerce, Science, and
Transportation Committee to urge the committee to "support peer-reviewed
research across the broad spectrum of disciplines as currently
administered by the National Science Foundation and other agencies."
More information, and the text of the letter, is at http://www.aaas.org/news/releases/2006/0518letter.shtml.

What's it all mean? First, let's dispense with the cry from the first email that this is "unprecedented Congressional interference into NSF functions that have for more than 50 years been set by scientists" because that's garbage. Let's not forget who created NSF (Congress), who reauthorizes NSF and makes appropriations for NSF (Congress), who must approve the top brass of NSF (the Senate), and who has tinkered at the edges of NSF since it's very start (Congress). If you don't believe that Congresspeople have been nibbling at NSF for a long time, you might start with a google search for "Senate Proxmire."

The item of actual interest here, however, is how we might read Sen. Hutchinson's intentions. The cynical would argue that she simply doesn't want the U.S. gov to fund social science research, especially when it's culturally messy or otherwise conflicts with her values. There is likely a strong component of that, but the arguments she put forth in a May 2 hearing and the actual language she agreed to in the compromise amendment, tell a different story. The Hutchinson/Lautenberg compromise "language encourages NSF to give priority to research that contributes to innovation and competitiveness." Interestingly, this compromise does two things:

1- brings Sen. Lautenberg into the fold of attempting to focus NSF on results, which was in part Hutchinson's priority (Sen. Lautenberg started by trying to derail the Hutchinson amdt outright without an alternative, as far as I know)

2- brings Sen. Hutchinson away from diminishing social science research for its own sake and pushes her toward a proactive (for results) focus rather than one reactive (against social science research)

Interestingly, the compromise amendment contradicts the comments of another strong conservative at the May-2 hearing, Sen. Sununu (R-NH):

Sununu added that “if you can identify an economic benefit [for research] you shouldn’t be funding it, that’s what we have a venture capital community for.”

If NSF tries to read both messages at once, the only conclusion it can reach is, "They want us to be useful and prioritize research that will have economic benefits, but if we can identify what those benefits might be [which, logically, they'd have to do to be effective under the Hutchinson/Lautenberg amendment] then we shouldn't be funding the research."

Curious. What's a poor NSF-thing to do?

The heart of the matter, it seems to me, is whether the government should only fund activities which clearly pay economic benefits, or whether the Fed should also be in the business of funding the interesting research that nobody else will fund (e.g., do wives or husbands initiate divorce more often?). Unfortunately for NSF, at the May-2 hearing Director Bement couldn't come up with a strong justification for continued social science research, other than "[Social sciences] compress the lead time from discovery to application." With an answer like that, I'm not surprised Sen. Hutchinson feels that social science research "burdens" NSF from focusing on what might be more useful.

[NOTE: cross-posted here.]

Posted on May 19, 2006 11:35 AM View this article | Comments (3) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Vranes, K. | Science Policy: General

May 12, 2006

Science Studies: Cheerleader, Marketer, or Critic?

A former colleague of mine used to say that social scientists were the equivalent of "lap dogs" for the broader scientific community.

By that, he meant that social scientists were around to entertain, look good, but nothing more. My experiences suggest that there is some element of truth in his description of the relationship of science studies with the broader scientific community, especially in those situations where the funding of the science studies scholars depends upon the largesse of the broader scientific community that they are working with. It is a difficult issue because one of the lessons from science studies research is the need for a close relationship with stakeholders, which for many science studies scholars are the scientists themselves.

I was motivated to blog on this after reading a column in the Philadelphia Inquirer by Arthur Caplan, a University of Pennsylvania bioethicist, discussing the challenges of putting limits on science. He observes,

The moral standoff that will quickly come to characterize the 21st century is becoming clear. It is not the teaching of intelligent design vs. evolution in American schools. Almost no one but biblical literalists takes the ID position with any seriousness as science. Nor will it be the heated squabble over embryonic stem-cell research. That scrum is actually over as well: Many nations around the world are doing this type of research, so the question is only where not whether.
The real battle - the battle that will come to occupy the moral center stage of American politics, morality, law, public policy, editorial pages, and water-cooler discussions - will be waged over where genetic engineering ought to take us and whether we are satisfied to leave it to scientists to guide us there.

Caplan acknowledges that "there here are plenty of reasons to worry about the misapplication and misuse of genetics." But even with such concern, Caplan quickly turns to a defense of the inexorable advance of research, and allaying of concerns about the role of scientists in shaping such advances,

Still it is a grave, grave mistake to argue that we must put all forms of genetic engineering off limits. Too much good will be lost. Our only hope of combating some of the worst pests and plagues that beset us and will torment our grandchildren is through genetic manipulation and engineering. The genetic revolution you and I are witnessing is humankind's last, best hope since it offers the prospect of more and safer food; the repair and elimination of genetic maladies like Tay-Sachs, juvenile diabetes, sickle cell disease, and hemophilia; the conquest of TB, malaria, avian flu, SARS, HIV, and many other plagues. And it will allow us to rebuild broken, worn out, or injured body parts.
Any of these alone would be enough reason to pursue genetic research. Together, they all but obligate us to do it. They are an all but unanswerable reply to those who say "No" to genetic research and engineering. Our society would be foolish and cruel to forbid or ban genetic research given the needs of the sick, starving, impaired and those of future generations for solutions and treatments. Will we really turn away from those who literally are dying before our eyes, or who will die before our children's eyes, simply out of fear of scientists guiding public policy?

Caplan offers a defense of scientific advancement much like the old saw, "guns don’t kill people, people kill people,"

I do not believe we have much to fear from the actions of any individual scientist. Few, contrary to the pope's concern, aspire to play God. Science has no tolerance for such fantasies.
Geneticists know how little they know individually and how hard it is to manipulate nature. Moreover, none of them, not even the best and brightest, is capable of transforming a discovery from the lab into the real world by himself or herself. That sort of power is reserved for the deity, governments or the market.

What the deity does is beyond our control. But what government or the market does or is allowed to do is very much a matter of politics, regulation and oversight. When theologians or members of the public point the finger of moral worry at scientists, they need to redirect it. It is governments and the marketplace that we need to shape and hold accountable for how genetic knowledge is or is not applied.

I generally agree with Caplan that genetic technologies may hold great promises and that almost every scientist is a good and decent person. But these general feelings about the science and scientists are no substitute for the fact that (a) genetic technologies may pose unknown risks (e.g., concerns raised about GMOs and the environment) and simply be morally wrong (e.g., chimeras), and (b) scientists, like any group in society, are not above democratic accountability.

Caplan suggests that the an unfulfilled role for scientists – and their science studies lapdogs – is to communicate the importance of research so that the public will allow it to go forward and support it.

What scientists need to do - and quickly - is come out of their laboratory lairs and be seen in public. You need to know about their aspirations, dreams, hopes, and values. You need to know they stand shoulder to shoulder with all of us in wanting a better world. They see a better future and a way to get there.
Genetic research in the hands of those who practice is not aimed at power, fame, ambition, or transforming oneself into a god. If it is about anything, it is about love: the love of life, the love of people, the drive to make a better life for the sick and those at risk of becoming so.

These last few statements are pretty incredible. The Hwang Woo-Suk and Gerald Schatten stem cell affair (see the University of Pittsburgh report in PDF) may have been an aberration but it did provide a window into a world where power, fame, and ambition are not so uncommon. In light of this recent experience, for an ethicist to suggest otherwise is a bit pollyannaish, and quite a bit too much cheerleadering from where I sit.

Caplan is of course right on when he asks us to

Hold your politicians accountable. Ask them to explain how funding for genetics is allocated and accounted for. Insist that they ensure that commercial interests do not succeed in keeping private genetic applications and products that might offend the moral sense of the community or, worse, our health and well-being.

But part of such accountability in my view is public engagement in the process of deciding on what research is and is not appropriate, not simply engaging abroader set of stakeholders in decisions about commercialization after the research is well underway or completed in the form of products. Along these lines, a perspective of "upstream engagement" has been discussed here in the context of the excellent work of a UK think tank called DEMOS. (Have a look at their most recent report on governing nanotechnology here.) Caplan goes too far when he asserts, "The genetic genie is out of the bottle. There is not much anyone can do to put it back nor, once we understand its potential for good, ought we to do so." There are many genies and many bottles. Deciding which genies to free and which to keep in their bottle is an important part of the democratic governance of science and technology.

Caplan’s piece reminded me of Langdon Winner’s comments about the societal aspects of nanotechnology in Congressional testimony in 2003. Winner had some strong things to say about science studies scholars,

The professional field of bioethics, for example, (which might become, alas, a model for nanoethics) has a great deal to say about many fascinating things, but people in this profession rarely say "no."
Indeed, there is a tendency for career-conscious social scientists and humanists to become a little too cozy with researchers in science and engineering, telling them exactly what they want to hear (or what scholars think the scientists want to hear). Evidence of this trait appears in what are often trivial excercises in which potentially momentous social upheavals are greeted with arcane, highly scholastic rationalizations. How many theorists of "intellectual property" can dance on the head of a pin?

One way to avoid the drift toward moral and political triviality is to encourage social scientists and philosophers to present their findings in forums in which people from business, the laboratories, environmental organizations, churches, and other groups can join the discussion. It is time to reject the idea there are only a few designated stakeholders that are qualified to evaluate possibilities, manage the risks, and guide technology toward beneficial outcomes.

As issues of science and technology continue to occupy an even more central role in important societal questions, there will be difficult questions raised about the role of science studies with respect to their relationship with science, politics, and policy. Science studies scholars will have to confront questions about what sorts of roles they ought to play and under what institutional, financial, and social dynamics. To oversimplify, what will it be, cheerleader, marketer, or critic?

May 11, 2006

Scientific Communication and the Public Interest

Often here at Prometheus we have made the argument that science does not take place in a vacuum. Efforts to communicate science to the public and policy makers are inherently social and political acts. The UK Royal Society has just released an important report titled “Science and the Public Interest” (PDF) which shares this perspective and discusses the challenges facings scientists communicating their results in the context of policy and politics. From the Preface, Lord Rees describes the significance of the report,

Usually, new research results are disseminated within the research community via conference presentations and journal papers; wider communication is usually an afterthought. However, the way this is done – by, for instance, press conferences or media releases – can strongly colour public reactions and attitudes, especially if there are immediate implications for people’s health or way of life. Recent episodes such as the high-profile discrediting of papers on cloning are likely to bring the quality and reliability of all research under greater scrutiny. And even when a result is firm, it is important to convey its impact fairly – neither over-hyping potential spin-offs, nor exaggerating potential risks.

The report argues that scientists have two primary responsibilities when communicating their science:

The first is to attempt an accurate assessment of the potential implications for the public. The second is to ensure the timely and appropriate communication to the public of results if such communication is in the public interest. These twin responsibilities should be embedded within the culture of the research community as a whole, and all practices should take them into account and respect them.

Communication of the significance of scientific results necessarily involves considerations that go well beyond the focus of the research that led to the results in the first place. I discussed this in a 2002 essay in Nature (PDF,

. . . it is essential to differentiate scientific results from the policy significance of those results. To illustrate the distinction, consider the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)’s conclusion that the global average temperature in 2100 will increase from 1.4 C to 5.8 C. Explaining what this scientific result means to the non-specialist may take some effort — it may require explaining the origins of the estimates, how ‘global average’ is defined, trends, conditions and the confidence levels of the projection. Yet, crucially, all this is different from an assessment of the significance of this conclusion for action (‘policy’), which depends on how the results (‘science’) are related to valued outcomes, such as human health, environmental sustainability, economic prosperity and so on.
Assessing the significance of science for policy requires a clear distinction of policy analysis from political advocacy. The former increases the range of alternatives available to decision-makers by clearly associating scientific results with a range of choices and outcomes. The latter seeks to decrease the range of alternatives (often to a single desired outcome). Because scientific results typically have a degree of uncertainty, and because a range of alternatives can achieve particular policy outcomes, commitment to a particular policy involves considerations that go well beyond science.

In its extremely valuable checklist for researchers seeking to communicate the Royal Society acknowledges that scientists may need assistance when seeking to describe the significance of their science for society:

7. Do you need any advice to help you to provide appropriate context for your results, and if so whom do you need to assist you?
8. How might your results be used by other individuals or organisations, such as campaigners or policy-makers?

Question 8 suggests raises a crucially important question but the report provides no guidance for scientists to help them determine what it means to act in the public interest versus as an advocate for a particular special interest group. For many scientists the route to influencing the public interest is simply align themselves with a “side” in a debate – based on money, politics, or other values. We see that a lot in the blogoshpere where people (including scientists) align themselves according to tribal-like affinities. This sort of self-segregation may lead to effective communication which is counter to public interests. We discuss such ideological self-segregation here. As an example, if all scientists align ideologically, as for instance the vast majority do on climate change, it may reduce science to simply a tool for marketing competing bad policy options, as scientists largely forgo the more effective role of introducing innovative new policy options into debate.

The Royal Society report is important because it highlights the importance of communication as an inevitable political and social act. It also provides valuable guidance for scientists seeking to communicate. However, it does not go far enough in providing guidance on how scientists might negotiate the minefield of special interests seeking to appropriate scientific authority for their special cause. Before communicating, scientists have choices in how they orient themselves and their institutions with respect to public interests and these choices can be as important as the process of communication itself.

Posted on May 11, 2006 07:18 AM View this article | Comments (16) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

May 02, 2006

Nowotny on Curiosity and Control

Helga Nowotny, science studies scholar and Vice-Chair of the European Research Council’s Scientific Council, has an interesting op-ed in which she discusses the challenges of managing scientific curiously in the context of the broader society wishing to control the direction of science in various ways. Here is an excerpt:

The dilemma – and it is a decisive one – is that today we cherish the passionate curiosity of an Albert Einstein. But we still want to control the unforeseeable consequences to which curiosity leads. The dilemma must be overcome by allowing curiosity to be protected and supported, while trying to capture those of its fruits that will benefit society. How we accomplish this must be continuously negotiated in the public sphere. Irreducible contradictions will remain, and therein lie the ambivalence that characterises modern societies’ stance toward science.

Posted on May 2, 2006 02:31 PM View this article | Comments (5) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

May 01, 2006

A Very Bad Dream Indeed

Did you catch this letter in yesterday’s New York Times? Titled "Scientists Speak Out About Guantánamo" the letter was signed by 19 scientists who identified themselves as members of the National Academy of Sciences, and as 4 Nobel laureates.

I pretty much agree with their politics on this issue, but I can’t figure out what it has to do with science or science in policy. They write,

Although this is not a scientific issue in the usual sense, we feel that to ignore it would be to abdicate our responsibility to the truth.

Well, I can’t imagine a better example of both the linear model (i.e., that truth dictates a particular course of action, see this PDF) and Brad Allenby’s concerns about "nightmare science," from his recent essay of that title which included this passage:

In short, the elite that has been created by practice of the scientific method uses the concomitant power not just to express the results of particular research initiatives, but to create, support, and implement policy responses affecting many non-scientific communities and intellectual domains in myriad ways. In doing so, they are not exercising expertise in these non-scientific domains, but rather transforming their privilege in the scientific domains into authority in non-scientific domains. Science is, in other words, segueing back into a structure where once again authority, not observation, is the basis of the exercise of power and establishment of truth by the elite.

Posted on May 1, 2006 02:20 AM View this article | Comments (57) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

April 25, 2006

What We Discussed in Class Today

Science and Technology Policy – ENVS 5100
In Class Assignment
April 25, 2006

You will be divided into 3 groups. You have 3 case studies written in the form of assertions/arguments about professional roles and responsibilities. The cases are related to space policy, bioethics, and climate change.

Please read and discuss the cases until 12:30. We will the reconvene as a class and discuss the cases among the group.

Questions to consider:

Do you agree with the arguments made in the essays? Why or why not?

What implications are raised for the individuals involved in the cases?

What implications are raised for the institutions involved in the cases?

What advice would you give to the participants?

What would you do?

Posted on April 25, 2006 12:17 PM View this article | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

April 20, 2006

New Article and Podcast

What does British philosopher Stephen Toulmin have in common with George Bush's science advisor John Marburger?

My latest column for Bridges is out and is titled, "Science Policy Without Science Policy Research." This time the folks at the Office of Science & Technology at the Embassy of Austria in Washington, DC have also produced a podcast, which can also be heard online. See the essay, hear the podcast, and learn the answer to the question posed above here. The entire issue of Bridges is worth your attention.

Posted on April 20, 2006 06:10 PM View this article | Comments (5) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Gathering Storm | Science Policy: General

April 19, 2006

Long Live the Linear Model

Scholars who study the role of science in society have long dismissed the so-called “linear model” of science as descriptively inaccurate and normatively undesirable. In fact, within this community, such discussions are often viewed as pretty old stuff. However, when it comes to practicing scientists and many policy makers, the knowledge of the science studies crowd seems pretty far removed.

The linear model holds that investments in basic research are necessary and sufficient to stimulate scientific advancements, motivate technology developments, and bring products and serves to the market, where society benefits. The linear model was championed in Vannevar Bush’s post-war science policy manifesto titled “Science: the Endless Frontier” and has been fundamental to modern science policy ever since. Here is a graphic I made up illustrating the linear model.

linear model.png

I am reminded almost daily at the depths to which the linear model shapes science policy, science advocacy, and science politics. Yesterday I came across an op-ed which used the linear model to argue for increased funding, at an exponential rate it seems, for health research, based on the linear model. Here is an excerpt:

In 2002, roughly one-third of the papers were from US research groups. By 2004, US groups accounted for only one-quarter of the publications. Government policy may be among the factors contributing to the gap between US and international publications in the field.
Why worry about this trend? The answer lies with our biomedical ''discovery machine," which operates on a seven-step assembly line:

1.) An academic scientist designs an experiment to answer an important question.

2.) The scientist applies to the government to fund the research.

3.) The money pays for students and fellows who conduct the research.

4.) The results are published in journals, which advance the field.

5.) An invention may result. This may lead to a patent, which then is licensed to a start-up company.

6.) With a monopoly granted by the patent, the company attracts venture capital. If it is successful, the company grows.

7.) Years later, the discovery becomes a therapy for patients.

It takes $28.8 billion, the annual budget of the NIH, to prime this machine. Every year, the money generates an astonishing amount of fundamental knowledge and thousands of biomedical discoveries. With no initial funding, this apparatus stops at Step 1.

With no money, what do the scientists do? They choose other careers. Worse, they leave to do research in other countries.

When scientists abandon their laboratories, a field can vanish. A scientific discipline is designed to grow exponentially. A professor will train a handful of students, some of whom go on to become professors and train more students. Some PhDs enter industry, where they lead projects and hire more trained workers. Funded properly, this collection of specialists becomes a formidable force, building research centers, driving innovation, and creating business sectors. The government front-loads the process; ingenuity and free enterprise takes care of the rest.

Scientists often get quite worked up when scientific knowledge is mispresented in the media, and rightly so. However, it seems that the bar is set quite a bit lower when it comes to the (mis)representation of knowledge from science studies.

Posted on April 19, 2006 10:20 AM View this article | Comments (6) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Gathering Storm | Science Policy: General

April 17, 2006

A New Article

I have an invited article just out in the magazine Regulation, published by the Cato Institute. The article is titled "When Scientists Politicize Science" (here in PDF). The first part of the article retells the story of debate over the Skeptical Environmentalist, and my views of the role of science in that debate, which I first presented in a peer-reviewed paper in 2004 (here in PDF). The second part gets into the the broader context of science and politics, and in this essay I am more explicit that I have before about the notion of "honest brokers of policy alternatives". Here is a short excerpt:

Instead of the futile effort to keep science and politics separate, it may make more sense to ask scientists to engage more substantively in policy debate, not by taking sides but instead by serving as “honest brokers of policy options.” Such honest brokers might distinguish themselves from policy advocates (who work to reduce available options) by furnishing policymakers with a broad set of policy alternatives and their relative pluses and minuses. The policymakers would then decide what course of action to take.

I welcome comments and reactions. Thanks.

Posted on April 17, 2006 06:32 AM View this article | Comments (19) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

April 13, 2006

Advocacy by Scientists and its Effects

Frank Press visited us earlier this week. Dr. Press was science advisor to President Jimmy Carter and he subsequently served as the president of the National Academy of Sciences. All in all it was a great opportunity for us, and Dr. Press was extremely generous with his time spent with faculty and students.

One vignette told by Dr. Press involved his response to why it was that the Academy, during his tenure, never saw fit to undertake a study on Ronald Reagan’s proposed Strategic Defense Initiative (or “Star Wars”). Dr. Press’ response was interesting.

He said that there was a petition circulating among the scientific community expressing opposition to the program and that something like 60% of the members of the Academy had signed the position. Dr. Press suggested that this had compromised the ability of the Academy to lend an independent voice to the debate and that any report that the Academy did would therefore be dismissed in the political process. It seems to me that the nation would have benefited from such an independent review by the Academy on this issue. Dr. Press did not shy away from expressing some strongly held views during his lecture and public interview, though he did note that he stays away from petitions.

I am not implying a general principle here, other than to underscore that the relationship of science and politics is complex, and the ways in which scientists choose to engage that relationship, as individuals and as a community, have important and sometimes unanticipated consequences for policy outcomes.

We’ll return to this when the transcript of his visit is available on our Science Advisors website. There are a number of other interesting vignettes as well.

Posted on April 13, 2006 10:56 AM View this article | Comments (6) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General | Space Policy

April 12, 2006

Boehlert on NOAA Press Policy

Below is a press release from Sherwood Boehlert (R-NY), chair of the House Science Committee, detailing a conversation with Vice Admiral Conrad Lautenbacher, NOAA Administrator discussing the PR policy at NOAA. Here's guessing that NOAA will adopt NASA's PR policy in short order. Here is the press release:

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
April 11, 2006

Science Committee Press Office: 202-225-4275

Joe Pouliot, joe.pouliot@mail.house.gov

Zachary Kurz,
zachary.kurz@mail.house.gov

BOEHLERT URGES CLEARLY DEFINIED PUBLIC AFFAIRS POLICY AT NOAA

WASHINGTON - House Science Committee Chairman Sherwood Boehlert (R-NY) sent the following letter last Friday to Vice Admiral Conrad Lautenbacher, Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), in response to an April 6 story in the Washington Post on concerns expressed by NOAA scientists.

Dear Admiral Lautenbacher:

I appreciated your call yesterday to discuss the concern we share over the report in The Washington Post describing scientists' concerns that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is limiting discussion about climate change. I was pleased to hear once again that you support open and unfettered scientific communication, as you have stated in the past both to me and in messages to NOAA employees.

However, it seems clear that, despite your commitment, at least some scientists at NOAA continue to feel that the agency is not encouraging open communication. (Our staff has heard such concerns repeatedly; the problem goes beyond the few instances alleged in The Post.) NOAA's efforts to attract, retain and make full use of the nation's best scientists will be stymied if your scientists and the scientific community at-large believe that NOAA seeks to limit the discussion of climate science and its implications. And the issue of climate change is too important to countenance any scientists feeling intimidated or constrained about discussing the matter, regardless of whether that feeling is the result of specific policy actions or of misimpressions that create a stifling atmosphere.

Therefore, I recommend that you swiftly take the following steps, which appear to have helped remedy similar concerns at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA):

1) Set up permanently a process that employees will trust by which employees can report concerns when they believe that scientific
communication is being suppressed.

2) Issue a clear and to-the-point policy - not something convoluted or subject to misinterpretation - that states the principles and policies that govern scientific communication at NOAA, the role of the public affairs office in such communication, and any limits on what NOAA scientists can say as government employees and as private citizens.

3) Address in a forthright manner the specific allegations raised in The Post.

4) Make sure NOAA's public affairs staff and science managers
understand the need for openness and the consequences that will ensue if they try to limit scientific discussion.

5) In a timely manner, meet with NOAA scientists around the country to express directly your commitment to open communication and to hear what concerns the scientists may have.

I do not doubt your commitment to openness. I do have to wonder whether that commitment is fully and uniformly being implemented at NOAA and whether scientists and their managers throughout the agency believe the agency is committed to openness.

NOAA scientists play a critical role in understanding climate change and other environmental phenomena. You need to redouble your efforts to ensure that NOAA fosters a truly open atmosphere. I look forward to working with you as you do that.

Sincerely,

SHERWOOD BOEHLERT

Chairman

# # #

109-226

Posted on April 12, 2006 12:38 AM View this article | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

April 10, 2006

Politicization of Science 101: How to Use Science to Argue Politics, Manipulate the Media, and Silence your Political Opponents

A recipe for effectively using science to advance political aims:

1. Find yourself in a highly political, high-stakes debate that involves considerations of science (or more generally, intelligence).

2. Seek to turn the political debate into a debate about science or information, that is, scientize the politics.

3. Seek to associate your preferred political outcomes with a clear consensus of the relevant expert community, even if this means oversimplifying the issue. This strategy will work best if you use the term “consensus” (scare quotes!) in an undefined manner. Even if there are legitimate areas of uncertainty or debate, keep the focus on “consensus.”

4. Disparagingly characterize anyone who disagrees with your preferred political perspective as a “skeptic” or “contrarian” or “outlying perspective.” Don’t allow any distinction between the typically few consensus areas of knowledge and typically many more areas that have some greater uncertainty. If uncertainty is raised as a concern, emphasize the need for preemptive action in the face of uncertainty.

5. Do whatever you can to associate your opponents with Republicans, Democrats, industry, environmentalists, or a lack of patriotism. The latter is particularly effective.

6. Argue that the media is dealing with mistruths by allowing your political opponents voice because they are not part of the science/information “consensus” (remember, if consensus is undefined you can use it against just about anyone who disagrees with you). Ask the media to favor your political agenda under these circumstances. (If the media can be tricked into thinking that claims about information are the same as political claims, then they just might fall for it, and take sides! Yours!)

If successful, this strategy will allow you to use science to argue for your favored political outcome while denying your opponent the opportunity to do the same, and the beauty of it is that you need not admit to being political at all, simply standing behind the truth, and who could be against the truth?

Two good examples of this strategy in practice are familiar to many of us, and in many ways the political dynamics of information/science are quite similar:

A. Climate science/politics.
B. Bush Administration arguments for going to war in Iraq.

The politicization of science is a bipartisan affair. The real question is whether politicization such as described above is OK (a) in no cases, (b) in all cases, or (c) in those cases in which the ends justify the means.

The more fundamental question that I have about this dynamic, which despite the tongue-in-cheekiness displayed above, is what effect such a strategy -- which I think exists in many venues -- has on the practice of science and the long-term sustainability of science as an effective contributor to policy and politics. Do we risk something in the long-term by using science as a Trojan Horse for political gain in the short term?

Posted on April 10, 2006 04:26 PM View this article | Comments (57) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Risk & Uncertainty | Science Policy: General

April 07, 2006

Op-ed Online

The Albuquerque Journal published an op-ed of mine last weekend titled "Science, Politics and Press Releases," and it is now online Thanks to each of you who provided comments on an earlier version.

Posted on April 7, 2006 03:36 PM View this article | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

April 05, 2006

Brad Allenby on "Nightmare Science"

Brad Allenby, a professor of civil and environmental engineering at of Arizona State Univeristy, where he holds an affiliation at CSPO, has a brilliant essay online at GreenBiz titled "Nightmare Science." Every scientist should read it closely. Here is an excerpt:

We have, as scientists, established the validity of science through adoption of a process that institutionalizes observation, and thus grants us privileged access to truth, at least within the domains of physical reality. In doing so, we have destroyed authority as the source of privileged knowledge -- and, concomitantly, assumed much of the power that used to reside in the old elite (e.g., the Church).
But now suppose that scientists become increasingly concerned with certain environmental phenomenon -- say, loss of biodiversity, or climate change. They thus not only report the results of the practice of the scientific method, but, in part doubting the ability of the public to recognize the potential severity of the issues as scientists see them, become active as scientists in crafting and demanding particular responses, such as the Kyoto Treaty. These responses, notably, extend significantly beyond the purely environmental domain, into policies involving economic development, technology deployment, quality of life in many countries, and the like.

In short, the elite that has been created by practice of the scientific method uses the concomitant power not just to express the results of particular research initiatives, but to create, support, and implement policy responses affecting many non-scientific communities and intellectual domains in myriad ways. In doing so, they are not exercising expertise in these non-scientific domains, but rather transforming their privilege in the scientific domains into authority in non-scientific domains. Science is, in other words, segueing back into a structure where once again authority, not observation, is the basis of the exercise of power and establishment of truth by the elite. But the authority in this new model is not derived from sacred texts; rather it is derived from legitimate practice of scientific method in the scientific domain, extended into non-scientific domains. Note that this does not imply that scientists cannot, or should not, as individuals participate in public debate; only that if they do so cloaked in the privilege that the scientific discourse gives them they raise from the dead the specter of authority as truth.

Why is this nightmare science? Precisely because it raises an internal contradiction with which science cannot cope. In an age defined by the scientific worldview, which is the source of the primacy of the scientific discourse, science cannot demand privilege outside its domain based not on method, but on authority, for in doing so it undermines the zeitgeist that gives it validity. When demanding the Kyoto Treaty as scientists, it is themselves, not their opponents, that they attack.

Read the whole thing, several times.

Posted on April 5, 2006 12:07 AM View this article | Comments (66) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

March 30, 2006

NASA in the Political Minefield

NASA, which has come under fire recently for its management of scientist’s access to the media, has run more issues involving politics. According to the Houston Chronicle today,

Five days after NASA administrator Michael Griffin urged a Houston audience to keep U.S. Rep. Tom DeLay in office, a spokesman denied Wednesday that Griffin had made a formal campaign endorsement.
"The space program has had no better friend in its entire existence than Tom DeLay," Griffin said Friday of DeLay's legislative support of the agency. "He's still with us and we need to keep him there."

With DeLay present, Griffin spoke at the annual Space Center Rotary Club of Houston's nonprofit National Award for Space Achievement Foundation gala.

Griffin had no intention of soliciting votes for the 11-term lawmaker, NASA spokesman Dean Acosta said.

"He did not make an endorsement and will not get involved in any political campaigns," Acosta said. "If his words of thanks to Tom DeLay were misconstrued as an endorsement, then he regrets that."

Why does this matter? Well, the law for one reason,

The black-tie awards dinner at which Griffin made his remarks was held after regular working hours, but Griffin was representing the space agency and giving an award to a NASA employee, astronaut Eileen Collins.
Griffin's travel to Houston from Washington, D.C., for the dinner was paid by NASA rather than the Rotary Club, said event organizer Floyd Bennett of the United Space Alliance.

The independent Office of Special Counsel, which administers the Hatch Act, will investigate the matter, spokesman Loren Smith said.

Employees who violate the Hatch Act can be removed from office, according to the Office of Special Counsel, or suspended without pay.

Determining whether Griffin was acting in an official or after-hours capacity "really is a close call," said Corey Ditslear, a political scientist at the University of North Texas.

According to one political scientist, this is a tempest in a teapot:

But any misstep by Griffin was relatively minor, said Stephen Hess, a professor of media and public affairs at George Washington University.
"Even in this context, I am not going to get too uptight about it," Hess said. "When (officials such as Griffin) make statements that can be interpreted as political statements, the government should not be underwriting it. You just caught the fellow with a little egg on his vest, looking untidy."

Just goes to show that in highly politicized contexts, minefields abound.

Posted on March 30, 2006 07:00 AM View this article | Comments (10) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General | Space Policy

March 22, 2006

A View From Colorado Springs

For those unfamiliar with the geography of Colorado, Colorado Springs is not far from Boulder, perhaps two hours drive on a good day. But in some respects it seems pretty distant. A link to an editorial in the Colorado Springs Gazette appeared in my inbox (thanks!) on Senator James Inhofe's request for information on UCAR/NCAR, which is here in Boulder. Here is how it begins:

[Disclaimer: I worked for UCAR/NCAR 1993-2001 and am hardly an unbiased person in this matter. You've been warned. Comments after the excerpt below.]

One senator’s inquiry into the inner workings of Boulder’s National Center for Atmospheric Research, and its parent organization, the University Center for Atmospheric Research, is being construed by some as an act of political intimidation. The senator, James Inhofe, a Republican from Oklahoma who chairs the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, is a global warming skeptic. NCAR and UCAR, which receive federal support through the National Science Foundation, are viewed as leading proponents of global warming theory. That’s led some to allege that Inhofe is trying to pressure NCAR and UCAR into tailoring their research to take a more skeptical view, and of polluting the purity of science with politics.
But we’re not sure Inhofe’s request is out of line. NCAR’s contract with the NSF hasn’t been put up for competitive bid in years — which strikes us as a legitimate subject of inquiry. What else Inhofe might be looking for is unknown. But if he’s searching for evidence that the organizations are engaged in “advocacy science,” rather than conducting unbiased research, that’s a legitimate inquiry as well, since federal funds are involved.

Taxpayers have an interest in knowing they are supporting sound, even-handed, agenda-free science, on climate change or any other issue. And if Inhofe or any member of Congress has reason to doubt this, inquiries are in order.

Some are shocked, shocked by the suggestion that science can be corrupted or co-opted — that researchers at NCAR and UCAR are doing anything other than objective research. How dare anyone question the integrity of “science,” they huff. But that’s a willfully naive view, given the way science, policy, advocacy and big money intermingle in this society.

Scientists are as susceptible to being seduced by political agendas, personal biases and self-interest as any other human beings, in our view. And given the power they wield on so many policy disputes, from global warming to the Endangered Species Act, it’s legitimate to ask if they have agendas.

It’s obvious that scientists have increasingly been crossing the line into advocacy. We find it laughable, for instance, when the Union of Concerned Scientists — which for years has been pushing a radical, left-wing political agenda — accuses the Bush administration of “politicizing” science.

Read the whole thing. Now some reactions.

My thoughts on this are very much along the lines of my reaction to Representative Joe Barton's request for information related to the so-called "Hockey Stick." Here is what I said about that:

From the perspective of climate science or policy Rep. Barton’s inquiry is simply inane. There will be little insight gained on climate or how we might improve policies on climate change through his “investigation.” As Congressman Henry Waxman (D-CA) has written in response to Rep. Barton, “These letters do not appear to be a serious attempt to understand the science of global warming. Some might interpret them as a transparent effort to bully and harrass climate change experts who have reached conclusions with which you disagree.... If the Committee indeed has a genuine interest in the science of global warming, you should withdraw these letters and instead schedule a long-overdue Committee hearing on climate change.”
Of course, it is doubtful that Rep. Barton’s Committee (on Energy and Commerce, I remind you) actually has any real interest in the science of climate change, except as a tool of tactical advantage in the continuing political battle over global warming. Rep. Barton and others opposed to action on climate change will continue to gnaw at the hockey stick like a dog on a bone so long as they perceive that it confers some political benefits.

1. I do think that it is perfectly fair to question the long-term management of NCAR by UCAR. Some competition might be valuable.

2. We have often discussed the consequences of scientists politicizing science. Like it or not, the reaction of the Gazette will not be unique. Unfortunately, the likely instinctive response of most people -- on all sides of this issue -- will be to exacerbate the politicization.

3. Senator Inhofe is going about this all wrong in my view. If he really wants to investigate UCAR/NCAR, then he should tap some of his colleagues on Senate Commerce and do it via hearings, out in the open, and through established channels of legislative oversight authority. His fishing expedition smacks of political opportunism, and will delegitimize any merit that his efforts might have.

4. For many scientists, it is crucial to understand where the editorial writers for the Colorado Springs Gazette are coming from. Simply opposing, criticizing, or dismissing their concerns will not be a good strategy, if for no reason than their views are likely to be widely shared by a significant part of the population, and both the future of support for your science, and support for the use of your science. depends upon maintaining some degree of legitimacy across the populace. Politicze the scientific enterprise at your own, and society's, peril.

5. In the blogosphere both the Inhofe request and the Gazette editorial serve in many situations as perfect wedge devices which allow people to align according to their political predispositions. This is well and good, but the scientific blogo-subset has to deicde if this is the best way to engage this issue. In my view, it may make things worse.

Posted on March 22, 2006 08:30 PM View this article | Comments (4) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Climate Change | Science Policy: General

March 20, 2006

Representative Boehlert Says "It's Time"

Sherwood Boehlert (R-MI), chairman of the House Science Committee, announced that he will not run for re-election. Here is an excerpt from his announcement:

As I see it, my unwritten instructions from the folks back home were basic and clear: go to Washington, listen to all the arguments, pro and con, weigh all the available facts, and then do what you think is best in our interest and that of the nation.
I have followed those instructions, believing as I do that Edmund Burke was right, more than two centuries ago, when he said,

'Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment, and he betrays instead of serving you if he sacrifices it to your opinion.’

My manner of representation and voting record of more than two decades has earned for me the label of moderate.

I’m proud of that label, fervently believing that the overwhelming majority of thinking people reject the extremes of the left and right.

They find stalemate unacceptable and want us to sort out our differences and find common ground. As I see it, that personifies a moderate.

As events of the past year in Washington have documented, this has been the ‘moderates moment.’ There is an abundance of evidence to suggest that our influence has expanded and our moment has been extended.

A few years ago, Congressional Quarterly, the highly respected, non-partisan magazine, conducted an extensive review and analysis of the records and performance of all 535 of the Representatives and Senators. The magazine then developed a list of 50 of ‘the most effective Members of Congress,’ honoring me among them as a ‘centrist’ who works to build consensus.

The magazine went on to say of the group ‘they exemplify skills and behaviors that help them accomplish their goals.’

That made me proud.

Congrats Rep. Boehlert!

Posted on March 20, 2006 02:22 PM View this article | Comments (1) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

Science, Politics, and Advisory Report Writing

In the comments from a post last week, Sylvia Tognetti and David Bruggeman raise some very interesting issues and questions about the role of scientific advisory committees, and in particular that of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences. In this post I’d like to highlight one important part of this issue, and that is the inevitable intermixing of science and politics in the process of writing government reports and those produced by science advisory committees. Consider the experience of Phil Clooney vs. Rick Piltz which was discussed on 60 Minutes last night (along with more from James Hansen).

For those who are unfamiliar with the issue, I discussed it in depth here last year, and here is a short synopsis:

The New York Times published an article last year identifying Phil Clooney, a former oil industry lobbyist, as an Administration official (then chief of staff for Council on Environmental Quality) who edited several government climate change reports -- one titled Our Changing Planet (OCP, a summary of climate science programs under the U.S. Climate Change Science Program) -- in ways that emphasized uncertainties. Upon being outed by the Times, Mr. Clooney resigned and took a job with ExxonMobil. Opponents to the Bush Administration highlighted this as an example of a non-scientist editing government reports related to climate science to support the Administration’s ideological and political agenda. And I believe that this charge is on the mark, if often overstated.

But what is often missed in discussions of this and related experiences is that the path from peer-reviewed science to advice for policy makers necessarily goes through non-scientists with political agendas. There is no alternative. And there are multiple legitimate routes from science to policy, given than science itself can compel no specific course of action over another. Policy making depends on many factors beyond science, and partisan politics or ideological predispositions are among them.

The most important question then is how this process is managed from the standpoints of maintaining the credibility of the science, the salience of the advice, and the legitimacy of the process. It is fair to criticize the Bush Administration on a range of counts for poorly managing this process, resulting in concerns about the credibility of their scientific advice and the legitimacy of their advisory processes. This is not limited only to scientific issues, see: Iraq War, justifications for.

But such concerns about credibility and legitimacy are often themselves determined in a politically expedient manner, which further damages the credibility and legitimacy of science as an input to policy making. Consider the online summary that accompanied the 60 Minutes story last night; it discussed the Piltz vs. Cooney affair as follows:

Dozens of federal agencies report science but much of it is edited at the White House before it is sent to Congress and the public. It appears climate science is edited with a heavy hand. Drafts of climate reports were co-written by Rick Piltz for the federal Climate Change Science Program. But Piltz says his work was edited by the White House to make global warming seem less threatening.
"The strategy of people with a political agenda to avoid this issue is to say there is so much to study way upstream here that we can’t even being to discuss impacts and response strategies," says Piltz. "There’s too much uncertainty. It's not the climate scientists that are saying that, its lawyers and politicians."

The irony here is that Rick Piltz who drafted the reports has no formal training in climate science, and is a Democrat. His decision to characterize climate change in the report as more threatening obviously reflected considerations that go beyond science. There is no getting around that how one determines the amount of threat that climate change presents is a function of values and trade-offs, which are at their core political judgments. The initial writing of OCP was every bit as political an exercise as the subsequent edits. It does not lessen the Bush Administration’s ham-handedness to note that whatever filters Mr. Piltz was using to decide what to include in the Our Changing Planet reports, they were as deeply grounded in his first-hand knowledge of climate science as Mr. Cooney’s. The point here is not that Mr. Piltz was unqualified to be writing the OCP -- it was after all a compendium of programs and summary of findings press-release style – but that someone has to write such documents.

The Bush Administration’s mistake, from their own perspective, was not the specific changes made by Mr. Clooney in his edits, which did of course seek to present the science in a way most favorable to Bush Administration goals, but their cavalier attitude toward the legitimacy of the process. After all, a NRC scientific advisory committee approved the CCSP strategic plan report after Mr. Clooney had made his edits. The Bush Administration could have very easily had someone else make those same changes but who had no connections to the oil industry and solid scientific credentials. The more general principle here is that science can be legitimately presented in a wide range of ways, and the choice of how to present science is determined in significant ways by political filters. How such choices are made is a function of who is in a position to make those choices.

So people from a liberal perspective will hold up Mr. Piltz as a hero speaking scientific truths, and those from a conservative position will identify Mr. Cooney as a hero for the same reason. And both will be right at the exact same time, from their own political perspectives. Piltz and Cooney were certainly not waging a debate over science, but politics clothed in the garb of science.

If we are to move beyond the scientization of the climate debate we must move beyond the notion that it is possible to state scientific truths in only one way in science advisory reports. More attention must be paid to the processes that put certain individuals in positions that allow them to control the content of scientific advisory reports. Partisans on both sides will I am sure continue to call for a narrow focus on “the scientific truths” as a Trojan Horse strategy of smuggling in their own political perspectives (“scientific integrity” and “sound science” seem to be the catch words). The reality is that Phil Clooney, Rick Piltz, me, and you each have strong political views. The best way to deal with that reality is to focus on developing legitimate processes for structuring, empanelling, reporting science advice. This is a challenge that the science policy community has yet to embrace, though there is a lot of knowledge of such processes to work with, see, e.g., the work of Sheila Jasanoff.

Posted on March 20, 2006 08:14 AM View this article | Comments (17) | TrackBack
Posted to Science Policy: General

March 17, 2006

Politicization 101: Segregating Scientists According to Political Orientation

A reporter I know sent to me a press release yesterday titled “Scientists Dispute Link Between Hurricanes and Global Warming.” The press release was disseminated by the TCS Science Roundtable. TCS – Tech Central Station – is often a very useful and informative site for analyses and opinions from a self-described perspective that values “the power of free markets, open societies and individual human ingenuity to raise living standards and improve lives.” As such TCS is very much a special interest group. People can choose to agree or disagree with TCS analyses, or share its values. But in this post I want to highlight the role that university and some government scientists play in the unhealthy politicization of science through their willing association with advocacy groups (like TCS, but also, e.g., environmental advocacy groups), and the increasing tendency for organizations that should serve as “honest brokers of policy options” to transform themselves into advocacy-like groups.

The scientists cited in the TCS press release with information on contacting them to discuss hurricanes are the following:

William Gray, Colorado State University
James O’Brien, Florida State University

Pat Michaels, University of Virginia

Anthony Lupo, University of Missouri-Columbia

Roy Spencer, University of Alabama

George Taylor, Oregon State University

Call me a rocket scientist, but it seems that these scientists in particular are included in this press release because their perspectives, which they may hold very strongly and have good support for scientifically, align in some way with the special interests of the group promoting them. Interest groups have a great deal of power in such situations, because they can selectively assemble experts on any given topic to basically support any ideological position. This is a function of what Dan Sarewitz calls an “excess of objectivity” or the not-so-tongue-in-cheek principle that for every PhD there is an equal and opposite PhD.

Let me emphasize that it would be utter nonsense to claim that this is only a phenomenon that occurs on the political right, where TCS is coming from. For instance, the Union of Concerned Scientists routinely uses university and government scientists to legitimize its views, generally viewed as coming from the political left. However, as we’ve discussed here before, the political right has been more successful at marshalling experts to their causes, but the left is rapidly closing the gap.

Let’s take a look at this behavior from two perspectives. First, from the perspective of the individual scientist deciding to align with an interest group, it should be recognized that such a decision is political. There is of course nothing wrong with politics, it is how we get done the business of society, and organized interest groups are fundamental to modern democracy. Nonetheless, an observer of this dynamic might be forgiven for thinking when they see scientists self-select and organize themselves according to political predispositions that different perspectives on scientific issues are simply a function of political ideologies. We can see how contentious political debates involving science become when filtering science through interest groups is the dominant mechanism for connecting science to policy.

It is this condition of dueling special interest scientists that leads to a second perspective, and that is an institutional approach to providing science advice in a way that is not filtered through a particular special interest agenda. It is this very condition that gives legitimacy to government science advisory panels, National Academy committees, and professional societies. But the role such groups as honest brokers is in my view endangered. For instance, consider a congressional staff briefing organized by the American Meteorological Society last fall on the subject of hurricanes and global warming (see this PDF). This briefing included the perspectives of:

Kevin Trenberth, NCAR
Judy Curry, Georigia Tech

Kerry Emanuel, MIT

All distinguished scientists, but undoubtedly a subset of scientific views (and on its policy significance) on hurricanes and climate change. The AMS took on the characteristics of TCS when putting together this briefing by selecting participants to represent a narrow perspective that was all but certainly shaped by political considerations. In discussing this general issue with colleagues and here on Prometheus, some make the claim that such unbalanced perspectives are needed from the scientific community in order to balance what is considered to be the greater ability of the political right to get its message out. Whether or not the right does in fact have a louder voice, it is important to recognize that efforts to restore some universal balance in public debate and discussions by picking a side in political debate have the ultimate effect of turning organizations like the AMS into what appears to be (or actually is) just another ideologically motivated interest group. Such threats to the legitimacy of scientific committees, assessments, advisory groups, and professional organizations are more and more common.

What we lose in this process are honest brokers. For the more ideologically motivated, such a loss may be no big deal. But for those of us who think that perspectives on science and policy are not purely a function of ideology, then there is a very real threat to the positive role of science in policy and politics.

Today, where does one go for the presentation of a comprehensive perspective on scientific views and their implications for policy? There are increasingly few outlets for such honest brokering, meaning that we all fall back on ideological filters, which means that science is increasingly subsumed to pure politics as a tool of marketing competing ideological agendas.

My advice to scientists:

1. Affiliate yourself with interest groups with open eyes. Recognize what you are doing, and if it makes sense for you then go ahead and affiliate.

2. But at the same time demand of the community’s scientific institutions that they reflect a broad perspective on science and policy. If you agree to participate in an event, a committee, an assessment, etc. look for people with different views than your own, and if you don’t seem them, demand that they be included.

Posted on March 17, 2006 09:00 AM View this article | Comments (73) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

March 14, 2006

To Advocate, or Not?

When should a scientist get involved in political advocacy related to policy making in the area of their expertise? And once having decided to get involved, what form of advocacy should the scientist engage in, given that there are numerous options for scientists as advocates?

In my experience, such questions are rarely discussed among scientists. Some assert that politics is necessarily a bad thing to be avoided and refuse to admit any role in advocacy, even among those who are clearly advocates. In discussing such things one prominent scientist went so far as to assert that in his entire life he had never done anything that might be construed as political. Others simply assert that what is in their own personal special interests is obviously in everyone’s interest, and that people who disagree must be science abusers and morally corrupt. Still others gather in tribes with like-minded colleagues, particularly in the blogosphere, creating very real instances of Cass Sunstein's echo chambers. The discussion of advocacy in science often takes place in its own echo chamber of the science studies community.

I came across an article about malaria in Kenya (courtesy of the always excellent SciDev.net), which had the following very interesting passage, which raises questions about roles and responsibilities of scientists in broader society:

Kenya is the third leading nation in research on malaria in the world, according to a survey published last November by Thomson Scientific’s Essential Science Indicators (ESI) — an in-depth analytical tool that offers data for ranking scientists, institutions, countries and journals around the world.
USA is the leading nation followed by England. France, Germany and Switzerland are ranked fourth, fifth and sixth, respectively. Available as a ten-year rolling file, ESI covers ten million articles in 22 specific fields of research and is updated every two months.

But despite the fact that Kenya is a leading producer of research data on malaria, it remains one of the countries with the highest malaria mortality rate in the world. Why the disconnect between research and control?

Prof Bob Snow, the head of Malaria, Public Health and Epidemiology Group, Centre for Geographic Medicine at the Kenya Medical Research Institute (Kemri), blames lack of mechanisms to translate research into policy and implementation. "The problem is not with the scientists that malaria burden in Kenya is still very high and raising. As scientists, we have done our part and done it very well. The major problem is that unlike in Britain and other countries, there is no mechanism to directly translate research findings into national policy or to translate research into action."

Prof Snow, who has been involved in malaria research in the country for the last 18 years and is ranked fifth in the world in malaria research, feels the government does not fully comprehend the role of researchers.

"As scientists in Kenya, we have to do two jobs. We have to conduct research and then convince the government or the Ministry of Health to adopt our research findings. This should never be the case. There should be a mechanism that automatically facilitates adoption of research findings by the government."

What mechanism? How created? Run by whom? What does it mean to “adopt research findings”? Automatically? These are the questions at the core of 21st century science policy. Asking and answering these question are of course political exercises themselves and can create some discomfort among scientists/advocates. Consider the cirle-the-wagon reactions often seen here to suggestions that the IPCC might not be an optimal means of connecting science and decision making. And consider the frustration expressed by scientists such as James Hansen about their role in the political process.

As people focus attention on press releases, NRC committees on hockey sticks, drug approval processes, government science reports, national academy statements, science in developing countries, etc. etc. it will be these questions of process that will be important to keep at the fore.

Posted on March 14, 2006 08:34 AM View this article | Comments (7) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Health | Science Policy: General

March 09, 2006

Uranium Enrichment and Stem Cells

Yesterday’s New York Times had an interesting article on uranium enrichment research in Iran. It begins as follows:

There are times when even a little bit of research can be a bad thing, especially if it centers on Iran and the bomb. On Tuesday, a wide range of nuclear scientists and analysts faulted as dangerous Moscow's tentative proposal to let Tehran do small amounts of research on uranium enrichment, with some comparing it to being a little bit pregnant. "After a while, you tend to wind up having a baby," said Peter D. Zimmerman, a professor of science and security in the war studies department of King's College, London. "I do not believe the Iranians should have any access to enrichment technology until they prove to be a more responsible partner than they've been so far." The Iranians have strenuously objected to such characterizations, saying the West wants to deprive them of atomic knowledge and expertise that they have a right to acquire for a peaceful program of nuclear power. They see it as nothing less than a devious plot by outside powers to keep their country from modernizing. In an interview with Al Arabiya television last month, for example, Ali Larijani, Iran's top nuclear negotiator, said, "The problem is that they look at the Islamic nations as being inferior, that we should not have modern technology, and it is enough for us to produce tomato paste and mineral water."

The international issue of nuclear research in Iran is in my mind exactly analogous to the debate at the federal level over stem cell research in the United States in the follow ways:

1. A group in society – the researchers -- wants to conduct research that has potential positive benefits to outcomes that they value.
2. Another group in society – the restricters -- wants to restrict that research because of its potential negative impacts with respect to outcomes that they value.
3. Both groups seek to impose their values on the other, but both cannot succeed at the same time as their goals are in direct conflict.
4. In both cases the restricters have the upper hand from a political perspective.
5. In both cases the researchers are seeking ways around the research restrictions.
6. The researchers assert that this is about the right to conduct research.
7. The researchers accuse their opponents as being morally challenged.
8. In both cases the decision to conduct the research or not is 100% political.

These debates are about what research gets to be conducted, by whom, and how paid for. Did I miss anything? I’m interested in reactions.

Unpublished Op-Ed: Science, Politics, and Press Releases

The following is an op-ed I prepared a few weeks ago. It was accepted for publication at a major U.S. newspaper but, for whatever reason, I never heard back frm them again. So I am assuming that its window of opportunity has passed and am posting it here. However, if anyone reading this is interested in publishing it before a broader audience, please send me an email - pielke@colorado.edu. Thanks!

Science, Politics, and Press Releases

The Bush Administration has faced constant criticism for its overbearing management of information. Some of the latest allegations involve scientists from two federal agencies who claim that they have been muzzled by political operatives.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), well known for its public relations prowess, embarrassed itself with the ham-handed efforts of a political appointee to deny media access to James Hansen, one of it's most prominent scientists. NASA's woes multiplied when it was revealed that the media gatekeeper was a 24-year old former Bush campaign worker who had "accidentally" claimed earning a college degree when he did not. And when the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) issued a press release asserting an official agency position on hurricanes and global warming, this assertion simply was not true. NASA fired its political appointee and instituted a review of its media policies. NOAA revised its press release and its administrator, Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr., encouraged all NOAA scientists "to speak freely and openly."

But the allegations that have followed these two incidents reflect fundamental misunderstandings about the relationship of science and politics. For instance some scientists in NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena complained that NASA headquarters preferred to use the phrase "climate change" rather than "global warming" in press releases. But the choice of language to use in a press release reflects political as well as scientific considerations.

It is true that a Republican strategy memorandum recommended the phrase "climate change," yet environmental advocacy groups have long preferred the phrase "global warming." Science alone cannot say which phrase to use, and consequently the choice between them necessarily involves political considerations. NOAA and NASA produce hundreds of scientific papers each year, and only a very small fraction are accompanied by an official press release. Thus the decision even to issue a press release necessarily involves non-scientific considerations such as casting the agency in a positive light, newsworthiness, and sometimes, partisan politics.

That the political leadership of federal agencies manages information in pursuit of their interests is not new or surprising. President Nixon went so far as to move around the timing of Apollo moon launches with respect to the 1972 presidential election against NASA's wishes in order to manage the possible negative public relations consequences of a failed mission.

Some seek to de-politicize science communications in the holy grail of identifying a bright line between science and politics. David Goldston, chief of staff to Representative Sherwood Boehlert, chairman of the House Science Committee, said "The issue is where does science end and policy begin." But if the choice of words in a press release and the decision to issue a press release about science are inherently political, then there simply is no such line.

A better approach was suggested by NASA Administrator Michael Griffin, who suggested distinguishing professional duties from personal opinions, "as long as people speak as private citizens, my attitude is, let me hold your coat for you. You can get into that fray and get beat up. You just can't label it as an agency position." In the 21st century scientists have options for communicating to the world that rival the reach of official press releases. For instance, scientists can easily set up a weblog from their home computers and on their own time expound on any topic that they wish. A good example of someone successfully using such a strategy is NASA's Gavin Schmidt, an employee of James Hansen, who along with collaborators has set up RealClimate.org, a widely read and influential internet weblog whose authors have not held back in hosting political discussions on topics like the Kyoto Protocol, Intelligent Design, and the Bush Administration. Today a weblog may have an even greater reach and influence than an official NASA press release.

But distinguishing professional duties from personal opinions can also present a challenge, especially for senior career officials. As the official NOAA media policy states, "Whether in person, on camera, or over the phone, when speaking to a reporter you represent and speak for the entire agency." Democracy would be impossible if every government employee sought to interpret or implement laws and policy according to their own personal preferences. Government employment carries with it professional responsibilities, which are proportionately greater the higher ranking the career official. J.D. Sobel writes, "All senior leaders, whether appointed or career, serve in an administration and for a principle with broader responsibilities. These officials have special obligations to protect and support their principal and administration as the mechanism of democratic accountability in government. They have strong implicit obligations to stay within the policy framework of their administration and not undermine their principal."

Of course, government scientists who disagree with the policies of their employers always have the option of resigning, if they feel that they can no longer do their jobs, or they can stay, do their jobs, and seek effective reform from the inside. But what they should not do, however, is pretend that in the purity of science there lies a solution to the realities of politics. Claims to the contrary ultimately will lead to further politicization of the scientific enterprise.

Posted on March 9, 2006 05:04 AM View this article | Comments (48) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

March 08, 2006

On Missing the Point

Karen O’Brien, of the University of Oslo’s Department of Sociology and Human Geography, has a very thoughtful editorial in the current issue of the journal Global Environmental Change. She suggests, quite appropriately in my view, that debate and discussion on global environmental issues focuses too narrowly on “science” and not on important issues of “human security.” She is asking us to consider reframing how we think about and organize to act on environmental issues. In my view, O’Brien is absolutely correct in her analysis, but her perspective, and that of Oxford’s Steve Rayner which we discussed yesterday, are far removed from the center of the current politicized and scientized debates over global environmental issues. Here is an excerpt from her editorial:

The time has come to reframe global environmental change first and foremost as an issue of human security. For years, the global environmental change research, policy, and activist communities have been pointing to a long list of potential negative outcomes from human-induced environmental changes. The premise for concern has been that we are altering key components of the Earth System, changing climate and hydrological systems, carrying out dramatic land cover changes, undermining ecosystem services, and reducing genetic, ecosystem, and species diversity (MEA, 2005; Steffen et al., 2004). A substantial effort has been made to document, understand, and explain the science behind these issues, in order to support policies and actions that address the driving forces of environmental change. This science-based approach has produced powerful arguments for reconsidering current strategies of economic growth and development, in favor of what can be considered sustainable development. Nevertheless, the approach has maintained environmental change as an issue of “science” rather than of human security, and it has consequently failed to engage society in creating the transformations that will lead to sustainability.
Human security goes beyond the traditional understanding of security as a state-centered concept related to threats and conflict. In terms of environmental change, human security can be considered the condition when and where individuals and communities have the options necessary to end, mitigate, or adapt to risks to their human, environmental, and social rights; have the capacity and freedom to exercise these options; and actively participate in attaining these options (GECHS, 1999). This is a people-centered concept that focuses on enabling individuals and communities to respond to change, whether by reducing vulnerability or by challenging the drivers of environmental change. More than a measurable and objective state, human security is something that is felt and experienced, and it is fundamental to every individual's well-being.

The emphasis on “science” over “security” is evident in popular debates about climate change. For example, the media in Norway (as in many other countries) seems to be obsessed with the question, “Is this climate change or not?” Every extreme hurricane, storm, or heat wave raises the spectre of human-induced climate change. Following each major event, the Norwegian media gathers groups of scientists to defend their research and the strong scientific consensus that increased greenhouse gas emissions are changing the climate. Sceptical positions and scientific uncertainties are then equally highlighted, and anyone who has not taken graduate level meteorology classes is thrown into deep confusion.

Watching the media debate the relationship between Hurricane Katrina and climate change in September 2005, I could not help but think that this is simply missing the point. The debate should not be about whether or not this is evidence of climate change, but about whether human society has the capacity to respond to these types of shocks. Focusing on scientific uncertainty diverts attention away from the factors that generate vulnerability and create human insecurities. Indeed, uncertainty about human impacts on the climate system is inevitable, and the more scientific knowledge we gain, the more uncertain we are likely to be …

Read the whole thing here.

March 07, 2006

“Bad Arguments for Good Causes”

In an editorial in the latest issue of the journal Global Environmental Change Oxford’s Steve Rayner laments “a widespread pathology: the use of bad arguments for good causes.” Rayner cites work that I and colleagues have been engaged in on hurricanes and global warming to help make this point (However, one might also look up on Promethesus Richard Tol, Hans von Storch, and Indur Goklany to see similar points being made in various contexts):

The danger of using bad arguments for good causes, such as preventing unwanted climate change, is two-fold. Generally, it provides a dangerous opening for opponents who would derail environmental policy by exposing weaknesses in the underlying science. Specifically, it leads to advocating policies for reducing future storm impacts that are likely to be ineffective in achieving their declared aim. With or without greenhouse gas emissions reductions, the costs of storm damage are bound to rise. Reducing greenhouse gas emissions will have far less impact on storm damage costs than moving expensive infrastructure away from coastal margins and flood plains.
For good or ill, we live in an era when science is culturally privileged as the ultimate source of authority in relation to decision making. The notion that science can compel public policy leads to an emphasis on the differences of viewpoint and interpretation within the scientific community. From one point of view, public exposure to scientific disagreement is a good thing. We know that science is not capable of delivering the kind of final authority that is often ascribed to it. Opening up to the public the conditional, and even disputatious nature of scientific inquiry, in principle, may be a way of counteracting society's currently excessive reliance on technical assessment and the displacement of explicit values-based arguments from public life (Rayner, 2003). However, when this occurs without the benefit of a clear understanding of the importance of the substantial areas where scientists do agree, the effect can undermine public confidence.

Rayner calls for greater attention to the institutional mechanisms that society has in place to connect science and decision making: “Yet if we recognize that science cannot compel public policy, the need to develop effective institutional arrangements for it to appropriately inform public policy is greater than ever.”

I think that he is absolutely correct. However, many prominent members of the scientific community are so wrapped up in asserting truth claims against so-called skeptics that they have all but ignored the broader issues of institutional legitimacy and the need for action in the face of diversity. The climate issue illustrates these dynamics prominently but is by no means a unique case. Rayner explains how this occurs:

Once a candidate issue is selected for attention, policy makers are consistently led to believe that, given time and money, scientific inquiry will reduce relevant uncertainty about environmental risk. Their scientific advisors hold out the promise that more fine-grained information will clarify the nature and extent of the problem and enable policy makers to craft efficient and effective responses. While it justifies important (and often expensive) research programmes, this view tends to disregard two factors.
First, as scientific knowledge increases, it raises new questions to be answered. The proliferation of uncertainties may make policy less, rather than more tractable. In particular, see-sawing scientific opinion, for example about whether particular substances have a net warming or cooling effect, can be particularly worrisome to policy makers, inclining them to postpone judgement to the long-term.

Second, the accumulation of information may lead to “contradictory certainties” that may make decisions more complicated rather than self-evident. The result is often a surfeit of information from which decision makers with opposing viewpoints can pick or choose. A decade ago, writing in this journal, Herrick and Jamieson (1995) recognized just this problem with the US National Acid Precipitation Assessment Programme (NAPAP), which generated a veritable banquet of data and findings, but little guidance to help non-specialist decision makers to determine which items should be considered in the policy choice. As a result, the Clean Air Act Amendments were passed without the benefit of a clear scientific direction. In the end, public disagreements about science become a surrogate for political debates about values and science is reduced to the spectacle of duelling assessments.

So long as policy debates are dominated by people who believe that universal agreement on a particular set “facts” or perspective on “truth” is a prerequisite to policy action, don’t be surprised to see continued gridlock and inaction. That is a truth you can count on.

Posted on March 7, 2006 07:53 AM View this article | Comments (8) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Climate Change | Science Policy: General

March 06, 2006

"Tear Down that Wall"

Robert Cook-Deegan of Duke University's Center for Genome Ethics, Law, and Policy is another worthy addition to the fledgling group-blog now forming over at Issues in Science and Technology. From his first post:

Without an OTA equivalent, S&T advice is channeled through external constituencies and the executive branch, which is inherently administration-dependent. Congress has lost most of its S&T analytical capacity, and the executive branch has lost its credibility. Have we given up on bipartisanship, resigned to polarized S&T war rhetoric, without even the option of consensual, incremental building?
Mr. Gingrich and Senator Clinton, tear down that wall! Then build sturdy structures that restore a bipartisan ethos. A good place to start is science and technology policy, where partisanship is particularly stupid and destructive.

Posted on March 6, 2006 09:06 PM View this article | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

AAAS Forum on Science and Technology Policy

Registration is now open for the 2006 AAAS Forum on Science and Technology Policy in Washington, DC. The meeting will be held on April 20-21, 2006 (Thursday and Friday) at the Washington Court Hotel.

The AAAS Forum on Science and Technology Policy (formerly the "AAAS Colloquium"), held in Washington each spring, provides a forum for discussion and debate about budget and other policy issues facing the S&T community. Click here for the latest version of the 2006 Forum program. Click here for registration information. The 2006 Forum features sessions on the budgetary and policy context for research and development in 2007; achieving energy security; avian flu and other global health threats; science and technology and homeland security; the global innovation challenge, and responses by U.S. industry and policymakers; and protecting the integrity of science.

More info here.

Posted on March 6, 2006 09:00 PM View this article | Comments (2) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

February 28, 2006

Newsweek on Outsourcing

An article about India and concerns about U.S. outsourcing in this week’s Newsweek is relevant to our on going discussion of Rising Above the Gathering Storm and U.S. "competitiveness." It is titled, “Outsourcing: Silicon Valley East Americans once feared their jobs would be shipped to India, but the backlash was overdone. Now everybody's winning,” and can be found here. Here is an excerpt:

Not long ago, what seemed most possible was that India would steal the jobs of American workers. But as George W. Bush visits there this week, he'll find a maturing economy that is no longer all about call centers and basic tech support. Now big American investment banks and drugmakers are joining tech firms on the passage to India. R&D centers are springing up so fast that there's now a shortage of Indian engineers. And the stigma of outsourcing jobs to India is disappearing. American companies once afraid to put their names on the doors of their Indian offices now issue press releases touting their latest investments there. "American firms have gotten over their anxiety about India," says financial-services consultant Harrell Smith of Celent Communications. "Now the new anxiety is if you're not in India."
What happened to the outsourcing backlash? It has been muted by the fact that India didn't suck Silicon Valley dry after all. Actually, U.S. tech employment is growing. There are 17 percent more tech workers in the United States today than back in the bubble days of 1999, says a new study by the Association for Computing Machinery. And the Bureau of Labor Statistics predicts that the U.S. economy will add 1 million tech jobs over the next decade, a 30 percent increase. "Everyone was worried about the offshoring bogeyman," says Moshe Vardi, an author of the ACM study. "But the big whoosh of jobs to India never happened.'' Indeed, that gush slowed to a steady stream once American companies realized it's tough to set up shop in a country with bad roads and a patchy power grid. Lately, American consulting firms that once predicted runaway growth in outsourcing to India have been slashing their estimates by half or more. Now American companies are hanging on to the high-skilled work that requires face-to-face interaction, while everything that can be done "over the wire" gets shipped offshore.

Posted on February 28, 2006 07:29 AM View this article | Comments (4) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Gathering Storm | Science Policy: General

A Review of Rising Above the Gathering Storm, Part 2

Part 1 of this review focused on Chapter 1 of RAGS. This post focuses on Chapter 2, which is titled, “Why are Science and Technology Critical to America’s Prosperity in the 21st Century?” It seems obvious that science and technology are indeed important to society, and understanding why this is so would be helpful for understanding how to prioritize R&D investments in the context of many other demands on public funds, and the relative desirability different possible R&D portfolios. Unfortunately, this chapter does little more than sandwich reams of information between highly general and simplified assertions of the importance of R&D. RAGS Chapter 2 does very little to answer the question posed in its title. For details, read on.

This chapter begins by simply asserting the answer to the question raised in its title,

The visible products of research, however, are made possible by a large enterprise mostly hidden from public view—fundamental and applied research, an intensively trained workforce, and a national infrastructure that provides risk capital to support the nation’s science and engineering innovation enterprise. All that activity, and its sustaining public support, fuels the steady flow of knowledge and provides the mechanism for converting information into the products and services that create jobs and improve the quality of modern life. Maintaining that vast and complex enterprise during an age of competition and globalization is challenging, but it is essential to the future of the United States.

This series of assertions may seem almost intuitive, and the chapter claims that the relationship of public R&D investments and economic growth are well understood,

“the economic value of investing in science and technology has been thoroughly investigated. Published estimates of return on investment (ROI) for publicly funded R&D range from 20% to 67%.”

However, one of the studies that it cites prominently does not display such confidence or certitude. Scott et al. (2001, available here in PDF) open their report with a telling quote from Georgia Tech’s Barry Bozeman:

In the study of technology transfer, the neophyte and the veteran researcher are easily distinguished. The neophyte is the one who is not confused.

Scott et al. introduce their literature review with a recognition of the challenges faced by scholars trying to understand the complicated relationship of R&D and the economy:

The relationships between public research and innovation are recognised to be an increasingly significant topic in the emerging knowledge economy. However, this is an area beset by high levels of complexity and a surprisingly small amount of empirical research. It is a field where it is easy to be misled by simplistic ideas, or to become confused by such data as do exist and the conflicting interpretations that can be made from them. As this review will show, even now eminent commentators and analysts are grappling with some of the most fundamental dimensions of the relationships between research and innovation, science and technology.

Scott et al. assertion a “small amount of empirical research” does not square with RAGS claim that this area has been “thoroughly investigated.” One might be excused for thinking that RAGS cherrypicked the convenient parts of Scott et al. and ignored the rest. Scott et al. warn the reader that the “intuitive approach” (which RAGS asserts unabashedly) to understanding the role of public R&D in the economy can be misleading:

In the context of limited resources for supporting basic research, and the need to justify the expenditure of these resources, a growing number of policy-makers and academic analysts have become interested in understanding the relationships between basic research and economic activity. Much of this analysis has been underpinned by an attractive intuitive approach to understanding these relationships. This approach is characterised by several logical and sequential steps:
• First, science is mainly seen as a source of new information about how the world works.
• Second, because this information is published openly (as is usual with academic research findings), it is ‘free to all comers’ – a low cost input into economic processes.
• Third, the link between science and technology is obvious: scientific information is used in the creation of new technologies, which are then used in economic activity.
• Finally, given this role of science in the creation of economic returns, it becomes attractive to try to quantify the amount of economic benefit that can be attributed to the basic science elements.

This way of seeing science-technology-economy linkages is so intuitively obvious that for a long time it was simply assumed to be a valid approach. Unfortunately, it contains within it a series of misleading and incomplete ‘mindsets and myths’, the limitations of which have only become apparent through more in-depth investigations in recent years.

Scott et al. are decidedly less sanguine that studies focused on quantifying economic rates of return to research are a useful basis for specific science policy decisions,

Studies that use productivity growth as an indicator of social returns to research investments have a number of problems. In adopting a high level of aggregation in their analysis they rarely control for inter-industry differences in technological opportunity and appropriability. Furthermore, such studies do not reveal how the economic returns are realised and thus do not enable a comparison of the productivity impact of research in different scientific disciplines. A further point to keep in mind is that most measures estimate average rates of return, while marginal rates of return are required for the purposes of resource allocation decisions.

A similar critique can be found in Boskin and Lau (1995). Scott et al. do suggest that R&D provides many benefits to the economy, perhaps even more significantly than narrow studies of economic activity would suggest, through the many “channels” of interconnection between science and the rest of society. They suggest that the management of the relationship of science and society through these channels can be a more useful approach to science policy than by seeking to modulate macro-economic effects in an input-output manner. What is clear from Scott et al. however is that understandings of the relationship of science policy decisions and societal outcomes remain quite murky, unlike the assertions found in RAGS.

RAGS plays fast and loose with the voluminous data that it presents. For instance, RAGS asserts that increasing life expectancy in the United States provides a good indicator of the value of basic research. But this assertion would seem to be countered by the fact that the United States is not even close to first place globally in life expectancy, while countries with longer life expectancy invest far less in health research (and healthcare). The story of life expectancy illustrates the many complexities involved in the relationship of science, technology, and societal outcomes. RAGS presents a large amount of statistical information about how health indicators have improved in the United States over the past century, with the suggestion that these trends were a direct or indirect result of public investments in R&D. This may indeed be the case, but this argument is not developed or made here.

Further, as interesting as it is to see ratios of horses to cars in 1900 versus 1997, it is not clear the relevant of such trivia to the underlying analysis. The most telling conclusion I draw from the various graphs presented about technological progress and market penetration is how spectacularly uncorrelated such trends are with public funding of science and technology. Important questions are raised by thee data, but they are not even touched upon here.

Based on its collection of upward sloping graphs, RAGS takes a page from Bjorn Lomborg’s The Skeptical Environmentalist and Gregg Easterbrook’s The Progress Paradox when it makes the claim that environmental and social indicators are almost universally getting better. It then reiterates its core assumption to explain why we see these improvements:

The science and technology research community and the industries that rely on that research are critical to the quality of life in the United States. Only by continuing investment in advancing technology—through the education of our children, the development of the science and engineering workforce, and the provision of an environment conducive to the transformation of research results into practical applications—can the full innovative capacity of the United States be harnessed and the full promise of a high quality of life realized.

What RAGS has yet to do through Chapter 2 is make an argument in support of this repeated assertion about the importance of R&D. Let me underscore that I also believe that R&D is important, but science policy decision making can and should be based on more than general statements of value. For instance, how might we judge the relative value of one possible R&D portfolio to another? Perhaps RAGS answers this in a subsequent chapter.

Posted on February 28, 2006 06:59 AM View this article | Comments (1) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Gathering Storm | Science Policy: General

February 27, 2006

A Review of Rising Above the Gathering Storm, Part 1

Given the recent attention to competitiveness by the White House and Congress, I thought that it might be useful to dig into the intellectual foundation that lies underneath. This post is the first in a series and offers a perspective on the recent NRC report, Rising Above the Gathering Storm (RAGS), all 543 pages of it, chapter-by-chapter. I start the review with this post focused on Chapter 1, titled “A Disturbing Mosaic.” We provided an overview of the executive summary of RAGS here.

The summary of my critique of the RAGS report so far is that there is a disconnect between the statement of the problem and the proposed solution. It is a truism that science and technology underpin modern society. And it is also true that the world economy has been transformed by economic globalization. But it does not clearly follow from these initial conditions that a policy focused on increasing investments in basic research in the physical sciences, mathematics, and engineering, and the number of scientists and engineers, will improve U.S. “competitiveness” much less counter the negative effects of globalization. While there are a suite of other policy recommendations to be found in RAGS, the focus is mostly on government funding for science and the production of PhD scientists and engineers. My interpretation of Chapter 1 in RAGS is that its arguments are largely faith-based rather than built on a foundation of policy analysis, but perhaps that is to come in future chapters. Read on for details.

RAGS has been cited as the intellectual foundation for the focus in President Bush’s State of the Union address on “keeping America competitive.” It also has been cited as the basis for a suite of proposed legislative actions now in various stages of development in Congress, most notable the so-called trifecta of PACE bills – Protecting America’s Competitive Edge.

RAGS defines the policy problem to be addressed consistent with the thesis of Thomas Friedman’s book, The World is Flat, which argues that the world in more economically competitive that ever before. RAGS summarizes Friedman’s concerns as follows:

Friedman asks rhetorically whether his own country is proving its readiness by “investing in our future and preparing our children the way we need to for the race ahead”. Friedman’s answer, not surprisingly, is no.

RAGS takes Friedman’s concern as its central focus:

This report addresses the possibility that our lack of preparation will reduce the ability of the United States to compete in such a world. Many underlying issues are technical; some are not. Some are “political”—not in the sense of partisan politics, but in the sense of “bringing the rest of the body politic along”. Scientists and engineers often avoid such discussions, but the stakes are too high to keep silent any longer. Friedman’s term quiet crisis, which others have called a “creeping crisis”, is reminiscent of the folk tale about boiling a frog. If a frog is dropped into boiling water, it will immediately jump out and survive. But a frog placed in cool water that is heated slowly until it boils won’t respond until it is too late. Our crisis is not the result of a one-dimensional change; it is more than a simple increase in water temperature. And we have no single awakening event, such as Sputnik. The United States is instead facing problems that are developing slowly but surely, each like a tile in a mosaic. None by itself seems sufficient to provoke action. But the collection of problems reveals a disturbing picture a recurring pattern of abundant short-term thinking and insufficient longterm investment.

The RAGS focus on “competitiveness” reminds me of a statement by Charles L. Schultze, writing in a book edited by B. L R. Smith and C. Barfield (Technology, R&D, and the Economy, Brookings, 1996), who suggested some principles for thinking about R&D in the economy

First, do not specify the target as increasing competitiveness. Competitiveness is a virtually meaningless, if widely used, word. It can – and has been – used to justify virtually anything.

RAGS then identifies three “clusters” of problems:

*Tilted jobs in the global economy
*Disinvestment in the future
*Reactions to 9/11

Let’s consider each in turn.

“Tilted jobs in the global economy” refers to the reality that companies have access to an employment market that goes well beyond national borders. Far from being a problem, RAGS seems to make the case that the flattening of the global economy is a good thing, both for the U.S. and other countries:

Most economists believe that [David] Ricardo is still correct—that there will be gains for all such nations. They acknowledge that there might be a transition phase in which wages for lower skilled workers in a rich country like the United States will fall. Some say that there is, however, no reason to believe that wages for highly skilled workers will fall in either the short run or the long run. Economist Paul Romer argues that technological change continues to increase the demand for workers with high levels of education. As a result, wages for US workers with at least a college education continue to rise faster than wages for other workers. The low wages for highly skilled workers seen in such countries as China and India are not a sign that the worldwide supply of highly skilled workers is so large that worldwide wages are now falling or are about to fall, says Romer. In those economies, wages for skilled workers are low because these workers were previously cut off from the deep and rapidly growing pool of technological knowledge that existed outside their borders. As they have opened up their economies so that this knowledge can now flow in, wages for highly skilled workers have grown rapidly.”

In spite of this seeming optimism based on the consensus view of economists RAGS then presents a conclusion that I can only conclude must be based entirely on assumptions:

It has also been argued that in a period of tectonic change such as the one that the global community is now undergoing, there will inevitably be nations and individuals that are winners or losers. It is the view of this committee that the determining factors in such outcomes are the extent of a nation’s commitment to get out and compete in the global marketplace. New generations of US scientists and engineers, assisted by progressive government policies, could lead the way to US leadership in the new, flatter world—as long as US workers remain among the best educated, hardest-working, best trained, and most productive in the world.

A few things should be pointed out. First, the United States is by any measure a global economic winner and has been for decades and longer. Second, this part of the report provides no data and no argument to make the case that the “tilting” of the global is in anyway problematic from a national perspective, and the evidence that it does provide suggests that this tilting is instead beneficial. The transition from a description of the realities of globalization to the call for progressive government policies and education of scientists and engineers is abrupt. It may very well be that such actions are needed, but the case has not yet been made thus far in RAGS. Let’s move on.

The second cluster of problems is “disinvestment in the future.” This section starts by citing a public opinion poll to make the case that education is suffering in the United States. It then presents familiar statistics on the average performance of U.S. K-12 students when compared to their OECD counterparts. The chapter then argues that more of the costs of education are being placed upon individuals, rather than the public. RAGS asserts that this has the effect of limiting the access to higher education among low-income students. I would agree that this is indeed a problem. But lets be clear, it is a problem of equity and access, and no connection is made here to the larger thesis of the chapter focused on economic competitiveness.

The section next claims that “the increasing pressure on corporations for short-term results has made investments in research highly problematic.” This section could have been a bit more substantive, and perhaps later in the report we will see such substance. But according to data gathered by the NSF SRS, industry has a long-term trend of increasing investments in research and development, with the NSF’s most recent issue brief noting, “Companies spent $204 billion in current-year dollars on research and development (R&D) performed in the United States during 2003 compared with $193.9 billion in 2002.” Industry outspends the federal government on R&D by about 50%. It is not at all clear that there is a problem in industry related to R&D investments. There is certainly no evidence of “disinvestment.”

The next section asserts that “funding for research in most physical sciences, mathematics, and engineering has declined or remained relatively flat—in real purchasing power—for several decades.” Why does this matter? According to RAGS, there are two reasons. The first is that health care advances depend on such research, “Many medical devices and procedures—such as endoscopic surgery, “smart” pacemakers, kidney dialysis, and magnetic resonance imaging—are the result of R&D in the physical sciences, engineering, and mathematics.” RAGS does acknowledge the meteoric rise in funding for health research over he past decade, but that apparently is insufficient. The second reason why RAGS argues that flat funding for the physical sciences, mathematics, and engineering matters is that it creates incentives for less-risky research, “Many believe that federal funding agencies—perhaps influenced by the stagnation of funding levels in the physical sciences, mathematics and engineering—have become increasingly risk-averse and focused on short-term results.” It is not clear either what this means or why it matters. A focus on high-risk research is a function of research policies and not necessarily the consequence of overall funding levels. For example, one way to encourage “riskier” research in NSF would be to do away with the second review criterion focused on broader societal impacts and focus narrowly on scientific merit. Funding is neither here nor there. Again, there is no evidence of a “disinvestments.”

Let’s now turn to the third problem cluster, “Reactions to 9/11.” RAGS takes issue with three specific areas of U.S. science policy put into place follow 9/11, “visa policies, export controls, and the treatment of “sensitive but unclassified” information.” These are of concern to scientists because of the limitations that each policy places upon the ability to recruit and train foreign students and conduct research alongside foreign colleagues.
Because I work in a university and see the effects of these policies, I am in general agreement with RAGS that they are problematic from the standpoint of fettering research. But at the same time these policies have been put in place as a reaction to the threat of terrorism. Have such policies gone too far? Perhaps. But of course scientists want research to be unfettered by restrictions. So far however RAGS has not provided evidence for understanding the effects of national security policies in a way that would allow for a sense of the tradeoffs involved. Perhaps this is to come in a subsequent chapter.

The chapter ends by asserting – not arguing – its conclusion: “Well-paying jobs, accessible health care, and high-quality education require the discovery, application, and dissemination of information and techniques … This report emphasizes the need for world-class science and engineering—not simply as an end in itself but as the principal means of creating new jobs for our citizenry as a whole as it seeks to prosper in the global marketplace of the 21st century.” That modern society is built upon science and technology is obvious. But the important questions about science and technology are not yet raised by RAGS, much less answered – What information is it that we need? What techniques? How should we think about priorities among different areas of knowledge? How does world-class science and engineering relate to jobs? Perhaps the answers to these questions will be revealed in subsequent chapters.

Thus far, the story is about an ill-defined problem with a crystal-clear solution: more investment in research and development.

Posted on February 27, 2006 07:22 AM View this article | Comments (4) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Gathering Storm | Science Policy: General

February 24, 2006

Reporting on the Jay Keyworth visit

It's a little stale at this point, I realize, but I wanted to give a brief report from our visit with Dr. George Keyworth, science advisor to President Reagan from 1981 -1986. Dr. Keyworth visited Boulder on Jan 31/Feb 1, the main event of which was a public lecture. I went to Dr. Keyworth's talk and interacted with him in a few other venues throughout his visit and here are some of the take-home messages as I heard them.

As national security is the most important issue facing any president, science advisors who are not involved closely in national security issues are not as relevant to the White House decision making process. Dr. Keyworth had multiple security clearances from his long tenure at Los Alamos, which gave him access to national security information and thus made him relevant to a president dealing with the Cold War.

To illustrate what happens when a science advisor is not directly involved in national security issues, Dr. Keyworth pointed to an exchange with a former Vice President. The VP asked something to the effect of, "Who was science advisor when we were in?" Keyworth's take-home message was that this long-serving advisor was unknown because he wasn't working on the top priority for the administration.

Dr. Keyworth made clear his Libertarian inclinations and called President Reagan a "true Libertarian." Arising from these views were a few observations and preferences, the most strident of which was:

-The government does well when it is a consumer and not when it is a producer of technology.

NASA illustrates this well. In the early days of the space station, nothing in NASA's rationale for its construction was significant or justifiable. NASA proposed a space lab for creating protein crystals in microgravity, and other such, but neither NASA nor the American government needed or needs protein crystals. [And the ISS floats along, irrelevant as ever....]

- The one thing that government can do right is to fund basic research.

People here question the effectiveness of the "linear model" (science $$ into a black box leads to economic benefits for the nation). But Dr. Keyworth was adamant that Vannevar Bush's ideas on funding basic research are still very important and relevant and that history shows the linear model to be right on.

There is a widespread consensus that we are declining rapidly in basic research funding and capability. Dr. Keyworth strongly backed up the message of Rising Above The Gathering Storm and discussed the purpose of basic research as a training ground of scientists. Roger should have a long post on this in the near future....

Strong views on NASA, including, "NASA is rotten to the core." The U.S. does not have a civil space policy, hasn't had one since Apollo, and out of this is a lack of a existence rationale for NASA.

Posted on February 24, 2006 11:36 AM View this article | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Vranes, K. | Science Policy: General

David Goldston on Science Policy in the U.S. Congress

In our Winter, 2006 newsletter David Goldston, Chief of Staff for the House Committee on Science, provides a perspective on the state of science policy in Congress. Goldston’s essay was invited as a response to his Democratic counter-part (recently retired), Bob Palmer, who prepared a perspective for us last summer titled, Science Policy: The Victim of Partisan Politics”.

Palmer wrote,

The Federal government is not responding to the many political challenges of the day – energy, environment, health care, global economic competition – whose resolution would greatly benefit from the wise application of S&T. When politics is overly fettered by partisanship, so is science – in the sense that its legitimate role in opening up more room for negotiations and the development of policy options is severely limited. This unfortunately is the niche that science policy occupies today.

To which Goldston responds,

In short, this hardly seems the time to lament the lack of debate over science policy in Washington or the unwillingness of Congress to air science issues. What remains to be seen is how much progress a divided Congress will make in an election year in resolving these issues. As of now, the outlook is promising.

We are appreciative of both David Goldston and Bob Plamer for not only engaging each other, but for providing us a rare look at perspectives on Congressional science policy straight from the House Science Committee. Our newsletter can be found here.

Posted on February 24, 2006 06:54 AM View this article | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

February 23, 2006

New IST Science Policy Blogs

The IQ of the science policy blogosphere just increased. The periodical Issues in Science and Technology, a publication of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, has unveiled several of the authors of its new group blog. They are ASU’s Daniel Sarewitz and OECD’s Jerry Sheehan. For those interested in science policy, they are worth a look and perhaps a link in your favorites. Here is one of Dan Sarewitz’s recent posts:

It comes as a relief to learn, from a recent NY Times article, that scientists have recently gone to Capitol Hill to give Members of Congress and their staff a briefing on “how science works.” It’s a little weird, I guess, that a single briefing could explain what centuries of inquiry and debate by scientists, philosophers, sociologists, historians, and others have failed to achieve, but I accept that one has to simplify these things for the lay audience. According to the article, Science editor Donald Kennedy told the Congressional audience that “the ultimate test of truth in science” is the replication of results: Hmmmm. Well, there’s certainly no way to replicate a billion or so years of Darwinian natural selection, so I guess the theory of evolution must not be science. And obviously you can’t replicate a general circulation model’s prediction of the future behavior of climate, since the future hasn’t happened yet, so apparently climate modeling isn’t science either. I suspect there’s some subtlety here that I’m missing, but I’m sure our elected officials were able to grasp it.

Have a look. We’ll keep you updated as Issues adds more contributors.

Posted on February 23, 2006 07:10 AM View this article | Comments (7) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

February 16, 2006

There is No Line

In today’s New York Times Andy Revkin has a follow up story on politics and NASA media policies. The story shows that we are rapidly on our way to intellectual incoherence on this issue. Consider the following:

"The issue is where does science end and policy begin," said David Goldston, chief of staff to Representative Sherwood Boehlert, chairman of the House Science Committee.

News flash (but not to Prometheus readers!) - There is no line that cleanly divides science from policy. The discussion of the use of the term “climate change” versus the phrase “global warming” clearly shows that there is no getting away from politics in the presentation of scientific issues. As scholars of communication tell us, politics is inherent in the act of communication.

In a more recent example of possible political pressure at the agency, press officers and scientists cited an e-mail message sent last July from NASA's headquarters to its Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, Calif. It said a Web presentation describing the uncontroversial finding that Earth was a "warming planet" could not use the phrase "global warming." It is "standard practice," the message went on, to use the phrase "climate change." NASA officials said the intent was to use the most general term to describe climate fluctuations. But other public affairs workers and some scientists at the agency called it an effort to avoid mentioning that global temperatures are rising. The e-mail message was written by Erica Hupp, a civil servant at headquarters. She did not reply to several requests for comment, but several people who work with her, and others who preceded her in managing earth-science news in the office, said this was a standing unwritten order from political appointees in public affairs. "There was this general understanding that when something in this field was written about that it was to be described as climate change and not global warming," said Elvia H. Thompson, who recently retired from the same office.

So think about this carefully. The phrase “climate change” was recommended in the Luntz memo as part of a (failed, IMO) strategy to sway public opinion against action on climate change. The phrase “global warming” is preferred by environmental advocacy groups for exactly the same reason. Which phrase do you choose? The choice cannot be determined by science alone. (Though it is worth noting that the science community does indeed prefer the term “climate change”, e.g., it is the IPCC not the IPGW.) As I’ve written here before, even the specific definition of the phrase “climate change” reflects a political position.

Other examples of the use of language as tools of political advocacy in science include the use of the words “fingerprint” (e.g., here) and “harbinger” (e.g., here) as recommended by the Union of Concerned Scientists as means of political advocacy.

Decisions about what press releases are put out and how the content in them is described are always going to be political decisions. There is no scientific basis for deciding what to release or how to frame it. When the Clinton Administration was in office things were spun one way, and when the Bush folks took over things were spun another way. In every case such spinning can be done in a way that does not involve misrepresenting scientific understandings (not that spinners always succeed in this).

There is no line. Looking for one is a wild goose chase. Policies and practices for media relations in science agencies will always be political. And politics is a function of who is in power. If you don’t like it, get involved, run for office, campaign for your favored candidate, get out the vote, participate in special interest advocacy groups, do all of these things. But don’t pretend that science can resolve political disputes. There is no line.

Posted on February 16, 2006 09:10 AM View this article | Comments (37) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

February 15, 2006

Sarewitz in American Scientist

Dan Sarewitz, director of the Consortium for Science, Policy, and Outcomes at ASU, is a close colleague and frequent collaborator. He is also one of our leading thinkers on science in politics and society. He has an essay in the March-April 2006 issue of American Scientist titled “Liberating Science from Politics.” It is relevant to frequent recent discussions on this blog. Below is an excerpt, but do read the whole thing:

”Wouldn't it be wonderful if science—and scientists—were taken more seriously in the political process? Wouldn't democracy be better served? And wouldn't many difficult problems be more rationally resolved? Take the debates over protecting the environment. It certainly seems that, here, science should be able to cut through political controversy and enable beneficial action. Yet experience mostly shows the opposite: Controversies surrounding environmental problems as diverse as global climate change, genetically modified foods, nuclear energy, biodiversity, air and water pollution, and toxic wastes rarely seem to come to a satisfactory resolution. They are instead characterized by long-term intractability and periodic resurgence of bitter partisan dispute—all in the face of a continual expansion of scientific understanding.
Blame for this unsatisfactory state of affairs is usually assigned to the political process itself, especially to those who use science to advance particular ideological agendas. If only, the complaint goes, those (a) conservatives (b) liberals (c) environmentalists (d) industrialists or (e) ignorant members of the public would understand the facts, or stop manipulating the facts for their own political gain, we could arrive at rational solutions to the problems we face.

Yet this sort of complaint—which I have heard, in one form or another, from innumerable scientists—suffers from a profound misunderstanding of the relation between science and politics. The idea that a set of scientific facts can reconcile political differences and point the way toward a rational solution is fundamentally flawed. The reality is that when political controversy exists, the scientific enterprise is ideally suited to exacerbating disagreement, rather than resolving it.”

Read the whole essay here.

Posted on February 15, 2006 07:04 AM View this article | Comments (5) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

February 12, 2006

Science Suppression: A Personal Story

During 1993-1994 I was doing research on my dissertation which was focused on the implementation of the U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP), then a new program having been written into law in the fall of 1990. Part of my research involved interviewing people responsible for the creation of the program and its implementation. Many of these people were high-ranking agency officials and very difficult to schedule, so I was only able to interview several of them. In 1994 I wrote up a paper based on my analysis for presentation at the annual meeting of the Association of Public Policy Analysis and Management (APPAM) in Washington, DC. I sent copies of the paper to the agency officials that I did get to interview for their reaction, and this is when the fun began.

At the time I was sitting at NCAR courtesy of Mickey Glantz, who later hired me as a post-doc and then a staff scientist in his group. But in 1993-1994 I was an unpaid graduate student taking advantage of Mickey’s gracious offer of a desk and access to NCAR people as I finished up my dissertation. The paper I had drafted for APPAM was critical of the USGCRP arguing that it was structured to produce a lot of good science, but not necessarily well-structured to contribute useful information to decision makers. (For the argument see this 1995 paper – PDF -- which is descendant of the 1994 APPAM analysis).

The reaction to the paper was swift and for a wet-behind-the-ears graduate student a lesson in the politics of science. (I have the email correspondence still from these events.) The few copies of the paper I had mailed to my interviewees had multiplied and had made their way around USGCRP circles, and people were not happy with the paper. There was concern among USGCRP officials that the paper could be damaging in the budget process, particularly since I had an affiliation with NCAR, which they felt gave me some credibility.

One person that I had sent the paper to was a top official in the National Science Foundation (NSF) in charge of the directorate that provided base funding for NCAR. Concern about my paper was expressed by this official to the director of NCAR and the President of UCAR, the body that oversees NCAR. There was quite a hullabaloo surrounding this as NCAR was encouraged to disallow me from conducting research there, and more than gently reminded where its funding came from. In short, USGCRP officials wanted me gone and my paper to disappear.

The good news is that the NCAR leadership stood up for my right to call things as I saw them and stood strong in the face of what must have been very uncomfortable pressure from NSF. After all I was just a nobody grad student and NCAR very easily could have brushed me off to please NSF. Here is an excerpt from an email from a top NCAR official to others in NCAR leadership on this from June, 1994:

Maybe this is a test – can a graduate student write his dissertation on a subject that may imply that a program of our government is not perfect? Is there any such thing as academic freedom or freedom of scientific inquiry, or must we all sing the party line? If a program can’t tolerate criticism – it probably NEEDS to be criticized. I’ve read some of Roger’s work, and I found his criticisms to be generally on point and constructive. I don’t feel we should in any way “distance ourselves” from Roger’s work. But what do I know?

Further good news that resulted from this was that part of the negotiations that resulted was an agreement that I would go to Washington, DC and interview a wide range of people associated with the USGCRP so that they could “set me straight.” Thus, I was able to get access to many people high up in the program who heretofore had been inaccessible to me. I interviewed them and much of what I learned appeared in the final version of my dissertation.

I learned a number of lessons from this experience. First, I learned the importance of some distance from government when doing policy research. Although NCAR works with government funds, its staff are not government employees. NSF could exert pressure through the budget, but did not have direct line authority over NCAR leadership or NCAR scientists. Second, I learned the importance of leadership. NCAR leadership from Mickey Glantz on up to the top was very supportive of research and erring on the side of openness rather than suppression. Third, I learned that incentives for suppressing unwelcome news are strong. I did not ascribe the actions of the NSF official to the politics of the newly elected Clinton Administration or any broader war on policy research, but a misguided effort to exert control over what information came out of NCAR in an effort to protect parochial political interests. Finally, I learned that efforts to suppress typically have the exact opposite effect. Had NSF ignored that paper, no one would have read it, I never would have had additional access to leading USGCRP officials, I probably wouldn’t have received an offer of a post-doc at NCAR, and today I’d be doing something completely different than giving scientists a hard time.

Postscript: More that ten years later a top official involved in the debacle expressed to me regret that it occurred and suggested that with hindsight my analysis at the time did prove to have merit. I appreciated this and remain on fairly good terms with this person, now retired.

Posted on February 12, 2006 03:58 PM View this article | Comments (1) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

More Info - Thanks Gavin!

Ed.- This comment from Gavin Schmidt of NASA appeared in the comments and I thought important enough to bring to the top. Thanks Gavin very much, RP

A couple of points for clarification. Around 20 of the scientific staff at GISS work directly for NASA as civil servants (including me). The rest work for Columbia University or the contractor.

GISS's mission is to research long term climate change, rather broadly defined, it is not to implement government policy. Thus there is no contradiction in Hansen continuing to work on climate science while disagreeing on policy.

The problem with NASA public affairs was not limited to Hansen, but also impacted the rest of us even on issues and media requests that had absolutely nothing to do with any policy questions. Simple requests to explain 'global warming' or discuss the difference between weather and climate were turned down by Deutsch and company, presumably because they felt the mere mention of the science was political.

Posted on February 12, 2006 03:29 PM View this article | Comments (4) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Others | Science Policy: General

Political Advocacy and the Ethics of Resigning

At the core of the debate over NASA and NOAA policies for the interaction of scientists with the media lies an implicit and ill-defined distinction between discussions of science and discussions of policy. Most discussions of Dr. Hansen have glossed over the distinction between his right to speak out and his fundamental disagreement with the policies of the U.S. government. Is there a point at which Dr. Hansen, or other government officials in similar situation, have an obligation to resign? The answer is that it is complicated.

Democratic government would be impossible without career government employees whose duty it is to carry out the laws and policies put into place by the properly elected representatives of the people. But is reality, career government employees have considerable discretion in their duties and are key factors in recommending and implementing policy. The debate over James Hansen has thus far failed to engage these complicated issues, falling back on the worn, but safe science-policy distinction.

For example, Michael Griffin, NASA administrator, released a statement on in which he stated, “It is not the job of public affairs officers to alter, filter or adjust engineering or scientific material produced by NASA's technical staff.” And NOAA Administrator Conrad C. Lautenbacher said “I encourage scientists to conduct peer-reviewed research and provide the honest results of those findings.” What is unsaid by NOAA and NASA here is how scientists should manage discussing policy issues when they are in political opposition to the current policies of the U.S. government, which is really at the core of the debate of NASA and NOAA.

A news story from Australia helps to frame the challenge:

A FORMER CSIRO senior scientist and internationally recognised expert on climate change claims he was reprimanded and encouraged to resign after he spoke out on global warming. . . Dr Pearman says he fell out with his CSIRO superiors after joining the Australian Climate Group, an expert lobby group convened by the Insurance Australia Group and environment body WWF in late 2003. A core aim of the group was to encourage Australian political leaders to consider carbon trading — where industry pollution is capped and there are financial incentives to reduce emissions — and other measures including a target to reduce greenhouse gases by 60 per cent by 2050. The Federal Government has said it will not pursue carbon trading at this stage. It accepts that global warming is real and poses a threat to the Australian environment, but does not support mandatory targets for reducing carbon emissions. Dr Pearman, who headed the CSIRO Division of Atmospheric Research for 10 years until 2002, said he was admonished by his Canberra superiors for "making public expressions of what I believed were scientific views, on the basis that they were deemed to be political views".

What is political advocacy anyway? Political advocacy refers to efforts to reduce the scope of choice available to decision makers, typically to some desired course of action. In the case above, Dr. Pearman was not only acting as a political advocate in arguing for carbon trading, he actively joined groups whose mission was overt political advocacy. For his part, Dr. Pearman doesn’t seem to recognize what political advocacy actually is stating, "In 33 years (with CSIRO), I don't think I had ever felt I was political in that sense. I've worked with ministers and prime ministers from both parties over a long period of time, and in all cases I think I've tried to draw a line between fearless scientific advice about issues and actual policy development, which I think is in the realm of government." The article does not say how active Dr. Pearman was in his political advocacy, but it is conceivable that his advocacy actions were in direct conflict with his duties as a government employee and as such it would be entirely appropriate to ask him to leave. (Much the same if a conscientious objector objected to a war. Rather than force them to fight or allow them to block implementation it would be appropriate to relieve them of their government duties.)

James Hansen has clearly engaged in political advocacy unrelated to his expertise on climate when he came out in support of John Kerry, when he criticized the role of special interests he disagrees with influencing the Bush Administration, and when he offered some comparisons to NOAA press policy, "It seems more like Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union than the United States." And James Hansen also engaged in political advocacy related to his expertise when he called for the U.S. government to act on reducing greenhouse gases. All of this seems quite obvious.

Let me emphasize that I think that Dr. Hansen should be able to do all of these things, provided that he is clear that he is offering his opinions and they differ from those of his employer, the government of the United States. He did exactly this in a recent speech,

Hansen prefaced his speech, which focused largely on how quickly humans must act in order to prevent irreversible climate change, by saying he was speaking as an individual. "I'm not speaking for the agency or the government," he said.

But at the same time it is important to recognize how government works in the United States, and most democracies. Far reaching national policies are set by the duly elected representatives of the people, and not unelected government bureaucrats. Governance would be impossible if every government employee sought to implement policies according to their own personal beliefs. As Sobel writes in an excellent article titled “The Ethics of Resigning,”

All senior leaders, whether appointed or career, serve in an administration and for a principle with broader responsibilities. These officials have special obligations to protect and support their principal and administration as the mechanism of democratic accountability in government. They have strong implicit obligations to stay within the policy framework of their administration and not undermine their principal.

Dr. Hansen has every right to disagree with the policies of the U.S. government. But at some point, Dr. Hansen and others in government positions have to decide where their allegiances lie – do they want to work for the government and help to implement those policies that, for better or worse, are the result of the messy process of democracy? Or do they want to throw their efforts behind the aims of special interest groups who are seeking particular political outcomes? There is indeed a choice to be made as they cannot effectively do both. And sometimes, the ethically correct choice in a democracy is to resign and take the honorable position of outspoken political advocate.

J. P. Dobel argues that the decision to resign from a government position has positives and negatives, among them,

. . . resignation can help ensure accountability to democratic institutions . . . exit from an institution can signal to the public the existence of a debate over deeper or more serious issues than had been exposed in public deliberations. A public resignation with voice adds information and credibility to dissent. Like any human action, however, resignation cuts both ways and can also harm accountability. If everyone opposed to a policy exits, the institution loses its capacity for internal reform. Exits of dissenters narrow the range of options within an inner circle, encourage groupthink, and undermine the internal trust and communication needed for honest policy discussion.

Dobel argues that career officials have strong incentives not to resign,

Career officials possess strong independent moral obligations to stay and accede to legal changes in policy as they respond to democrativ accountability and defend the competence of their office. They might believe they can ameliorate the policy, leak, or whistle blow, or work to change the policy.

Bottom line from my perspective:

NASA and NOAA have an obligation to allow career scientists to express their views on science and its relationship with policy.

Career scientists have an obligation to differentiate their personal views from official government policies.

Career scientists need to look inside themselves and ask the difficult question, “If I cannot in good faith fulfill my job and its responsibilities to implement the policies of a democratic government because I disagree with those policies, do I have an ethical obligation to resign and take on a role as political advocate working to change the system?”

If democratic governance is to be possible, then for some people in some situations, the answer to this question should be “Yes.” I don’t know what the answer is for James Hansen, but it is a question that he should ask himself every day that he works to overturn U.S. government policies on climate.

Reference: J.P. Dobel, 1999. The Ethics of Resigning, Journal Policy Analysis and Management, 18:245-263.

Posted on February 12, 2006 08:46 AM View this article | Comments (21) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

February 02, 2006

Especially Special Interests

Many observers of and in the scientific community have quite appropriately decried the apparent undue influence of industry on political issues involving science. So it is very interesting to read in today’s New York Times how big industry lobbied the Bush Administration for more funding for science:

President Bush's proposal to accelerate spending on basic scientific research came after technology industry executives made the case for such a move in a series of meetings with White House officials, executives involved said Wednesday.

Why would industry want more government spending on research?

After all industry already spends upwards of $180 billion per year (PDF) on research and development, and since 1998 (PDF) basic research funding has increased dramatically. Could it be that industry has a special interest in seeing the government spend more on science? According to the New York Times this is exactly the case.

What was different this year, according to a number of Capitol Hill lobbyists and Silicon Valley executives, was support on the issue by Republican corporate executives like Craig R. Barrett, the chairman of Intel, and John Chambers, the chief executive of Cisco Systems. Industry officials eager to see a greater government commitment to research held a series of discussions with administration officials late last year that culminated in two meetings in the Old Executive Office Building on Dec. 13. There, a group led by Mr. Barrett and Norman R. Augustine, a former Lockheed Martin chief executive, met with Vice President Dick Cheney. A second group headed by Charles M. Vest, the former president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, met with Joshua B. Bolten, director of the Office of Management and Budget. The industry and science leaders told the officials that the administration needed to respond to concerns laid out in a report by a National Academy of Sciences panel headed by Mr. Augustine. It warned of a rapid erosion in science, technology and education that threatened American economic competitiveness.

The panel headed by Norman Augustine was full of people with corporate ties (details here). Consider:

Norman Augustine: Former CEO of Lockheed Martin, on the boards of Black and Decker, Lockheed Martin, Proctor and Gamble, and Phillips Petroleum
Craig Barrett, CEO, Intel

Gail Cassell, vice president, Eli Lilly

Robert Gates, on the boards of NACCO Industries, Brinker International, and Parker Drilling Corporation

Charles Holliday, CEO, DuPont, on the boards of HCA and Catalyst

Richard Levin, on the board of Lucent

Lee Raymond, CEO, ExxonMobile

P. Roy Vagelos, former CEO Merck & Co.

Charles Vest, on the board of IBM
So here is one perspective on how an observer might interpret what what has transpired here:

The National Academy of Sciences convened an expert panel of people to make recommendations about how the federal government might help the United States become more competitive. This expert panel was comprised of many people who have a clear vested, financial stake in their recommendations. Not surprisingly then they recommend a set of actions involving increasing the federal support for research and development, much of which directly benefits industry, e.g., through intellectual property rights under Bayh-Dole, a greater supply of U.S. based talent (i.e., greater supply = less wages) etc. Then, along with a number of their industry friends, the chairman and a member of the NRC committee actively lobby the Administration for this particular package of “industry subsidies” to appear in the federal budget.

Now I am writing this not to object to more spending for science and technology. I’m all for it, after all I work at a university and frequently apply for reserach grants. But I am writing this to illustrate how fickle people are when it comes to “special interests.” Imagine, if you can, if this panel had been comprised to recommend an energy policy strategy and came up with a set of recommendations for drilling in the Arctic and clean coal. You can bet that many activists in the science community would be howling about the influence of industry special interests on government.

As it happens the special interests in question here are those parochial interests shared by the science community across industry, government, and academic science. So you can expect to hear not a single word from the scientific commnity about industry's prominent role in formulating these recommendations or any protests about members of a NRC committee engaging in overt political advocacy and lobbying. the only difference between this issue and others is that in this case it is the science community's self-interests that are at stake.

It just goes to show, that when it comes to special interests, they are especially special when they are yours.

Posted on February 2, 2006 10:35 AM View this article | Comments (3) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | R&D Funding | Science Policy: General

January 31, 2006

Straight from the Horse’s Mouth

No doubt we’ll be discussing the SOTU in days to come, but for now on a different subject, Harvard’s Center for Health and the Global Environment organized a congressional briefing last week on what science is and is not, according to a story in the New York Times today.

So now, when scientific questions pervade legislation on issues like climate change and stem cell research, there is growing concern that Congressional misunderstanding can produce misguided policy. To fight such misunderstanding, Mr. Boehlert and others sponsored the Jan. 23 briefing, organized by the Center for Health and the Global Environment at Harvard. Capitol Hill has briefings by the dozen every year in which industry, academic and activist groups address diverse topics related to science. Some criticize these briefings as little more than showboating. But Mr. Boehlert, like many others, thinks they are "absolutely" useful. And the briefing was unusual in that its subject was not avian flu, the budget for NASA or any other relatively narrow issue, but rather "how science works."

Harvard’s Sheila Jasanoff, a widely read and respected scholar of science studies, took a less positive view of the session, one that I largely share:

Not everyone thought defining science was even possible, in such a short session. "It makes me extremely tired that they are going to do this again," said Sheila Jasanoff, a professor of science and technology studies at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, who has written widely on how science policy is made. "There is no easily graspable definition."

Some interesting quotes from the New York Times article:

The worth of any scientific finding, Dr. [Donald] Kennedy [editor of Science] told the crowd, is not the prominence of the researchers responsible, the prestige of their institutions or the authority of their funding agencies, but whether other researchers achieve the same results. Dr. Kennedy did not refer explicitly to a scandal that is roiling science, and Science — the discovery that highly praised cloning experiments in South Korea survived the magazine's peer review process to win publication, only to be declared fraudulent. But he said: "Peer review is not a process that guarantees truth. If it were, no one would ever repeat experiments." Replication, he said, "is the ultimate test of truth in science."

I am sure this will be seized upon by the opponents ~~still beating that dead horse~~ involved in the “hockey stick” debate, with one side claiming that other studies have found the same results as the controversial earlier study and the other side claiming that study has yet to be fully replicated. Both sides are probably right.

The following excerpt caused me to raise an eyebrow and is pretty telling about science in politics:

Dr. [Harvey V.] Fineberg [president of the Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences] spoke of the way scientific knowledge was turned into information useful to society, a process that he said the National Academy encouraged through its regular production of reports on topics as diverse as national security and arsenic in drinking water. The academy's reports are influential, he said, because of its reputation for integrity, because of its avoidance of conflict of interest, because researchers who produce its findings are volunteers and because "nothing is kept back."

Now if an official from just about any other organization such as tobacco companies, big oil, environmental groups, etc. stated that their group had no conflicts of interest, it would pass the laugh test. For some reason, scientists get a free pass, even in the face of ample evidence to the contrary, which we’ve documented here in abundance.

If Congress wants to learn about how science works, it should of course talk to scientists, but it should also talk to people whose expertise lies in how science works. When might we see a congressional briefing starring Shelia Jasanoff?

Posted on January 31, 2006 07:57 AM View this article | Comments (32) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

January 27, 2006

Two Interesting Articles

This post describes two papers that discuss different aspects of climate science, policy and politics. I don’t agree with everything argued in them, but they are thoughtful pieces of scholarship that challenge us to think. They are both worth a look.

In the journal Science Technology & Human Values Reiner Grundman has an interesting paper that makes the compelling argument that scientific consensus is neither necessary for sufficient for political action on climate change. He argues that the absence of a consensus did not limit progress on the ozone issue and the presence of a consensus has not forced progress on the climate issue. Instead, he argues the importance of political leadership. Here is the abstract:

Science, Technology & Human Values, Vol. 31, No. 1, 73-101 (2006) DOI: 10.1177/0162243905280024 © 2006 SAGE Publications
Ozone and Climate: Scientific Consensus and Leadership
Reiner Grundmann

Aston University

This article compares the cases of ozone layer protection and climate change. In both cases, scientific expertise has played a comparatively important role in the policy process. The author argues that against conventional assumptions, scientific consensus is not necessary to achieve ambitious political goals. However, the architects of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change operated under such assumptions. The author argues that this is problematic both from a theoretical viewpoint and from empirical evidence. Contrary to conventional assumptions, ambitious political regulations in the ozone case were agreed under scientific uncertainty, whereas the negotiations on climate change were much more modest albeit based on a large scientific consensus. On the basis of a media analysis, the author shows that the creation of a climate of expectation plus pressure from leader countries is crucial for success.

A second paper is by our Myanna Lashen also the journal Science technology & Human Values (here in PDF), and grapples with the contradictory impulse for more democratic decision making and the practical reality of the role of information limits and political power that shapes the ability of the public to weigh competing knowledge claims. She argues,

this study demonstrates that exposure to countervailing opinions does not necessarily result in a more informed, participatory, and critically aware citizenry, a necessary basis for legitimate policy making in policy arenas in which only probabilistic knowledge is possible. This study of U.S. climate politics highlights problematic aspects of how governments, international bodies, and political and vested interest groups have chosen to deploy science. It shows that these actors deploy science and the “symbols of science” (Toumey 1996) in ways that constrain public debate and critical, balanced understanding of the strengths and limitations of scientific knowledge.

Here is Lahsen’s conclusion,

As shown by countless social studies of science, science is intimately and inextricably interlinked with politics, and no transcendent definitions exist by which to distinguish true science from “pseudoscience.” Even peer-reviewed science produced by means of the scientific method of hypothesis, experimentation, and falsification is liable to error. But it is nevertheless a particularly rigorous basis for the production of knowledge, and it can and should enjoy greater consideration relative to claims that not only are produced by less rigorous methods but also are paid by, and designed to benefit, financial and political elites over the general good. As responsible citizens, we must learn how to recognize the difference and to define the general good by means of truly participatory processes.

Like all of her work, this piece is complex and rich in detail, and challenges you to think about the complexities and inconsistencies present in the real world of human action.

Posted on January 27, 2006 07:27 AM View this article | Comments (16) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Climate Change | Science Policy: General

January 25, 2006

And They’re Off . . .

Interesting times are ahead for science policy discussions for a lot of reasons. This story from The Hill mentions the bills that we referenced a few days ago:

A bipartisan group of senators will introduce an ambitious trifecta of bills today aiming billions of dollars in new spending at the nation’s sliding science and technology sector. The bills, collectively called Protecting America’s Competitive Edge (PACE), sprang from a request made by Sens. Lamar Alexander (R-Tenn.) and Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.) to the independently funded National Academies: What specific actions could Congress take to ensure continued U.S. competitiveness? When the National Academies came back with 20 recommendations and a report on how to implement them, the senators took notice, as did President Bush, who is reportedly considering making science and technology innovation a major theme of his State of the Union address. Alongside Energy and Natural Resources Committee Chairman Pete Domenici (R-N.M.) and Sen. Barbara Mikulski (D-Md.), Alexander and Bingaman are sponsoring three versions of PACE: one for energy, one for education and one for tax policy. The bills would set up a new transformational-energy agency within the Energy Department, create science and math scholarships for 25,000 students and boost research spending at seven federal agencies. The bills are estimated to cost upwards of $9 billion, a price tag that could prove anathema to a congressional leadership already wary of the bloated federal deficit. But the PACE bills have the solid support of the GOP-leaning business community.

The brief article is here .

Posted on January 25, 2006 11:19 AM View this article | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | R&D Funding | Science Policy: General

Public Value of Science

Yesterday we pointed to a thoughtful report from DEMOS, a UK think tank, titled “See-through science” published in 2004. Last year DEMOS published a follow-up report that provided a somewhat more sober perspective on the staying power of the so-called “deficit model” of the public understanding of science. The follow-up report is tilted, “The Public Value of Science” and is just as thoughtful as the first. Here is what it says about the deficit model:

Beneath the thin crust of consensus in these debates there lies a deeper ambivalence. Old assumptions continually reassert themselves. To give one recent example, Alec Broers, in his 2005 Reith Lectures, The Triumph of Technology, rehearsed the now familiar argument that ‘it is time . . . to move away from the old concept of “the public understanding of science” to a new more dynamic “public engagement”’. Minutes later, in the debate that followed, he had this exchange with Mary Warnock:
Baroness Warnock: After the election, the government, whatever government, has simply got to bite the bullet and start planning and constructing new nuclear reactors. In spite of your extremely welcome insistence that the public must be involved, do you think the public is really well-enough informed? Are they not perhaps too apprehensive to make this decision? It seems to me that what is needed here is very firm leadership.

Lord Broers: I agree with you. But I don’t know how quickly we can educate the public, to bring the evidence forward in a calm and rational way.

No sooner have ‘deficit’ models of the public been discarded than they reappear.

Later in the report the authors single out those who would use the notion of objective scientific truth to argue against public involvement in science policy decision making:

As we noted earlier, rumours of the death of the ‘deficit model’ have been greatly exaggerated. Despite the progress of the science and society agenda, there are still those who maintain that the public are too ignorant to contribute anything useful to scientific decisionmaking. One of the most vocal is the Liberal Democrat peer, Dick Taverne. In a letter attacking Nature’s editorial on upstream engagement, Taverne rejects ‘the fashionable demand by a group of sociologists for more democratic science’. He goes on: ‘The fact is that science, like art, is not a democratic activity. You do not decide by referendum whether the earth goes round the sun.’ But Taverne is setting up a straw man. As we emphasised in See-through Science, upstream engagement is not about members of the public standing over the shoulder of scientists in the laboratory, taking votes or holding referendums on what they should or should not be doing. That Taverne can conceive of accountability only in these terms reflects nothing more than the poverty of his own democratic imagination. This agenda is not about imposing cumbersome bureaucratic structures on science, or forcing lay people onto every research funding committee. Questions about structures do need to be considered, but are a sideshow compared with the far more important – and exciting – challenge of building more reflective capacity into the practice of science. As well as bringing the public into new conversations with science, we need to bring out the public within the scientist – by enabling scientists to reflect on the social and ethical dimensions of their work.

But getting individual scientists or communities within the scientific enterprise to “reflect” on the broader dimensions of their work can be a challenge. A few written comments from students in my graduate seminar this week were extremely perceptive along these lines. One student observed,

Pielke (2002) states, “many granting agencies now ask in their evaluation criteria whether the proposed research will benefit society.” Although many scientists support this principle, they do not have the expertise to assess their work in this way. This statement resonated with my office mate and me, and we had a good laugh. Whether applying for a large research grant or a graduate student fellowship there is always a requirement to state broader impacts or to indicate how the proposed research furthers the mission of the funding agency. In addition, the applicant must usually specify how the results will be made available to the public. These are always the most exasperating questions to answer, and I generally feel like I'm pandering to some reviewer with my uninspired response. Its not that I do not think science should provide some benefit to society at large. To the contrary, I and most scientists are trying to better understand the natural world so that we can fix some of the problems in it. I just can’t answer the broader impacts question very well because, aside from understanding a tiny piece of the sea level rise puzzle, I don’t really know how my increased knowledge of meltwater movement on the Greenland Ice Sheet will benefit my neighbor down the street.”

Another student was less charitable,

In science and engineering, it seems that people are becoming more specialized in certain areas and do not always see beyond their realm. They did not always realize how their work affects others and vise versa. . . The individuals see their finished product and move on to their next task. What goes on beyond that point may not be of their concern. There are many other things that go into research such as funding and politics. Many people say to themselves “That is not my job, so I do not have to know”. . . I believe that today many people play the ignorant card . . . Again, it is not their responsibility and therefore they believe they do not need to care.”

These comments from practicing, early-career scientists echo the arguments of the DEMOS report which finds fault in the so-called linear model of the relation of science and society, which provides a rationalization for both detachment and a lack of accountability in the form of a narrow focus on scientific truths:

When all else fails, critics of upstream engagement tend to resort to arguments based on a linear model of innovation. They grudgingly concede that technologies and applications may merit some public discussion, but insist that ‘basic science’ should be kept apart, as a unique domain governed by curiosity and ‘science for science’s sake’. Yet like deficit models of the public, linear models of innovation are a default, unthinking response to the complexity of the subjects they purport to describe. As John Ziman observes, despite the fact that ‘the linear model of technological innovation is obviously over-simplified. . . it underlies what most politicians, business people, civil servants and journalists say about science’.”

So what is a science studies scholar to do? If the linear model of science doesn’t work in shaping public views about science and about science in particular policy issues, it certainly won’t work in shaping scientists’ views about science in its broader societal and political contexts. The DEMOS reports are open in acknowledging that the answers to this challenge are not readily apparent, but that there are numerous efforts ongoing to enage the scientific community in discussions about its role in society. Their closing words encourage us to keep this subject in play even if challenging,

These are difficult issues and we do not pretend they can be easily resolved. But they bring us back to where we started: the fundamental questions of why we do science, where it is taking us, and who it is for. Tony Blair’s speech to the Royal Society, in which he warned of emotion driving out reason, was titled ‘Science matters’. Our argument has been that, yes, science does matter. But it matters for more than narrow, economic reasons. We need to talk, and occasionally to argue, about why this is so. And we need to infuse the cultures and practices of science with this richer and more open set of social possibilities. This is how, together, we can build public value.

Read the whole thing, here.

Posted on January 25, 2006 08:49 AM View this article | Comments (3) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

Global Spending on R&D

According to a recently released UNESCO report, in 2002 the world spent $830 billion on research and development in the public and private sectors, which represents about 1.7% of global GDP or $134.40 per person. The United States spent 3.1% of its GDP or $1,005.90 per person; the EU spent 1.8% of its GDP or $431.80 per person, Japan 3.1% and $836.6/person, Israel 4.9% and $922.40/person, China 1.2% and $56.20/person, and India o.7% and $19.80/person. This data come from this table in PDF.

In 2002, the United States had 1.26 million researchers with R&D funding per researcher at $230k. For the EU, 1.11 million researchers, and $177,000 per researcher, Japan, 647,000 researchers, $165k/researcher, Israel 9,200 researchers, $661k/researcher, China 811,000 researchers, $89k/researcher, India 118,000 researchers, $177k/researcher. This data comes from this table in PDF.

A press release describes it as follows:

North America continues to lead in scientific investment, with public and private funding accounting for 37% of the world’s gross expenditure on research and development (GERD) in 2002. However, Asia is now the second largest investor, with a share of 32%, overtaking Europe which contributed 27% of GERD, according to data from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) featured in the UNESCO Science Report 2005.

Aside from the two summary table linked above the whole report must be purchased, here is a link to the report.

Posted on January 25, 2006 03:12 AM View this article | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | R&D Funding | Science Policy: General

January 24, 2006

Have we really moved beyond PUS?

The excerpt below is from the excellent report from DEMOS, a UK think tank, titled “See-through science,” which discusses the evolution of engagement between the scientific community and the rest of society. It argues that we have moved beyond the simplistic and unsuccessful efforts by scientists to enhance the public understanding of science (PUS) as a way to motivate public action in particular directions, such as supporting science or accepting certain technologies. Perhaps this is the case in certain contexts having to do with the introduction of potentially disruptive technologies like nanotechnology, but my sense is that the PUS model is alive and well in the scientific community at large. Just consider the recent NRC report on US competitiveness I mentioned yesterday. Here is the excerpt from the DEMOS report:

Phase 1: Public understanding of science (PUS)
The initial response of scientists to growing levels of public detachment and mistrust was to embark on a mission to inform. Attempts to gauge levels of public understanding date back to the early 1970s, when annual surveys carried out by the US National Science Foundation regularly uncovered gaps in people’s knowledge of scientific facts (for example, whether the earth goes round the sun or vice versa). Walter Bodmer’s 1985 report for the Royal Society placed PUS firmly on the UK agenda, and proclaimed ‘It is clearly a part of each scientist’s professional responsibility to promote the public understanding of science.’ The Bodmer report gave birth to a clutch of initiatives designed to tackle the blight of public ignorance, including COPUS, the Committee on the Public Understanding of Science.

Phase 2: From deficit to dialogue

For more than a decade, the language and methods of PUS oozed across the face of UK science policy. But instead of lubricating understanding, scientists gradually discovered that PUS was clogging the cracks and pores which might have allowed genuine dialogue to breathe. Implicit within PUS was a set of questionable assumptions about science, the public and the nature of understanding. It relied on a ‘deficit model’ of the public as ignorant and science as unchanging and universally comprehensible. Partly as a result of PUS’s failings, relations between science and society festered throughout the 1990s, and an occasional rash of blisters erupted (the BSE crisis, GM crops, mobile phones, MMR). It wasn’t until 2000 that PUS was washed away, when an influential House of Lords report detected ‘a new mood for dialogue’. Out went PUS, which even the government’s Chief Scientific Adviser now acknowledged was ‘a rather backward-looking vision’. In came the new language of ‘science and society’ and a fresh impetus towards dialogue and engagement.

Phase 3: Moving engagement upstream

The House of Lords report detected ‘a new humility on the part of science in the face of public attitudes, and a new assertiveness on the part of the public’. And in the four years since it was published, there has been a perceptible change. Consultation papers, focus groups, stakeholder dialogues and citizens’ juries have been grafted on to the ailing body of British science, in the hope that they will give it a new lease of life. Every so often, a few drops of PUS still dribble out from a Lewis Wolpert or a Lord Taverne, but these voices are now a dwindling force. The science community has embraced dialogue and engagement, if not always with enthusiasm, then at least out of a recognition that BSE, GM and other controversies have made it a non-negotiable clause of their ‘licence to operate’.

Read the whole report here.

Posted on January 24, 2006 09:11 AM View this article | Comments (3) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

January 23, 2006

United States Competitiveness

It looks like science policy issues might be increasing at the focus of policy makers attention in the near term. Chemical & Engineering News reported late last week,

“A bipartisan group of senators plans to introduce a package of legislation next week aimed at boosting U.S. competitiveness in science and technology by doubling federal funding for basic research and establishing a new science agency within the Department of Energy. The bills will be collectively titled the Protect America's Competitive Edge Act. They would implement 20 recommendations contained in an October 2005 report by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) that outlined a series of steps the U.S. should take to maintain its global economic competitiveness. The legislation would establish an agency at DOE called the Advanced Research Projects Agency—Energy (ARPA-E) that would provide grants for "high-risk" research and development programs in the energy sector.”

The 20 recommendations referred to are from the NAS report “Rising Above The Gathering Storm: Energizing and Employing America for a Brighter Economic Future”. The report was in response to a request from Congress that asked:

(1) What are the top 10 actions, in priority order, that federal policy-makers could take to enhance the science and technology enterprise so that the United States can successfully compete, prosper, and be secure in the global community of the 21st Century?
2) What strategy, with several concrete steps, could be used to implement each of those actions?

Like kids in a candy store, the NAS committee was unable to limit itself to just 10 and came up with a list of 20 recommendations. Here are the recommendations:

Annually recruit 10,000 science and mathematics teachers by awarding 4-year scholarships and thereby educating 10 million minds.
Strengthen the skills of 250,000 teachers through training and education programs at summer institutes, in master’s programs, and Advanced Placement and International Baccalaureate training programs and thus inspire students every day.

Enlarge the pipeline by increasing the number of students who take AP and IB science and mathematics courses.

Increase the federal investment in long-term basic research by 10% a year over the next 7 years.

Provide new research grants of $500,000 each annually, payable over 5 years, to 200 of our most outstanding early-career scientists.

Institute a National Coordination Office for Research Infrastructure to manage a centralized research-infrastructure fund of $500 million per year over the next 5 years.

Allocate at least 8% of the budgets of federal research agencies to discretionary funding.

Create in the Department of Energy and organization like the Defense Advanced Research Projects Office called the Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy.

Institute a Presidential Innovation Award to stimulate scientific and engineering advances in the national interest.

Increase the number and proportion of US citizens who earn physical-sciences, life-sciences, engineering, and mathematics bachelor’s degrees by providing 25,000 new 4-year competitive undergraduate scholarships each year to US citizens attending US institutions.

Increase the number of US citizens pursuing graduate study in “areas of national need” by funding 5,000 new graduate fellowships each year.

Provide a federal tax credit to encourage employers to make continuing education available (either internally or through colleges and universities) to practicing scientists and engineers.

Continue to improve visa processing for international students and scholars.

Provide a 1-year automatic visa extension to international students who receive doctorates or the equivalent in science, technology, engineering, mathematics, or other fields of national need at qualified US institutions to remain in the United States to seek employment. If these students are offered jobs by United States-based employers and pass a security screening test. They should be provided automatic work permits and expedited residence status.

Institute a new skills-based, preferential immigration option.

Reform the current system of “deemed exports.”

Enhance intellectual-property protection for the 21st century global economy.

Enact a stronger research and development tax credit to encourage private investment in innovation

Provide tax incentives for US-based innovation

Ensure ubiquitous broadband internet access.

Depending upon how this is financed it looks to me like a $5 to $10 billion price tag for all this annually, maybe more. Since both parties are strong supporters of both R&D and U.S. competitiveness, it will be interesting to see how this issue develops. One question that seems to be unasked is, will implementing these 20 recommendations actually lead to the desired results? That is, will they address the issue of US competitiveness? What is the problem anyway?

January 17, 2006

OSTP AWOL?

The website Office of Science and Technology Policy in the Executive Office of the President has been uncharacteristically inactive in recent months. For example, the most recent posted speeches by OSTP officials John Marburger, Kathie Olsen, and Richard Russell are at least six months old. And with the exception of a report released last month on tsunami risk reduction, OSTP has been completely mute on substantive science and technology policy issues.

This seems pretty inconsistent with the quote from President Bush featured on the OSTP home page, ""Science and technology have never been more essential to the defense of the nation and the health of our economy".

If it is so essential, then what gives with the absence of OSTP in the face of important science policy issues of the day?

Posted on January 17, 2006 07:28 AM View this article | Comments (1) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

January 13, 2006

Some Various Quotes

Here are some quotes from things I read recently that I thought were interesting:

Former Colorado basketball player Chauncey Billups was not talking about grade inflation, but he might as well have been when he said, "When you have success and you're not working as hard as you can, it can really be a curse because it gives you a false sense of what it takes to be successful."

Havard's Sheila Jasanoff has many wise things to say about science, policy, and politics. Here is a passage from her 1986 book, Risk Management and Political Culture, p. 72, about risk assessment:

"Scientific judgment must be exercised throughout, usually in full knowledge that different choices may lead to substantially different policy recommendations. Given this state of affairs, it is almost inevitable that a scientist's personal and political values will influence his reading of particular facts."

And page 70 has this gem,

"Research in the sociology of science has led to at least two formulations of the degree to which science is actually socially constructed. The dominant and more complex view holds that scientific knowledge is constructed partly in accordance with norms internal to science, such as empirical testing and peer review, but partly in accordance with external social interest, including the political interests of particular scientific communities. The relative importance of the internal and external norms can vary across disciplines, over time, and in response to political context. A more extreme formulation of the "social construction" hypothesis holds that differences in scientific claims can be reduced to differences in political orientation, so that most assertions about science can be seen as just a camouflage for constellations of values and preferences. Understandably, the second formulation has found adherents among political activists, who sometimes claim that there is no such thing as "good" or "bad" science, at least in the policy context. All policy-relevant science, in this view, is directed to strategic ends, and its quality is irrelevant so long as it leads to the desired societal objectives. At the opposite pole, some scientists are convinced that "good" and "bad" or "right" and "wrong" are absolute, unambiguous categories in science and that policymakers must steer clear of "scientific nonsense" if they are to reach legitimate policy decisions."

Like Jasanoff and most STSers put me down as an adherent of the "dominant and more complex view" of science in policy and politics.

Richard Rorty has lots of wise things to say as well, here is one interesting passage from the essay "A World Without Substances or Essences" which appears on p. 51 in his 1999 book, Philosophy and Social Hope (thanks AB!),

"The term 'objective' is defined by antiessentialists not in terms of relation to intrinsic features of objects by rather by reference to relative ease of attaining consensus among inquirers. Just as the appearance-reality distinction is replaced by distinctions between the relative ease in getting agreement. To say that values are more subjective than facts is just to say that it is harder to get agreement about which things are ugly or what actions evil than about which things are rectangular."

Like Rorty, put me down as an anti-essentialist.

Posted on January 13, 2006 08:40 AM View this article | Comments (7) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Hodge Podge | Science Policy: General

January 11, 2006

Policy Sciences and the Field of S&T Policy

This essay is in response to the series of articles in Policy Sciences (and posted on Prometheus) that discussed the future of the policy sciences. My comments assume a basic familiarity with these articles, and any page references are to those articles, which you can find here I've written a brief summary of the main discussion which you can find below. My intention is to spark comment on how the discussion about policy sciences is applicable to science and technology policy.

While the interests and research agendas of people in both communities do overlap, I think there is a distinct difference. The policy sciences are a specific intellectual tradition within the academic public policy community. The policy scientist would be concerned with context, unpredictability, uncertainty, trial-and-error, and normative commitments in their work (213), which would be problem oriented and utilized many different methods (209). They do not have a specific subject matter focus within public policy. They are also a smaller field that can trace their academic pedigree to one of two founding scholars: Lasswell or McDougal. While there are similar forebears in science and technology policy (Brooks, Bush, Greenberg, Hounshell, et al.), their academic influence is not as distinct. There aren't the common tools, perspectives and approaches to pass down to the 'next generation' of scholars and practitioners.

First, some personal context to inform the rest of my comments. My bachelor's degree is in politics, and my master's is in science and technology policy. I'm currently all but dissertation in science and technology studies at Virginia Tech's National Capital Region campus. I am sympathetic to the policy sciences tradition, and I have taken courses with professors influenced by it; however, I am not trained in that tradition. This is an example of the convergence hypothesis Pielke mentions (220), and a career track similar to one of the authors, Rodney Muth. I also engage in the kind of dual life mentioned by Pielke (222), though my policy science work has been primarily in my professional work, having been employed in the field most of the time I have pursued graduate studies.

I welcomed and enjoyed this exercise in self-reflection about an intellectual perspective (I do not think it fits conventional definitions of a discipline, mostly because it is defined by approach more than subject matter). I think many fields would benefit from this kind of dialogue, including those who study, analyze, and practice science and technology policy. In fact, since many people do come to science and technology policy after being trained in other disciplines (our own version of the convergence hypothesis discussed in the articles), this kind of dialogue may be even more important in trying to determine where the field has been and where it could go. Also, while almost all policy scientists could be put into a larger academic endeavor, public policy, the same is not true for the science and technology policy field. Participants in that work may have homes in public policy, STS, or any number of science, engineering or humanities fields. The diffuse and diverse nature of the science and technology policy field also makes such a discussion that much harder to have.

There are two major points I want to discuss. First: why restrict this kind of reflective/reflexive discussion to the academic component of the policy sciences? This restriction may not have been intended, since this discussion was in an academic journal. But I think this restriction explained some of the optimism over whether the policy sciences community was sustainable. Wallace seems to think a community is sustainable as long as you can maintain the population of teachers in the field. If that's true, and the field has a good handle on future demand then perhaps the policy sciences needn't worry. But is that what the community wants to sustain? This should be a question, as Muth writes, of outcomes, rather than outputs such as faculty positions or number of Ph.D. students in programs. Discussion of applications of policy sciences research and non-academic work in policy sciences are scarce in these articles, and as someone who does not see an academic career for the bulk of graduate students (myself included), I think the authors fail to adequately consider a significant portion of their own community, both now and in the future. An outcome of many academic programs in science and engineering is trained workers in non-academic settings. Why don't Pielke, Wallace, Pelletier and Muth consider that a valid outcome of policy sciences? This is consistent with the trends in science and technology studies and science and technology policy to give short shrift to undergraduates, something apparently shared in the policy sciences. I understand that some consider graduate students the proper emphasis for continuing intellectual traditions. However, for a problem-oriented, pragmatic endeavor like the policy sciences (or science and technology policy), why not spread the precepts, tools and approaches to all the people you educate? After all, an undergraduate in your field stands as much of a chance as a graduate student in developing, executing and/or analyzing policy. If they carry on the communal intellectual tradition, doesn't that magnify the influence of the field? Couldn't it help increase enrollments and, by extension, funding? Does the science and technology policy community have an understanding of what it wants to sustain in terms of outcomes and outputs? Perhaps. But that is a question worth asking every few years, and not just in a commonly read journal (which probably doesn't exist for science and technology policy).

Second, the tension between a cohesive intellectual community and the diverse, diffuse location of policy scientists in academia deserves continued attention, and I think the same tension is present in the science and technology policy community (those who have attended conferences on science and technology policy, or have noticed the increasing specialization within science and technology policy may find this familiar). While invisible colleges (academic communities organized virtually, rather than in a single, physical location) are real, and could address many of the concerns raised by those seeking a more centralized field of policy sciences, they are shrinking in size as they grow in number - a by-product of academic specialization. The institutional resources of federal agencies and academic departments do suggest that policy sciences (and science and technology policy) face additional challenges for not being located in established departments (or federal and state agencies). However, the reward structures of universities are sufficiently different from the kind of pragmatic, problem-oriented work encouraged by policy studies that perhaps the best place to grow policy sciences (and work in science and technology policy) is in research institutes (such as CSPO or SPRU) or outside of academe entirely.

Additionally, much of the relevant literature of science and technology policy, as well as those who influence it, are not located in academia - as I hinted at earlier. So not only is the academic community involved in science and technology policy spread across disciplines and departments, those who would use that knowledge are likewise diffuse and diverse. Would gathering these groups in a single organization or discipline better focus the field and improve its efforts in training policy scholars and professionals? I'm resistant to efforts towards a monoculture for the field. For better or for worse, I think academic and organizational turf battles would doom any effort (at least in the United States) to limited success. One might look at the Office of Science and Technology Policy as one example of such limited success in developing and promulgating a common perspective of science and technology policy. This field must learn to work with its diversity and diffuse organization, because I think it is much harder to try and centralize it as one might try and centralize an academic discipline. However, if centralization is to occur the research meetings organized through the Gordon Research Conferences on Science and Technology Policy are one candidate.

While the discussion in Policy Sciences does not come to any strong conclusions on how to proceed with respect to the field of policy sciences, those third-generation scholars with standing should be encouraged to take some chances, build some connections outside of their group, and conduct some experiments/pilot projects on future possibilities for their community. And we, the science and technology policy community, should doing the same. A stronger network can mean greater impact. Part of that strength comes from a better understanding of what each part of the network does. That's where discussions like the one Roger started can be of most use. I'm going to start by learning more about the policy sciences and how they might apply to science and technology policy.

Posted on January 11, 2006 07:30 AM View this article | Comments (12) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Bruggeman, D. | Science Policy: General

January 06, 2006

The Policy Gap on Climate Change

Do scientists who work on the climate issue have a responsibility to place their work into policy context, specifically, to help policy makers understand the significance of science for alternative courses of action?

Here I'll argue that the answer to this question is clearly "yes," based on a careful look at the historical record of justifications given for public investments in climate research, but that many scientists, including leaders in the community and the IPCC, believe that the answer is "no." Such a refusal to formally sanction, much less engage in, the invention and evaluation of new policy options is one very important reason why the climate issue remains in gridlock, with debate continuing over bad options all around.

(Note: To be fair, some limited progress has been made on connecting climate science and policy, particularly at the regional and sub-regional scales, but there is a long way to go. See this informative but deflating post from Lisa Dilling on the recent CCSP workshop on decision support.)

Before proceeding several clarifications are in order. First, by "climate science" I mean all of the work conducted under climate research programs, which includes physical science and social science (including economics), and summarized by all three Working Groups of the IPCC. My focus is not exclusively on WG I-type science. Second, many scientists and organizations are indeed involved in political advocacy on the climate issue, where political advocacy is defined as working to reduce the scope of choice available to decision makers. Such advocacy often takes the form of explicit endorsement of specific policies. But advocacy can also be "stealth advocacy" in the form more general endorsement of those who support particular policies, or more commonly, opposition of those who advocate a particular course of action, with such opposition typically expressed in terms of science. What is wrong with advocacy anyway, as it is a noble calling in a democracy? In general nothing, but in some situations ever more advocacy can actually contribute to sustaining a political gridlock when all available options are bad ones, as I argued last year in an essay criticizing advocacy efforts by national science academies. The climate change debate desperately needs a dramatic expansion of policy options under discussion, but where will these new and innovative options come from?

Not from the U.S. scientific community is one answer (and I think that this argument holds more broadly, but the examples below focus primarily on the U.S. where more than half of all climate research funding comes from). To understand this argument, I'll present a bit of history on science-policy interactions on the climate issue. I'll provide references at the bottom for those interested in further details or sources.

From the start, politicians put responsibility for action on climate change onto the shoulders of scientists. Al Gore was representative of this dynamic when he stated in 1984,

"The ability of political and economic institutions to respond to a challenge of this magnitude will depend in large part upon how the scientific community explains the problem, how much certainty it invests in that explanation, and how actively involved it becomes in spelling out what the clearly sensible choice might be."

Politicians are more than happy to hand off this hot potato to scientists because dealing with climate change means making decisions and making decisions, especially far-reaching ones, holds the prospect of upsetting important constituencies, which cannot be a good thing for most politicians.

For their part the scientific community, or at least its leadership, warmly accepted the responsibility for leading the response to climate change. In the late 1980s the scientific community organized a massive research program under an explicit policy mandate. The U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) was developed with the following goal:

"To gain an adequate predictive understanding of the interactive physical, geological, chemical, biological and social processes that regulate the total Earth system and, hence establish the scientific basis for national and international policy formulation and decisions "

Read that goal statement closely. It is important to recognize that the USGCRP was never proposed as a basic research program, it was proposed as a program to support policy making, with science as a means to that end, not the end itself. The USGRP is a policy research program that includes climate science as its focus. This focus was codified in a 1990 law (P.L. 101-606) calling for the USGCRP to support policy development (a detailed history of this law and its meaning can be found in Pielke 1995 referenced below). In 1989 before the law was passed a member of Congress expressed his reasons for supporting the program, "We [in Congress] are in desperate need of policy assistance. What are the ways - what are some of the things that we could do to increase the policy relevance of scientific research on global change?" The answer to this question was to initiate a large-scale climate research program with a policy mandate.

Now it was not too long after the law was passed that a number of members of Congress began asking for results. In 1993 a leading official of the USGCRP testified before Congress and was asked the following question,

"How much longer do you think it will take before [the USGCRP is] able to hone [its] conclusions down to some very simple recommendations, on tangible, specific action programs that are rational and sensible and cost effective for us to take . . . justified by what we already know?"

The USGCRP official provided a stunningly telling reply, "Whether [USGCRP] research can translate into actions to deal with the climate change problem . . . is not really the business of the [USGCRP]. That is where our job ends and, thank God, in some sense, other people's job starts"

What?!? Think about this; here we have a multi-billion dollar research program, justified as providing "useable information to policymakers," and a leading official of that program disavows the program's connection to action? Either the program was misjustified or mis-implemented (see Pielke 1995 cited below for a comprehensive argument to this effect, in short the program's goals were never clearly described so that scientists could think they were supported to do basic research, policy makers could expect relevant, and the different perspectives were not resolved).

Fast forward a decade to the Bush Administration which decided to rearrange the structure of U.S. climate research by creating a Climate Change Science Program (CCSP) as an umbrella over the USGCRP and a new effort, the Climate Change Research Initiative (note: I am PI on a major CCRI research program on climate science policy, SPARC). The new structure restated the policy focus of climate research, "The Climate Change Research Initiative (CCRI) [was] launched by the President in June 2001 to reduce significant uncertainties in climate science, improve global climate observing systems, and develop resources to support policymaking and resource management." And similarly to a decade earlier, the leadership of the program disavowed any responsibility for connecting research to policy, with its director stating in congressional testimony in 2003, "The CCSP studies and reports do not recommend specific policy options."

One difference between 1993 and 2003 was that some prominent observers began to complain about the situation. For example, Donald Kennedy, editor of Science, wrote a 2003 editorial titled "The Policy Drought on Climate Change" in which he complained about the focus of the CCSP as being too narrowly on basic research and too little on research on policy options. Yet much stayed exactly the same.

In 2003 Dan Sarewitz and I wrote an essay for Issues in Science and Technology making many of these points titled "Wanted Scientific Leadership on Climate" (cited below). Issues printed an incredible letter in response from a group of very prominent scientists whose names will be familiar to anyone working on the climate issue - Tom Wigley, Ken Caldiera, Martin Hoffert, Ben Santer, Michael Schlesinger, Steven Schneider and Kevin Trenberth. In the letter (here as PDF) these scientists, apparently unaware of the justifications and legislation behind the research program which supported their work, sought to rewrite history in terms of their own interests,

"The basic driver in climate science, as in other areas of scientific research, is the pursuit of knowledge and understanding. Furthermore, the desire of climate scientists to reduce uncertainties does not, as Pielke and Sarewitz claim, arise from the view that such reductions will be of direct benefit to policy makers"

Compare this statement to the goals of the USGCRP and CCRI described above, and there is an obvious mismatch, again leading one to the conclusion that climate research is either misjustified or mis-implemented. The letter-writers then further disavow an explicit connection between climate research and the needs of policy makers, perhaps unaware that this is in fact established in law,

"Of course, it would be nave to suppose that climate scientists live in ivory towers and are driven purely by intellectual curiosity. The needs of society raise some interesting and stimulating questions that are amenable to scientific analysis. It is true, therefore, that some of the research results that come from climate science are policy relevant. It is also true that scientists in the community are well aware of this. It is preposterous, however, to suggest that climate science is primarily policy driven."

Preposterous. Right. About as preposterous as looking at climate research program documents, public law, and congressional hearings to document the repeated justifications expressed by and scientists and policy makers for spending tens of billions of dollars of public monies on climate research.

The disengagement of the scientific community from discussion of policy options continues. For example, the IPCC eschews formal discussions of policy options (something it did not do in its first assessment report where it had an explicit mandate to consider policy options). The net result of the IPCC's disengagement from discussing policy options means that it has in practice fallen in behind the Framework Convention and rather than helping to lead policy discussions on climate change it has arguably become more of an instrument of political advocacy than policy analysis. By taking such a stance, the IPCC is quickly working itself towards complete policy irrelevance. When 2007 comes around decision makers will need information on what to do post-Kyoto, not arguments in support of Kyoto or Climate Convention Article 2.

I was motivated to describe this history by a valuable conversation over the past week on this blog post with several climate scientists that I respect who vigorously defended the proposition that climate scientists should steer clear of engaging in policy research or discussions that might help to expand or clarify the scope of policy alternatives available to decision makers.

One scientist captured (perhaps unwittingly) the perspective held by the vast majority of scientists that I engage with on this issue when he wrote, "Nothing is perfect in this world, and that includes your utopian dream where scientists seek to "expand the scope of choice". Sure, that's a great job for some people to do, and I'm all for it. I don't see why it has to necessarily be _my_ job just because my field of research may have some policy implications." By contrast, in the U.S. at least climate research is supported for exactly this reason. For researchers who accept funding under the CCSP/USGCRP engaging policy is your job.

So my response to climate scientists who decry the pace of action on climate change, criticize the policies of Bush Administration, battle those nefarious climate skeptics, or their perceived mischaracterizations of their science in the media is as follows:

It may be wise to understand the justifications for the ample funds that our fields received from the public. Tens of billions of dollars in research support are provided not because the public or politicians share our innate curiosity in the behavior and implications of climate phenomena, but instead because they want policy options that are politically feasible, technically possible, and economically viable. When you complain about the lack of action, ask yourself where policy options come from. Then go look in the mirror.

References

Pielke Jr., R. A., 1995: Usable Information for Policy: An Appraisal of the U.S. Global Change Research Program. Policy Sciences, 38, 39-77. (PDF)

Pielke, Jr., R. A., 2000: Policy History of the U.S. Global Change Research Program: Part I, Administrative Development. Global Environmental Change, 10, 9-25. (PDF)

Pielke, Jr., R. A., 2000: Policy History of the U.S. Global Change Research Program: Part II, Legislative Process. Global Environmental Change, 10, 133-144. (PDF)

Pielke, Jr., R. A., 2001: The Development of the U.S. Global Change Research Program, A Policy Case Study Prepared for the 2001 American Meteorological Society Policy Symposium, June. (PDF)

Pielke, Jr., R. A. and D. Sarewitz, 2003. Wanted: Scientific Leadership on Climate, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter, pp. 27-30. (PDF)

Posted on January 6, 2006 09:47 AM View this article | Comments (10) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Climate Change | Science Policy: General

January 04, 2006

Relevant but Not Prescriptive Analysis

Continuing a series of posts this week about the role of scientists in politics I'd like to call attention to a very interesting 2002 paper by Fulton T. Armstrong in the journal Studies in Intelligence. If Armstrong's name sounds familiar it may be because it came up last year in the nomination of John Bolton as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations as someone who has bumped heads with Bolton, and had been demoted as a result. See this article for some background.

Armstrong's article is titled, "Ways to Make Analysis Relevant But Not Prescriptive" and if this title also sounds familiar it may be because this is the same phrase used by the IPCC (e.g., here in PDF) to describe its relationship with policy in its work. In my comments below I'll contrast Armstrong's view on this subject with that of the IPCC, and my critique of some of the IPCC's practices related to policy analysis. The IPCC never defines what it means by "relevant but not prescriptive," but it seems pretty clear that however it uses the term it is not the same meaning as Armstrong suggests that it should be defined.

What follows are some excerpts from Armstrong's article, which is very interesting, but certainly not comprehensive on this subject. Let's start with Armstrong's "bottom line" and then I'll offer some comments on particularly interesting passages.

"The policymaker (or his or her boss) was elected by the American people to make value judgments. It is our job to develop a framework to help policymakers weigh multiple options, but their job to determine how to react to challenging situations, from turning the other cheek to staging a full confrontation. It is our job to discern whether the Argentine government's new economic policies will enable it to survive and satisfy people's needs, but it is the policymakers' job to determine whether Argentina's steps warrant US and IMF help. It is our job to assess the intentions, strengths, and vulnerabilities of violent groups, such as the Colombian FARC insurgents, but it is the prerogative of senior US officials to brand them "terrorists" and include them in the Global War on Terrorism. It is our job to provide information on whether the Cuban government is supporting terrorist activities, but it is the policymakers' choice whether to keep Cuba on the State Department's list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. It is the decisionmakers' prerogative to decide whether rhetoric hostile to a US policy-say, criticism of the war in Afghanistan-is a "setback" for the US national interest in absolute terms.

The Intelligence Community should provide policymakers with analytic products that are realistic and reflect a range of legitimate interpretations of events and their implications for the United States. We should be the radiologists: We take the picture and read the spots on it to the best of our ability, but we leave the diagnosis and cure to the doctors. We should provide the facts and possible interpretations of them, but not apply a value ruler. Our products should reflect an awareness of the immutable "national interests" as well as the range of policy options and political preferences-and not prejudge them for the policymaker."

The key here is found in the last statement. Armstrong sees that "not applying a value ruler" occurs not by ignoring policy, but by being aware of and engaged in policy analysis, by providing a range of options for policy makers to consider. This stands in stark contrast to the behavior of the IPCC, which stands at arms length from explicit discussion of policy options, yet expresses a clear preference throughout for certain policy options over others.

He starts his essay with some humor,

"The CIA is neither a policy nor a law-enforcement agency-this is our mantra from the day that we sign on. Analysts do not have policy preferences. Analytic products do not lean in specific policy directions.

The Agency produces intelligence free from political bias. We say implicitly that we focus on national interests, not the policy or political interests of an administration or the Congress. Every piece of intelligence we produce is to be both policy relevant and-despite the correlation between relevance and the political stakes behind it-reflect a non-politicized interpretation of the national interest. We say we can swim without getting wet."

In other words, politics imbues the work of the CIA, despite statements to the contrary.

"The complex dynamics that underpin policy preferences are part of living in the real world. Priorities are never as clear-cut as policy rhetoric would have them. It is the responsibility and prerogative of the policymakers to determine how conflicting interests will be prioritized for their purposes. It is particularly tough when policymakers' appetites for intelligence contributions do not correlate closely with the lofty priorities we think we should be supporting. Indeed, many of us have worked late into the night to meet a policymaker request for intelligence on a matter that is presented as being of urgent national interest, only to find out later that our support was used to help one side in a bureaucratic dogfight."

In other words, sometimes intelligence is used to support pre-determined political objectives. Shocker!

"The temptation to take sides in policy debates is strong, but analysts can run into trouble even inadvertently, because there are so many types and levels of "national interest." If we are not careful, sections that address "Implications for the United States" can become policy-prescriptive simply by describing a positive outlook that coincides with a policy direction or expressing pessimism about a foreign country's course of action, and can appear to "poke the policymaker in the eye," as former Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates used to say."

The IPCC has run into considerable trouble on this count, exactly as Armstrong describes, starting with it schizophrenic approach to the concept of "climate change" itself (see this PDF).

Armstrong argues that being relevant but not prescriptive requires having an awareness of the political and policy terrain. Ignorance of or attempting to ignore this context is not helpful

"To stay clear of minefields, the crucial first step is to consciously assess the different categories into which US interests fall-not an easy task because all interests seek to cloak themselves as "national" interests. To do that, in my opinion, requires intelligence professionals to follow the policy and political debates and know where various policymakers and politicians are drawing the lines on national interests.

Our job is to remain outside the policy and political process, not to be ignorant of it. To navigate around the shoals of debate, we have to know where the points of contention are. We can garner only a piece of this from policymaker "feedback" on analysis, although such channels of communication are important. In my personal experience, feedback should always be taken with a grain of salt. Administration officials are human, and it is natural for them to favor information that supports their views.

Policymakers usually are not eager to challenge us or put opposing views on the table-because they see no benefit in questioning the conclusions, want to avoid the appearance of unduly influencing analysis, or are too harried to take the time. Periodic internal reviews of our work provide more meaningful insights into the quality and timeliness of our support to policymakers. Analysts should also seek information from outside the administration-from public forums, nongovernmental organizations, and Capitol Hill. Analysts should be versant in the policy and political sides of their stories. Savvy intelligence requires it."

The second part of the preceding excerpt warns of the dangers of relying too much on feedback from policy makers as a source for evaluating the effectiveness of intelligence. The IPCC has highlighted its role in support the Climate Convention and Kyoto Protocol (discusses here), but with more and more observers asserting that Kyoto is a very, very small step forward at best (a dismal failure at worst), it is fair to question how effective the IPCC has actually been in supporting decision making on climate. Positive statements from people responsible for implementation of the Convention are valuable of course, but not definitive.

Armstrong calls for internal and external reviews of intelligence activities, which is something that the IPCC and its supporters have openly and vigorously resisted.

"Use alternative analysis. Single-line analysis entails selectivity in the use of evidence and argumentation and, therefore, results in a relatively narrow interpretation of US interests. Explorations of alternative possibilities are more intellectually honest, prejudge policy preferences less, and have a longer shelf life. Reinterpreting evidence based on a recognition that the assumptions, drivers, and implications in our main line of analysis may be wrong or skewed can force us to recognize the legitimacy of different perspectives and keep us from getting too close to one policy thrust or another."

The IPCC is focused on developing a "consensus" view on climate science. However, evidence exists that in some areas the IPCC's consensus may not accurately reflect scientific opinion among relevant experts. For example, this forthcoming paper by Granger Morgan and colleagues finds that the consensus view on uncertainties associated with aerosol forcing reported by the IPCC dramatically underestimates the uncertainties actually held by the relevant experts, they conclude, "The range of uncertainty that a number of experts associated with their estimates, especially those for total aerosol forcing and for surface forcing, was often much larger than that suggested in 2001 by the IPCC Working Group 1 summary figure." It may very well be that policymaking is better support by a presentation of the full ranges of uncertainty rather than through idealized constructs of consensus, (see this essay in PDF). The great irony here is that the best way to deflate the efforts of legitimate skeptics of any sort is to invite them into the fold and have them present their views as part of the diversity of perspectives on complex, contested scientific issues. Not allowing them to participate enhances their legitimacy and credibility, particularly in situations like that documented by Morgan et al. where the assessment report understates the uncertainties as view by the relevant community.

"Merely to warn is somewhat extortionary; it tells policymakers that we see circumstances harmful to national interests according to a single interpretation of them. It covers our rear ends-we can always say we "told you so"-but it leaves the policymakers exposed, often without providing actionable intelligence that would help them develop a viable remedy. Good opportunity analysis, on the other hand, provides the policy community with an inclusive assessment of how various US interests are affected by evolving circumstances. Done right, opportunity analysis reflects the complex array of interests that policymakers are trying to juggle. If a foreign government is headed toward a decision harmful to a US interest, analysts may see opportunity to promote other interests, perhaps as a quid pro quo. Foreign policy does not follow a straight line; analysis should not either."

I interpret "opportunity analysis" here to be equivalent to a discussion of policy options. The IPCC in seeking to describe a problem requiring action short changes politicians when it fails to follow through with a wide-ranging discussion of specific policy options (i.e., taken by who, how, where, at what costs?) rather than broad hand waving at best and stealth policy advocacy at worst.

The Armstrong essay provides lots to think about and discuss. Read the whole thing "here".

Posted on January 4, 2006 01:28 PM View this article | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Climate Change | Science Policy: General

January 03, 2006

Partisan Politics and Science Policy

Conservative commentator Jonah Goldberg had an interesting column last week on the virtues of political partisanship. He writes, "Of course, there's nothing wrong with people being more polite to one another. But the belief that a healthy liberal democracy is one in which partisanship has disappeared is not merely ignorant, it's dangerous. Liberal democracy ceases to exist when partisanship vanishes. Democracy is about disagreement before it is about agreement." I think that this is exactly right.

I also agree with Goldberg when he writes, "When you hear people say, "We need to get past partisan differences," what they are really saying is you should shut up and agree with me. Similarly, when public health experts, child advocates, televangelists, environmentalists and the rest insist that this or that isn't a political issue, it's a health issue, child-safety issue, moral issue or whatever-kind-of-issue, what they are really saying is that we shouldn't have a political argument about my cause. Because my cause is beyond politics. You should just agree with me and do it my way. But even when people make this argument in all sincerity, they miss the point. Virtually all issues are political issues the moment we ask politicians to deal with them."

But Goldberg's argument is incomplete. Yes, politics is bargaining, negotiation and compromise (through arguments of course) in pursuit of desired ends, but arguments are about some action (i.e., policy). Policy has politics because political debate is typically over competing courses of action. But what happens in situations in which options for action are poorly defined or all available options for action are bad ones? Where do options for action actually come from? That is, who invents policy options? Who is responsible for developing the range of options that we wind up falling behind in partisan fashion? They certainly don't invent themselves. (One colleague recently responded to this question by explaining that "policy options are exogenous variables to policy analysis"!). The answer seems to be obvious - experts invent policy options. This begs the further question, what roles do we want experts to play in a democracy? Are some roles more context-appropriate or effective than others? How do we know?

One role is of course to engage in overt political advocacy, in the explicitly partisan sense that Goldberg applauds. The political advocate is not only a noble calling in society it is in many ways the fundamental basis for American democracy, e.g., as espoused by James Madison in Federalist 10. Experts should indeed support those policy options or political candidates that they feel will advance the values that they hold dear.

But there is another role for experts, particularly in situations where policy choice is limited or all available options are unlikely to achieve desired ends. In such cases we want experts to invent new options, to give us more choices. More options hold the prospect of altering political dynamics in ways that can break pre-existing gridlock. For example, when scientists invented substitutes to chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) over two decades ago it helped to sway industry support for CFC regulations. Imagine if instead of working on new options, those scientists instead spent their time simply arguing for or against regulation. Some areas of policy institutionalize the distinction between expanding or clarifying options and promoting a particularly favored option, and military intelligence is probably the best example. When the Bush Administration worked to conflate these two roles during its promotion of the Iraq war, it arguably led to a weakening of the intelligence infrastructure at best and a limited perspective on available options at worst. (There are other roles for experts as well, not described in this essay.)

Here we've frequently argued against mindless partisanship among scientists. By this we mean the knee-jerk reaction by some scientists, and more importantly scientific organizations, to jump on this or that political bandwagon in an effort to reduce the scope of choice available to decision makers. The issue of climate change provides a great example of this dynamic with many prominent scientists focusing their time and efforts arguing against the nefarious skeptics who oppose regulation of greenhouse gases. As a result of this action these anti-skeptics wind up either explicitly or implicitly (i.e., hiding behind science) advocating either undefined or unworkable policy options. This is a problem when if anything climate debate needs more options not more advocacy.

Instead of such political advocacy, like those scientists who helped to break open the debate over CFCs open, we think that some scientists should be working hard to expand the scope of choice available to decision makers. The IPCC, for example, has explicitly ruled out such behavior, and thus has increasing come to serve as an advocacy effort. Expanding options does not mean "getting beyond partisanship," or that partisanship is undesirable, but instead that there are multiple roles for experts in society and we would be wise to understand what those roles are and what criteria scientists might use in deciding what role(s) to play.

Scientists and other experts do face choices in how they relate to the broader society and such choices have individual and collective consequences.

To read more along these lines see this essay:
Pielke, Jr., R. A., 2002: Policy, politics and perspective. Nature 416:368.

Posted on January 3, 2006 08:51 AM View this article | Comments (51) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

January 02, 2006

Normative Science

Robert Lackey, a senior fisheries biologist for the Environmental Protection Agency in Corvallis, Oregon, has a number of very interesting papers on the role of science in politics and policy, and in particular on the role of scientists in policy and politics.

One very interesting essay (of many) is on "normative science" (PDF here) which appeared in Fisheries in 2004. In this essay, which focuses on fishery science but has much broader relevance, Dr. Lackey starts by noting where he stands on science in policy and politics:

"First, fisheries scientists should contribute to policy analysis. Not only is it the right thing to do, we are obligated to do so. I do not hold with the notion that it is sufficient for scientists to publish their findings solely as scholarly reports. Second, when scientists contribute to policy analysis, they need to exercise great care to play an appropriate and clearly defined role. Here is where the interface between science and policy gets muddled for many fisheries scientists. Exactly what is an appropriate role and how do we tell when we are off track? Our role is not described adequately under the current rubric of providing the so-called "best available science." Further, scientists are often asked to contribute to help resolve fisheries policy issues that are unfolding amidst a complex, volatile mix of clashing values, differing preferences, and opposing, often mutually exclusive, societal priorities."

Dr. Lackey defines "normative science" as follows:

"These days, one commonly asserted imperfection in the science-policy interface is that some so-called "science" is imbued with policy preferences. Such science may be labeled as normative and it is potentially an insidious kind of scientific corruption. By normative science, I mean "information that is developed, presented, or interpreted based on an assumed, usually unstated, preference for a particular policy or class of policy choices." In some forms, normative science is not obviously normative to policy makers or even to many scientists. Such "science" has become a serious problem. I believe that use of normative science is stealth policy advocacy."

This perspective is one that Prometheus readers will be familiar with as a topic frequently discussed on this site. "Normative science" has also been labeled "post-sensible science" by Dennis Bray, described here at Prometheus by Hans von Storch as, "science which is encroached by moral entrepreneurship which is usually a mix of "good" political intentions and personal drive for the limelight." Dr. Lackey also notes, "Politically, from what I observe, the use of normative science cuts across the ideological spectrum. It seems no less common on the political Left or the Right, nor from the Greens nor from the Libertarians."

For many scientists and observers of science a common, but misplaced, response to issues of "normative science" is to call for science to be pure, or somehow separate from normative considerations. We see this from those on the political right in calls for "sound science", and on the political left in their calls for "scientific integrity." These are really just different terms for the same concept. Others suggest that a focus on scientific consensus can work to avoid normative concerns, e.g., such as claimed by the IPCC. As Dr. Lackey suggests, dealing with issues at the messy interface of values and science requires that scientists engage with, not pull away from, issues of policy and politics. How to structure such engagement is the real challenge.

Reference

Lackey, Robert T. 2004. Normative science. Fisheries. 29(7): 38-39.

Posted on January 2, 2006 08:38 AM View this article | Comments (5) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

December 19, 2005

Sarewitz on Mooney

Center affiliate and long-time collaborator Dan Sarewitz has posted an advance copy of his review of Chris Mooney's book "The Republican War on Science," forthcoming in Issues in Science and Technology. The review can be found here in PDF.

Sarewitz writes, "The Republican War on Science offers a catalog of Republican-led confrontations with mainstream science, ranging from attacks on evolution and denial of climate change tocthe stacking of government advisory committees with industry scientistscand the blocking of federal funds for stem cell research. As an unapologetic critic of the Bush administration, I was eager to read a penetrating political analysis of how the current regime has sought to wring partisan advantage from the complex and difficult relationship between politics and science. Alas, what I found was a tiresome polemic masquerading as a defense of scientific purity."

For a contrasting viewpoint see this favorable review of Mooney's book by John Horgan in the New York Times, which finds agreement with Mooney that Democracts seek truth, while Republicans seek God and money. Horgan writes that telling good science from bad, "can indeed be difficult, especially if all the scientists involved are trying in good faith to get at the truth, and Mooney does occasionally imply that demarcation consists simply of checking scientists' party affiliations. But in many of the cases that he examines, demarcation is easy, because one side has an a priori commitment to something other than the truth - God or money, to put it bluntly."

Sarewitz picks up on this point as well and rejects it in no uncertain terms, "Mooney tells a story of bad, duplicitous, politically motivated scientists and policymakers on the Republican side, and good, honest, disinterested scientists and policymakers on the Democratic side... Yet Mooney never confronts the reality that scientists on his side of the fence must have values, interests, and personalities just as surely as those on the other side, whom he portrays as consistently corrupt. There can be only one of two reasons for this neglect. Either Mooney has chosen not to portray the values of scientists who line up on the Democratic side because he knows it would weaken his argument and undermine his claim that he is only defending the purity of science, or he actually believes that the scientists on his side are uninfluenced by their values and interests. The reader must therefore decide if the narrator is unreliable or just hopelessly naive."

Posted on December 19, 2005 05:08 AM View this article | Comments (13) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

December 13, 2005

Matt Nisbet on Framing Science

Matt Nisbet, a professor at Ohio State, has set up a very interesting blog on "framing science". We look forward to reading, responding to, and engaging with Matt and his readers.

Posted on December 13, 2005 10:37 AM View this article | Comments (1) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

December 08, 2005

Science Studies in Science Policy

My latest perspective in Bridges is now online here. It is titled, " The Role of Science Studies in Science Policy." It starts out like this:

"In recent decades, science has been increasingly called upon to forge closer connections with the broader society. The days of the basic researcher toiling away in a laboratory with little concern about or accountability to external influences seems to be growing more distant every day. The trend toward a more societally-responsive scientific enterprise has been well documented by scholars who study science in society. Concepts describing this trend such as "Mode 2 science," "use-inspired basic research," and "well-ordered science" will be quite familiar to anyone well-acquainted with the discipline of "science and technology studies." But this trend is not just something that affects natural scientists. It also affects scholars like myself who study science in society. This leads me to ask: What is the relationship between science studies and science policies? And how should that relationship be shaped?"

The rest can be found here. Comments welcomed.

Posted on December 8, 2005 08:01 AM View this article | Comments (5) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

October 20, 2005

The Case for Scientific Assessments

**Post by Andrew Dessler

It has been argued on this web site that it is impossible to receive advice on science independent of political considerations. I disagree and suggest in this post a process for how it might be achieved. The process relies on scientific assessments: summaries of the scientific literature that are produced by expert scientists. Assessments connect the domains of science and democratic politics, but are distinct from both. They differ from science because rather than advancing the active, contested margin of knowledge on questions that are important for their intrinsic intellectual interest, they seek to make consensus statements of present knowledge and uncertainty on questions that are important because of their implications for decisions. They differ from democratic policy debate because they reflect deliberation over questions among scientific experts based on their specialized knowledge, not among all citizens or their representatives over what is to be done.

Here’s how the process would optimally work. Policymakers would determine the positive (scientific) questions of importance to them on some issue. This would likely be an iterative process, where scientists and policymakers together identify which scientific issues are most important for a particular issue. For the climate debate, the important questions might be: 1) is the Earth warming? 2) are human activities to blame? 3) what kind of warming do we expect over the next century? These questions would then be passed to the assessment body, which would use the existing peer-reviewed literature to determine the scientific consensus on those issues, and produce from that a report that is itself peer reviewed by outside experts. A good example of this process in action is the National Academy review of the IPCC Working Group I report initiated by the Bush Administration in 2001. The White House provided a list of questions, and the NAS panel responded to them.

Under this model, the questions investigated by the scientific assessment might have an obvious political agenda. This would not invalidate the non-political "honest broker" status of the assessment, however, since the political agenda is that of the policymakers who determined the questions, not the assessment scientists.

In one of Pielke’s “honest broker” posts, he posed a question about giving advice on where to eat. According to the assessment model described here, if a policymaker asks "where should I eat?", an expert advisor should balk. Answering this question clearly requires the expert make some value judgments about what kind of dinner the policymaker wants. Rather, the expert should insist that the policymaker reconfigure the request into a series of specific positive questions that can be addressed by facts alone, without any value judgments by the expert: "Where is the nearest vegetarian restaurant?” "Which restaurants have entrees under $20?" "Where can I get a dinner that follows the Atkin's diet?" etc. Such questions can be answered without the expert assuming any normative values because all necessary value choices were made by the policymaker in formulating the questions (e.g., decisions such as whether the dinner should be vegetarian or not).

One key assumption underlying this model is that policymakers are able to decide on a set of specific, well-phrased, positive questions for the assessment body to evaluate. For the climate change problem, this would require a values debate between and within national governments, which I believe would be extremely beneficial for the overall debate. It might be particularly beneficial to entrain skeptics like Joe Barton into the process of defining questions. This would allow them to pose their favorite questions to the assessment panel — e.g., Does the disagreement between the surface and satellite record invalidate the surface record? Is there any merit to Lindzen’s “iris” hypothesis? etc., etc., etc. (FYI, the answers are no and no).

For climate change policy, in the end I believe that it is possible to identify a set of pertinent scientific questions that most (but not all) policymakers would agree are the important questions for determining a policy — although this is supposition on my part. I should also note that defining a question is no guarantee that the scientific community can provide a good answer. Policymakers need to realize that policy still needs to be made, even if science cannot tell them everything they want to know. Uncertainty is a fact of life — deal with it!

Once one decides on a set of scientific questions, the IPCC Working Group I provides a good example of how the scientific community answers specific scientific questions without regard to the scientists’ normative values. [note: I’m not arguing that the IPCC TAR does or does not follow this model, just that the questions addressed in the Working Group I report are all answerable entirely from scientific facts.]

To summarize, if one could get all policymakers to agree to use assessments derived according to this model, then I believe that many of the problems of the politicization of science would disappear. I would be incredibly surprised, however, if it ever happened. There are simply too many incentives for policymakers to argue about science for them to willingly give up the opportunity.

Posted on October 20, 2005 09:06 AM View this article | Comments (7) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Others | Science Policy: General

October 13, 2005

Some Reactions to Chris Mooney

The discussion continues over at TPM Cafe; check it out here.

I do have a few other "down in the weeds" reactions to Mooney's response to my first post.

First, Mooney is caught up on passing a judgment on which political party is better or worse at the politicization of science. He writes, "just because science is always to some extent politicized, that doesn't mean that today's Republicans and Democrats are equally guilty." On this point we seem to be talking past each other. If the issue was campaign finance reform, Mooney would be talking about which party exploited the rules to a greater degree while I'd be talking about how to reform the system so that it works better for all participants. But to get past this, lets just postulate that Republicans have been more effective at exploiting science to achieve political ends. I have discussed this before here.

Second, Mooney's better/worse tendency results in his mischaracterizing my perspective. He writes, "Pielke suggests that I am just as bad on this issue as Senate Environment and Public Works committee chair James Inhofe." I suggested no such thing. Here is what I wrote, "Mooney's argument adopts the exact same tactics of cherry picking and relying on convenient experts as does Senator Inhofe". Mooney's cherrypicking is not as significant as Senator Inhofe's, clearly, given that Mooney is a pundit and the Senator is a policy maker. Without a doubt cherrypicking is endemic (even here at Prometheus!).

Third, Mooney demonstrates that he doesn't get what Dan Sarewitz is arguing when he writes, "Sarewitz more or less suggests that we should just shrug off the political misuse or abuse of science--it's no big deal." Sarewitz does not say this at all, and given that Sarewitz writes often about science and politics, he clearly thinks that it is a big deal. Sarewitz argues that there is no point in trying to achieve political ends through realizing some agreement on scientific facts. I am sure that Sarewitz thinks, as I do, that we should always strive to have the best knowledge possible when making deicsions, but we would be foolish to think that we can adjudicate values discputes through debates over science. I discuss this in my secod post at TPM Cafe here.

Fourth, Mooney (and several commenters at Slate) asks us to "Consider the "intelligent design" movement, a well organized, PR-savvy crusade against evolution that masquerades as science even as it seeks to redefine science itself to include supernatural explanations within the fabric of inquiry. This goes far beyond mere "cherry picking," and becomes a more fundamental assault on the nature of scientific knowledge itself." Well lets consider ID. If you look at the data, a similar number of Democrats as Republicans support the teaching of ID in public schools, with only a slight advantage to Republicans. So are these Democracts who support ID also a party to the "war on science"? It is baffling to me how Mooney can just ignore such data that is inconvenient to his thesis. If anything, data on ID clearly supports my argument that we are looking at a phenomena that is much more complicated than can be described as Rep/Dem.

Finally, let me again thank Chris for the chance to discuss these topics at TPM Cafe. It is a pleasure to participate in an open and wide-ranging discussion of these important topics, even though Chris and I disagree.

Posted on October 13, 2005 12:02 AM View this article | Comments (9) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

October 12, 2005

There is No War on Science

A discussion with Chris Mooney is underwway at TPM Cafe. Check it out here.

Posted on October 12, 2005 12:59 AM View this article | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

October 08, 2005

Next Week at TPM Cafe

Thanks to Chris Mooney for inviting me to participate in a discussion of his book "The Republican War on Science" next week over at TPMCafe. We'll provide links to the discussion as it develops next week (though it is safe to say that there will be more incoming than outgoing traffic to out site!) I am pleased to see that there is interest in an open discussion of the issues raised by Mooney's book, even though he and I disagree on its central thesis.

Posted on October 8, 2005 07:56 AM View this article | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

October 06, 2005

More on the Mooney Thesis

Earlier this week I raised some general issues that I had with Chris Mooney's thesis of a "Republican war on science." With this post I'd like to get more specific, with some comments on Chapter 7 of his book which focuses on climate politics and Senator James Inhofe (R-OK) in particular. Mooney argues that Senator Inhofe is "probably the Republican Party's leading environmental spokesman" and thus focuses his critique of Republican climate policy on a July 28, 2003 speech given by Senator Inhofe on climate change and a congressional hearing called by Senator Inhofe the very next day.

Mooney is perfectly justified in excoriating Senator Inhofe for cherry picking and selectively choosing his experts. But so what? This is a member of Congress acting in a political manner. Congress is a political place (shocker), always has been always will be. There is absolutely nothing unprecedented about Senator Inhofe's intemperate speech or his stacked hearing. Floor speeches and hearings are political theater. They are certainly not fora for scientific discourse, and often not even policy discourse. A 1954 study of congressional hearings provides a glimpse into how little has changed over a half-century,

"Each group seemed to come into hearings with a ready-made frame of reference. Facts which were compatible were fitted into it; facts which were not compatible even when elaborately documented, were discounted, not perceived, or discounted."

(R. K. Huitt, 1954. The congressional committee: A case study, American Political Science Review, 48:340-365.)

Further, Mooney's argument adopts the exact same tactics of cherry picking and relying on convenient experts as does Senator Inhofe.

For example, Mooney is quick to tell us of linkages between scientists that he disagrees with and right leaning groups, i.e., Willie Soon (Marshall Institute, TechCentralStation, Frontiers of Freedom) and David Legates (Marshall Institue, National Center for Policy Analysis). But Mooney seems to think that his readers don't need to know a scientist that he agrees with, Michael Oppenheimer, serves as a "science advisor" to a left leaning group, Environmental Defense, which advocates as its top priority passage of the McCain-Lieberman Climate Stewardship Act. At a minimum the selective presentation of information distracts from Mooney's argument, because it leads one to ask why the author doesn't trust the reader with this information.

Mooney also argues that "climate change has become an issue on which conservatives have elected to fight over science ... " Well yes, but so too have liberals. We document this quite clearly here (PDF), and it goes well beyond just climate change. Mooney neglects to discuss how liberals have in many cases adopted the mirror image strategies to conservatives, arguing that a consensus on climate science compels their favored actions. Just like uncertainty is not a reason for inaction, nether is certainty a reason for action.

Also, Mooney quotes Tom Wigley as not liking how Senator Inhofe used his work. Wigley is perfectly legitimate in saying so, but I study climate impacts as well and I see nothing inaccurate or misleading in how Senator Inhofe cited Wigley's work. Mooney's citation of Wigley strikes me as a convenient reliance on an agreeable expert, which is exactly what he accuses Senator Inhofe of doing. Again, I have no complaints about this, as this is the nature of political debate. One cherry picks and relies on dueling experts at the risk of being called on it. But it represents no "war on science." In fact cherry picking and selective use of experts depends upon science.

So it's fine with me that Senator Inhofe and Chris Mooney are both selectively marshalling information to put the best spin on their argument. As far as their arguments, I find neither Senator's Inhofe's thesis on climate change nor Mooney's thesis that there is a misuse of science going on here to be very convincing. (I should say as an aside I found Mooney's disrespectful characterization of a fairly elected U.S. Senator completely offensive, e.g., calling him an "absolute know-nothing." Even in the face of ideological disagreements, if we want to be constructive we should at least be civil in our discourse.)

Let me be unambiguous. I disagree with Senator Inhofe's characterization of climate science as a "hoax" and it seems clear to me that he is cherry picking and relying on experts that happen to mesh with his perspective, i.e., he is using "facts" and scientists selectively. He has every right to do so, and Chris Mooney has every right to call him on it. This is called political debate. If you want climate science, go to the Journal of Climate.

Crucially, Mooney provides no evidence (because there is none) to support the most important claim in this chapter: "Not only do [the conservatives] strive to prevent the public from understanding the gravity of the climate situation, but in sowing confusion and uncertainty, they help prevent us from doing anything about it." This statement is demonstrably false. As I have documented here frequently, the public overwhelmingly believes that humans cause climate change, that its impacts are serious, and that the United States should take action. See here and here (PDF). There is absolutely no evidence that scientific uncertainty (manufactured or otherwise) is an obstacle to action on climate change. The real obstacle is a lack of politically viable actions on the table.

Consider that last June, 11 Democrats voted against the McCain-Lieberman Climate Stewardship amendment to the 2005 energy bill and 6 Republicans voted for it. Had the Democrats voted partyline, the bill would have been very close to passing. If the Left wants to make scientific issues partisan, then they'd better figure out how to win some more elections. If in the face of Republican control of government the Left wants to enact policies that advance their interests, then they'd better come up with some options that their own party can support unanimously and continue to find some bipartisan support. Complaining about the misuse of science will be effective only as catharsis.

There is no war on climate science, just your standard political machinations involving cherry picking and dueling experts. If those wanting action on climate change want to see different outcomes in the future, they would be far better served working to develop viable, bipartisan policy options rather than pursuing the impossible task of enforcing some sort of unanimity of views and statements on climate science. If the reality-based community really believes in its own moniker then it should hear these very real, but probably uncomfortable, words from Dan Sarewitz:

"It is not productive to blame politicians for manipulating or distorting objective science to support partisan positions. Of course politicians will look for any information or argument that they can find to advance their agendas -- that is their job. While politicians may not be above playing loose with scientific truth, more often they can and will simply search out -- and find -- a legitimate expert or two who can marshal a technical argument sympathetic to the desired political outcome. It is the job of politicians to play politics, and this -- like the second law of thermodynamics -- is not something to be regretted, but something to be lived with."

Appendix

To be fair there are some other issues that the chapter discusses, and some of these I have addressed elsewhere, but in a way unrelated to Mooney's thesis.

On NYT reports on the editing of agency reports see here and here.

On uncertainty as a red herring, see this post.

On the role of prediction in policy, see this book and here is the last chapter in PDF.

Posted on October 6, 2005 07:32 AM View this article | Comments (6) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

October 05, 2005

Revisiting Bob Palmer on Partisanship in Science Policy

Last April, recently-retired minority (Democratic) staff director for the House Science Committee gave an excellent talk here on the state of contemporary science policy. Recent commentary here suggests that Bob Palmer's views are worth revisiting. Here is an excerpt from a short essay Bob prepared for our spring newsletter,

"While debates about S&T policy have never been center-stage in Washington, its current corrosively partisan atmosphere has driven them further underground. Partisan science fights began in the late 1980's, when S&T became politicized in Congress as part of a broader strategy - ironically formulated by the aforementioned Newt Gingrich - to fight Democrats on everything, including science. The partisan fight over science policy - exemplified today in reports by Congressman Waxman and the Union of Concerned Scientists - did not start during this Administration. It has been bubbling in Congress for 15 years... Why should this increasingly partisan atmosphere matter to science, when it will continue to perk along nicely, buoyed by tens of billions of dollars of Federal funding? It matters because S&T are key to helping us understand and respond to global changes unprecedented in their speed and scope. We have the largest defense budgets and among the largest Federal deficits in history. We also have the challenge of terrorism and the threat of attacks on our own soil from weapons of mass destruction. Health care costs continue to spiral upward, threatening our small businesses and our future fiscal stability, despite massive expenditures on health research, which seem to exacerbate the cost problem. We face an increasingly competitive Asia, whose ability to challenge our manufacturing base, even our high-tech base - and before long our research and development base - seems limitless. None of these challenges will be solved by science, but they will all require the wise application of science. In the current environment, they may not even get serious consideration, because of a fixation upon partisan advantage and a political culture which makes it increasingly difficult to reach across party and ideological barriers."

Posted on October 5, 2005 06:53 AM View this article | Comments (51) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Others | Science Policy: General

October 04, 2005

Excess of Objectivity Revisited

Here's Dan's response to the entry below:

Author: Daniel Sarewitz

I thank Dylan Krider for his interesting comments. His point, I take it, is that one side (that is, his side) values science and truth, and the other side (that is, I take it, the current political regime) is simply a bunch of totally duplicitous greedheads who don't give a crap about anything except feathering their own beds while the rest of the world suffers.

The problem, though, is that even if you accept this view of things, the ultimate political questions still have little to do with science, and everything to do with what kind of world each side wants to live in. Science can help you know if your path to a goal makes sense or not; it cannot determine what the goal ought to be. The question is this: Are the Republicans in power because they distort the science and so nobody realizes that they're screwing up the world? (Who, one must wonder, is actually being fooled in this manner?) Or are they in power because they speak to a set of values that, for some reason, a majority of voters seems to find preferable to the alternative?

Mr. Krider's true objection, I take it, is that he doesn't like the values and goals of the current regime. I'm with him. But he makes this argument in terms of the regime's use of science. He thus seeks to substitute science for politics.

So this is exactly my point. Now is not the time to argue about who is misusing the science; it's the time to be clear about one's values. Until the Democrats figure this out they're going to remain the minority party.

Put somewhat differently, I'm sure Karl Rove would much prefer to have his regime attacked for misuse of science than for the values and interests that underlie its policy choices.

For more, see: http://www.cspo.org/ourlibrary/articles/EnvironControv.htm

Posted on October 4, 2005 10:05 AM View this article | Comments (6) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Others | Science Policy: General

Reader Comments

In responding to this entry yesterday, Dylan Otto Krider offered this thoughtful comment responding to Dan Sarewitz's piece, Excess of Objectivity. We'd like to encourage the discussion by bringing Dylan's comment and a response from Dan to a larger audience.

Author: Dylan Otto Krider has written on science related issues for the Houston Press, Dissent, and Skeptic.

I have read the Excess of Objectivity paper, and agree with it wholeheartedly - at least, I think I do, until I see it put into practice.

Quote: "[Science] can alert society to potential challenges and problems that lie ahead. In fact, the threat of stratospheric ozone depletion, acid rain, and global climate change were brought to public attention and political prominence in part through the work of scientists. But, once an environmental issue becomes politically contentious, the geological view of nature accepts that science itself can become an obstacle to action."

Well, no science can't alert society if we're still arguing about whether the Earth is going through a "cooling" period, or whether Satellite data shows no warming trend at all.

Does anthropogenic warming necessitate Kyoto? Is reducing CO2 a realistic goal? Is a warmer Earth necessarily "bad"? By arguing the science, as this essay points out, we are avoiding the values debate. I, too, want the debate on values - but we can't get there if you keep jumping on guys like Krugman every time he points out that think tanks have distorted where the science is on this issue. To move to the geologic view, we must first state unequivocally that anthropogenic warming is occurring, just as we must first state unequivocally that evolution is good science before we have a discussion on whether it should be taught in class.

Quote: "Because consensus already exists, action can be taken along lines that all parties can more or less agree on -- the problem of excess objectivity is at least partly allayed. Politics has been allowed to do its job, and science becomes a tool to help determine if implemented policies are working as intended and if progress is being made toward agreed upon political goals."

Okay, for the sake of argument, lets say we actually do shut down the distortions of scientific consens to the point where we do have the policy debate, and implement some policy to address whatever issue. Again, I agree with what the paper says, but how is science to be a tool to determine that policy is a success if we sink studies that contradict our policies? How can we determine that progress is being made if we have no way of reaching those conclusions objectively, or if reached objectively, have no way of getting them into the public sphere?

What good is a study that shows benzene causes cancer if one party is going to sink or rewrite the report and instead tout their API funded study that their internal documents have already shown will conclude that benzene is perfectly safe? - before the experiments have even been conducted. If we have no means of determining what is "good" and "bad" science, well, then, nothing is safe or unsafe. It is a matter of opinion, my science vs. your science, and everyone has some scientific study in their pocket.

This is the problem you're avoiding. If one side sees no value in science that finds environmental problems, or says a commodity is not safe, then how can we ever have this policy debate? What role does science play if one party sees science only as a potential liability that will prevent them from achieving their ends? Is it for the other party to become just as postmodern about science, and get as good at faking studies as API?

You are operating on the faith that the people in control value science. They don't. They value loyalty, yes, and research that can develop technology to be sold, but not science. We will never reach the geologic view because no amount of data will ever convince these guys humans effect the environment for ill, a product is unsafe or that the Earth wasn't created in seven days. We'll never be able to determine if a policy works because they'll never accept any science that contradicts their policy. So what place is there for science in such an environment? None. They'll embrace science if it backs them up, and will apply whatever pressure to distort or subvert any science that doesn't.

And you say same old, same old. Everyone does it. Everyone can pull out some particular fact to back them up. If that was what they were doing, I wouldn't be quite so bothered, but they aren't just cherry-picking facts, they're making them up. They're pulling them out of thin air. Spinning requires some recognition that there are facts to "spin" - what fact is being spun when reports that say regulations on military bases "increase" combat readiness are change to say "decreased"? That's not spin. It's out and out invention.

We have a choice: either accept that this is how you "play the game", and have both sides go tit-for-tat in a postmodern war of press releases, or we can proactively make the case that science matters, that done correctly, we can learn things about the world that will inform us, and say unequivocally that subverting or rewriting scientific studies is a bad idea.

Just because politics is unavoidable does not mean we ought to embrace conflicts of interests, and throw up our hands and bring in whatever pressures interests want to bring to bear on scientists to distort their findings.

Because if we don't convince people that it's important to have a functioning scientific community, then it's let the best press release win. If that's how it's going to be, then we might as well be fighting a values debate over whether eating cheese causes thunderstorms.

Posted on October 4, 2005 09:44 AM View this article | Comments (1) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Others | Science Policy: General

October 03, 2005

A Few Comments on the Mooney Thesis

With a number of readers writing me and asking for some commentary on Chris Mooney's recent book, "The Republican War on Science," I thought I'd offer a few thoughts. I expect that there will be some comments, questions and criticisms and I am happy to address these in subsequent posts. It is a complicated subject. This post is not a book review, but an attempt to engage the "Mooney thesis" from a big-picture perspective. Mooney's work and accompanying marketing blitz has people talking and debating, and that is quite an accomplishment in today's over-saturated information environment. Chris was kind enough to send to me a signed copy of his book with a "thank you" for always challenging him, and I appreciate that. This post continues in that spirit - seeking to challenge Mooney's thesis in a respectful, intellectually-grounded manner.

However, I'll admit to being reluctant to do so. The Mooney thesis is a clever, even brilliant, wedge device, like a political Rorschach test if you will. It is difficult in this context to engage in intelligent debate about the substance of Mooney's thesis without ideologues being quick to ascribe a political motivation for one's views, and then to ignore the substance. It is not uncommon to see ensuing discussion devolve into angry ad hominem attacks and mindless witnessing to one's own political values. That being said, because Mooney's thesis forces science policy to be discussed in Republican-Democrat terms, it is ironically enough an important factor in the contemporary politicization of science. This is not a statement about Mooney's motivations, but the effects that his work has had on science policy debate and discussions, which I observe in classes and in professional collaborations every day. Such debates are polarized from the start, and getting people to consider the factors that enable the misuse of science is clouded by their partisan lenses. I do believe that there are factors that are independent of party affiliation that enable, and even motivate, the politicization of science.

Here is Mooney's thesis in his own words:

"Everyone, every interest group, politicizes or abuses science to some extent. Everyone cherry-picks information, from time to time, to help bolster a particular agenda. However, there's something that's quite different about this [Bush] administration, when it comes to the extent of the abuses. Hardly a week goes by but we have some new outrage at the science-and-politics interface. So the problem is systemic, not just occasional. My thesis is that this is a political phenomenon that is unique to Republican rule in the United States, and which is epitomized by the Bush administration. This administration is constantly doing favors for its big-business and religious-right constituents. That prejudice drives distortions of science on issues ranging from global warming to sex education."

To make any coherent sense at all, Mooney's thesis requires a rather precarious balancing act. He must admit that all interests abuse science (because they do), but then instead of focusing attention on the conditions that lead generally to such misuse, he justifies his almost exclusive focus on Republicans by claiming that they are somehow worse politicizers, and somewhat less credibly, that "it's a crisis that's only recognized by one side of the political spectrum," the Democrats. Thus, Mooney admits that the Left abuses science, briefly, and then focuses 99% of his attention on the Right as if the abuses by the Left are somehow acceptable or not worth attention in this context. Such an argument will of course be well-received by Democrats and attacked by Republicans, because it pretty much gives a free pass to those who abuse science but happen not to be on the Right.

It seems fairly obvious that one's views on whether Republicans are "worse politicizers" or simply "better politicians" are two sides of the same coin and are simply a function of one's own political views. At the national political level, one needs only to look at the composition of Congress and the current occupants of the White House to observe that Republicans have in recent years been more effective politically than Democrats; it should be no surprise to see this in respect to science policies as well. But in the end, arguing about whether Republicans or Democrats (or Bush or Clinton) are "worse politicizers" strikes me as making about as much sense as arguing about whether the American League or National League represent a better version of baseball - you can waste a lot of time doing it and have a lot of fun, but in the end you are no closer to winning baseball games than when you started the debate. (National League, duh.)

There are of course some readers of this post who may believe that science is, or at least should be, value free, unbiased and kept separate from politics. This belief has been so thoroughly discredited by scholars in the field of science and technology studies that it bears only a passing mention here. I have commented on this point at various occasions in the past on this site, and I am happy to get into specific details in follow up discussions.

Mooney's thesis also requires claims of an "unprecedented mobilization" of scientists in opposition to the Bush Administration in order to assert the uniqueness of the Bush Administration's misuse of science. But history does not bear out this claim. According to longtime science policy observer Daniel Greenberg there is nothing unprecedented about the recent mobilization of scientists in support of or opposition to political candidates. In fact, Greenberg argues that scientists are much less involved in politics than in the past, and not because Bush has shut them out, but because of their own lack of sophistication and naivete, "On the Washington scene today, they are virtually ineffective, if present at all, in the venues that count." When one takes the long view, there is much less to distinguish the actions of the Bush Administration than its predecessors, other than perhaps the jarring ideological and political contrasts with its immediate predecessor in the White House. But make no mistake, there was plenty of politicization of science (PDF) going on under Clinton-Gore, as under every administration in the modern era. The underlying problem is not that one political party devalues science, it is that there are circumstances that enable the misuse of science. We have discussed such circumstances at various occasions here, and among them is the willingness of scientists to serve readily as issue advocates rather than honest brokers. Other relevant circumstances include Sarewitz's argument that an "excess of objectivity" allows most any set of facts to be mapped onto diverse and contradictory value positions, and Sarewitz's argument that it is often political controversy that drives scientific uncertainty, and not vice versa.

Ironically, the Mooney thesis depends upon oft-repeated claims of the significance of the views of a small number of people such as Russell Train and William Ruckelshaus whose sole source of credibility lies in the fact that they are Republicans who have criticized the Bush Administration. This reminds me of the claims made by some that Bjorn Lomborg's "skeptical environmentalist" thesis was somehow more credible because he once was a card-carrying member of Greenpeace. By this logic, my critique of the Mooney thesis should be vastly more credible than most because I am no fan of the Bush Administration. I reject this logic in all three cases. Instead of appeals-to-authority-by-playing-against-type, how about we focus on the content of the arguments and data instead? For instance, this year we have been visited by science advisors to Bush (Marburger), Clinton (Gibbons) and Nixon (David) and still have to come advisors to Clinton (Lane), Johnson (Hornig) and Reagan (Keyworth). Our research (e.g., see this PDF) for these events and discussions with the science advisors clearly indicate that science has always been political across administrations and party affiliations. Why? Because there are important underlying dynamics of politics and policy that enable and even motivate the politicization of science. Most recently Edward David told us story after story of the politicization of science under Nixon (stay tuned, we'll discuss these as soon as the transcript of his talk is available). He also described how he is no fan of the Bush Administration' science policies, but he rejects the idea that things are appreciably different today than when he served. Republicans hold no special claim to uniquely politicizing science; they are just more effective these days a playing national politics. Democrats don't like this, but they should resist enlisting science or science policy as a tool to try to reverse this trend of political domination by Republicans at the national level By trying to score cheap political points under the meme of science politicization, the Left is contributing to the problem that it is decrying.

But seeking political advantage for the Left is exactly where Mooney's thesis leads. Mooney suggests that we can address the politicization of science at the ballot box,

"Ultimately, all of this energy should translate into political action itself: If conservative Republicans have a bad record on science, we need to call them out on their abuses and support candidates (Democrat or Republican) with better records."

It is hard to take seriously Mooney's call for supporting Republican candidates, given his various statements (e.g., "we could cry out warnings to conservatives, begging that they step back from the abyss before it is too late," at p. 248) much less the title of the book carrying his thesis. But he can prove my skepticism wrong by announcing the various Republican candidates that he endorses in the mid-term general elections next year.

Advancing Mooney's thesis at times depends upon its own misuse of science. For instance, in a recent op-ed Mooney writes, "Many scientists feel they have received the back of the hand from this administration -- and not just when it comes to the requests for funding of basic research in Bush's budget." This is far from reality. Under Bush R&D budgets have increased more rapidly than at any time since the Apollo era, with particularly enormous increases in health research. If Republicans are indeed waging a war on science, then it seems that the primary ammunition has been to carpet bomb the R&D enterprise with dollar bills. Similarly, in the same op-ed Mooney makes a convenient but apparently erroneous assertion when he suggests that the head of the FDA recently resigned in part because of controversy of the Plan B issue, when media reports suggest that the reason for his resignation instead had to do with financial disclosures. The presence of such mistakes and mischaracterizations helped to support the part of Mooney's thesis that admits everyone abuses facts to support their arguments, and also my claim that such abuse is not the special province of one political party, or even a sub-set of one political party.

Any thesis that is predicated on distinguishing Republican science from Democrat science is going to lead directly to the politicization of the politicization of science. If the underlying dynamics that the Mooney thesis critiques are those same dynamics that explain the ascendancy of conservatism in contemporary politics (e.g., rise of the religious right, industry influence in politics), then the Mooney thesis becomes nothing more than a Trojan horse for attacking conservatives and advancing liberals. This may all be received as well and good, particularly from the perspective of those with liberal leanings, but they should not pretend that the politicization of science policy is going to do anything to address the politicization of science, because it neglects the dynamics that enable the politicization of science to occur in the first place. (For those wanting to learn more about these dynamics, I'd suggest starting with the works of Sarewitz, Bocking and Jasanoff, and I'd be happy to discuss further in the follow up discussion.) Further, I doubt that the Mooney thesis will even do anything to advance the cause of liberals in modern politics, other than rally the faithful to witness to what they already believed in the first place.

Posted on October 3, 2005 12:34 AM View this article | Comments (22) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

September 30, 2005

Neal Lane Talk

For you local folks:

Neal Lane, White House science adviser to former President Bill Clinton from 1998 to 2001, will speak at the University of Colorado at Boulder on Wednesday, Oct. 5 at 7 p.m. in Room 1B50 of the Eaton Humanities Building.

The free, public event is part of a year-long lecture series titled "Policy, Politics and Science in the White House: Conversations with Presidential Science Advisers," sponsored by CU-Boulder's Center for Science and Technology Policy Research.

Lane, who is a long-time Fellow Adjoint at JILA, a joint institute of CU-Boulder and the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and also served as chancellor of the CU-Colorado Springs campus from 1984-1986, will address the role of science in the presidential decision-making process. Following Lane’s remarks, center director Roger Pielke Jr., will interview Lane about topics like the current Bush administration’s alleged misuse of scientific information. The event will conclude with a question-and-answer session with the audience.

As presidential science adviser, Lane was the most senior member of the White House staff on matters of science and technology policy. Lane earned a reputation as an unusually effective advocate for science among policy-makers, especially within the White House.

The CU-Boulder presidential science adviser series coincides with an unusually high interest by the public and media in science policy issues like global warming and hurricanes, energy development and space exploration, Pielke said. Lane was the director of the National Science Foundation from 1993 to 1998 and served on the National Science Board. He joined the faculty of Rice University in 1966 and served as Rice provost from 1986 to 1993. He currently is a Rice professor and a senior fellow at Rice’s James A. Baker III Public Policy Institute. Lane received his doctorate in physics from the University of Oklahoma.

The series previously hosted science advisers to Presidents G. W. Bush, Bill Clinton and Richard Nixon. Upcoming series speakers include Donald Hornig, science adviser to President Lyndon Johnson, on Oct. 24 at 7 p.m. in Old Main Chapel, and George Keyworth, science adviser to President Ronald Reagan, on Jan 31 at 7 p.m. in Hale 270.

Additional information about the series, as well as web casts, transcripts, audiotapes, photographs from past talks and a library of background materials are available here.

*** This announcement posted by Bobbie Klein.

Posted on September 30, 2005 08:10 AM View this article | Comments (1) | TrackBack
Posted to Science Policy: General

September 27, 2005

Is Better Information Always Better?

It is a canon of the academic enterprise that more and better knowledge is always a good thing. However, when it comes to actual processes of decision making, more knowledge does not always lead to better outcomes, and in fact may lead to worse outcomes. In a thoughtful column in a recent edition of the Wall Street Journal, David Wessel takes on this interesting subject. Here is an excerpt:

"How about the service offered by LegalMetric LLC, a start-up founded by patent lawyer Greg Upchurch? Contemplating a patent-infringement case in Delaware? For $795, Mr. Upchurch will tell you which judges rule most swiftly and which tend to favor patent holders. Making a motion for summary judgment? Mr. Upchurch can tell you how the judge has ruled on similar motions versus his peers. These data always have been available in court files, but putting the pieces together was so expensive no one did it. Now, it's on the U.S. federal judiciary's Web site. Mr. Upchurch and his two employees download dockets, key information into a database and push a button so their software generates detailed reports. For lawyer and client, this knowledge can be very valuable. But does it increase the chances that the judge will come to a just decision? It is the sort of information that Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow labeled "socially useless but privately valuable." It doesn't help the economy produce more goods or services. It creates nothing of beauty or pleasure. It simply helps someone get a bigger slice of the pie. Sure, if the product helps win cases, then both sides will buy it -- just as both sides in high-stakes product-liability cases invest in jury-selection experts and software -- and neither will have an unfair advantage. But does that make the society better off? The same question arises in the sophisticated software used to draw the boundaries of U.S. congressional districts so precisely that Republicans and Democrats know which party is almost certain to win. This has enhanced the power of incumbency: In 2004, 401 of the 435 members of the U.S. House of Representatives sought re-election; all but seven won. It also has polarized the U.S. Congress, and made compromises scarce, because with safe districts, legislators have little reason to court the voters in the center. The advantage to individual lawmakers is clear; the value to society is not."

In important respects uncertainty about future outcomes is what allows for risks to be shared equitably. Wessel asks us to imagine what would happen if we had perfect knowledge of the future:

"Imagine a place with uncertain weather where food is plentiful in rainy spots, but not in others. Residents, in essence, buy insurance. The lucky feed the unlucky. No one starves. Then it becomes possible to buy accurate weather forecasts. One who buys the forecast knows whether he needs insurance or not; he profits. But the total amount of food available is unchanged. And if everyone buys the weather forecast, the insurance market becomes impossible. "There is a double social loss -- the resources used unnecessarily in acquiring information and the destruction of a market for risk sharing," Mr. Arrow said when he posed this example in 1973. Eliminating uncertainty makes insurance impossible. That's no small matter: If deciphering the human genome allows each of us to know the precise odds of contracting a dread disease, life and health insurance will be very tricky."

For scientists seeking to justify investments in their area of research, findings such as these make it untenable to simply assert that society will inevitably be better off with more knowledge. Indeed the current debate over stem cell research indicates that some people in society are more than willing to forgo the potential fruits of science in service of other valued outcomes. The value structure of a scientific endeavor seeking to advance knowledge, well-described by Michael Polanyi thirty years ago, is not always the same value structure that underlies the needs of pragmatic decision making or political battles among people who hold different conceptions of how the world should look.

Posted on September 27, 2005 08:19 AM View this article | Comments (2) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

Bayh-Dole at 25

Fortune has a very interesting, and highly negative, article about the Bayh-Dole Act and its effects on universities. Here is an excerpt:

"That single law, named for its sponsors, Senators Birch Bayh and Bob Dole, in essence transferred the title of all discoveries made with the help of federal research grants to the universities and small businesses where they were made. Prior to the law's enactment, inventors could always petition the government for the patent rights to their own work, though the rules were different at each federal agency; some 20 different statutes governed patent policy. The law simplified the "technology transfer" process and, more important, changed the legal presumption about who ought to own and develop new ideas-private enterprise as opposed to Uncle Sam. The new provisions encouraged academic institutions to seek out the clever ideas hiding in the backs of their research cupboards and to pursue licenses with business. And it told them to share some of the take with the actual inventors. On the face of it, Bayh-Dole makes sense. Indeed, supporters say the law helped create the $43-billion-a-year biotech industry and has brought valuable drugs to market that otherwise would never have seen the light of day. What's more, say many scholars, the law has created megaclusters of entrepreneurial companies-each an engine for high-paying, high-skilled jobs-all across the land. That all sounds wonderful. Except that Bayh-Dole's impact wasn't so much in the industry it helped create, but rather in its unintended consequence-a legal frenzy that's diverting scientists from doing science."

Posted on September 27, 2005 08:16 AM View this article | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

September 22, 2005

Response from William Colglazier on Science Academies as Political Advocates

In Bridges last July, I questioned the wisdom of science academies acting as political advocates. I argued that, "There are at least three reasons why political advocacy by science academies should be greeted with caution," and these were the practical self-interest of scientists, the broader needs of policy making, and reasons of democratic accountability.

William Colglazier, Executive Officer of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and Chief Operating Officer of its National Research Council provides a rebuttal in the current issue of Bridges. I appreciate that Mr. Colglazier chose to enage this issue. Here are a few excerpts from his rebuttal and my comments in response:

Colglazier: "In our view, the eleven academies statement was consistent with and supported by careful objective studies done by the US National Academy of Sciences (NAS) over the past 15 years ..."

Response: Of course, my point is that there are any number of policies "consistent with" such "objective studies." Settling on a subset of policy recommendations involves many considerations that go well beyond science. This is the essence of political advocacy, as science is poorly suited to reaching closure on what actions we should take in any given context, which is ultimately a question of values.

Colglazier: "Mr. Pielke asked about democratic accountability when science academies issue findings and recommendations in statements and reports. We view our reports as bringing the best available insights from science and technology to help inform public policy decisions, not engaging in political advocacy or politics."

Response: My commentary was obviously not about academy reports generally, but a single statement. I think that it is quite fair to call a statememt calling for political actions by policy makers issued in order to influence the G8 Summit an act of "political advocacy." There is something very different about this action versus the typicaly science academy study, though Mr. Colgazier directs our attention to the latter with the bulk of his response.

Colglazier: "The eleven science academies that developed the climate change statement for the G8 heads of state meeting at Gleneagles, Scotland, last July will likely join together again to produce additional statements, based on their individual studies, as input to future G8 meetings. One unfortunate aspect of the release of the eleven academies statement on climate change was confusion caused by a press release issued by the Royal Society (RS) of London. That press release went far beyond what the eleven academies statement actually said. The RS press release was not seen in advance by the NAS and did not represent the views of the NAS. So there is still work to be done in developing the right traditions."

Response: I think that the flap over the Royal Society letter helps to make my main point -- " there are real risks for the scientific enterprise when science academies become political advocates." And on Colglazier's recogniztion of work to be done in developing the right traditions, we are in complete agreement.

Posted on September 22, 2005 12:37 AM View this article | Comments (3) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

September 16, 2005

Excellent Book on Think Tanks

I am overdue to comment on an excellent 2004 book by Andrew Rich, Think Tanks, Public Policy and the Politics of Expertise (Cambridge University Press). Anyone who wants to understand the evolution and role of think tanks should read this book (A sample chapter, here in PDF, whets your appetite for the whole thing. Here are some short, thought-provoking excerpts from the book:

pp. 26-27, "The greater substantive potential for policy research early on as opposed to during final deliberation and enactment is recognized by scholars. But this insight does not seem to have guided the behavior of many think tanks, at least not in the past quarter century. In the chapters that follow, I examine what account for these particular developments. I consider the paradox why, at precisely the moment when experts and those who support them are realizing their own power in policy making, those among the that are most conscious of their own potential devote effort where it can achieve the least substantive effect. This development in combination with the harm to collective reputation done by some ideological think tanks results in little evidence that, amid the proliferation of think tanks in American policy making, these think tanks and experts generally are especially - or proportionally - influential. Quite the opposite in fact: Their actual standing may be eroding just as their numbers and scholarly recognition increase."

p. 215, "When think tanks become involved in producing commentary, they abandon the most distinctive niche for experts in the policy process, the point in the process when the contributions of researchers are least contested by other types of actors. Instead, in efforts to attract attention for work that at best serves little substantive role anyway, think tanks compete with scores of non-expert actors involved in policy debates, especially interest groups and lobbyists, that almost invariable have more resources and power than they do. In the competition between interest groups and think tanks to make views influential at latter stages of policy debates, interest groups almost always win out."

p. 216, "At the beginning of the twenty-first century, research is frequently evaluated more in terms of its ideological content and accessibility to audiences than by the quality of its content."

p. 218, " the imbalance between conservative and liberal think tanks seems likely to diminish... "; p. 220, "... whether liberal think tanks become more marketing oriented or whether they increase in numbers to rival conservative organizations, I question whether it matters as much for policy making as some activists believe."

p. 220, "The biggest worry for liberals, conservatives, and scholars alike should be the trend for think tanks - and increasingly experts of all kinds - to produce research that is little more than polemical commentary. This work diminishes the potential for its producers to have substantive influence with policy makers. Even more, this work, especially in its most ideological and most aggressively marketed forms, damages the reputation of experts generally among policy makers. The distinction between experts and advocates is tenuous. As we head into the future, the weakness of that distinction presents a fundamental challenge for think tanks, experts, and those who rely on the. The weakness threatens the quality of policy produced; for if trusted research and analysis is not available, what becomes the foundation for informed policy decisions?"

For those interested in understanding think tanks in contemporary policy and politics, get the book and read it.

Posted on September 16, 2005 08:21 AM View this article | Comments (2) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

September 01, 2005

A Rant on Ceding the High Ground

When liberal commentators on science decided this week to turn a blind eye to numerous egregious examples of the misuse of the science of hurricanes to advance political agendas focused on bashing George Bush and the US, or lobbying for Kyoto, they ceded the moral high ground on this issue to their conservative opponents. And so James Glassman, of TechCentralStation, happily (and quite properly) takes that unoccupied moral high ground on this issue. It is unfortunate that liberals who should know better, and claim to know better, are simply mute on this issue. Can they not see that their stony silence does far more to damage their credibility than the extreme statements by a few ideologues? Can they not see that their own credibility is enhanced by a bit of self-critique? Can they not see that their opponents gain legitimacy when the moral high ground is ceded?

What is a misuse of science? It seems that for many people it is playing fast and loose with science but (!) only in a situation in which such mischief seeks to advance the agendas of their opponents. The misuse of science in situations that are politically expedient seems to get a free pass, except of course from those who happen to be opposed to the political agendas of those engaging in the misuse. Let's be clear -- conservatives and liberals alike are both guilty of applying ideological blinders to their views of the politicization of science. As a result we have seen, quite ironically, the politicization of the politicization of science.

Here is an essay I wrote on this a few years ago, and an excerpt:

""Junk science," it seems, is merely that science which your political opponents use to support their position. It is ironic that expressions of concern about the politicization of science have become another way for ideologues to advance their particular agendas. In other words, we are witnessing the politicizing of the politicization of science ... Politicization of science is a problem, irrespective of the ideology of those doing the politicizing. Our scientific enterprise is too important to allow putative concerns about the politicization of science to become just another weapon in partisan battle."

That is the end of the rant (for now)!

Posted on September 1, 2005 08:43 AM View this article | Comments (31) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

August 16, 2005

Finding God in Science

Tom Yulsman writes:

Is evolution compatible with religion?

People on opposite ends of the spectrum in the debate have shown in recent weeks that they do manage to agree on one thing: that the answer is ‘no.’ They frame the debate in black and white terms, leaving no room for nuance and ambiguity. In doing so, they pit religion implacably against science itself, harming both.

On one side of the debate stand proponents of intelligent design, most notably at the Center for Science and Culture of the Discovery Institute. They say they do not reject evolution outright, just the idea that evolution of complex biological structures can happen without intervention by an intelligent designer.

In other words, evolution and religion are perfectly compatible — as long as modern evolutionary biology is rejected and replaced by a religious concept.

The center isn’t really all that shy about making this point, as its now infamous paper called the “The Wedge Strategy” shows. Published in 1999, the document plots a political strategy to replace what it calls the “scientific materialism” of traditional evolutionary biology with a “broadly theistic” worldview. The Wedge Strategy establishes a dichotomy between materialism, which it says has “infected virtually every area of our culture,” and what it describes as “one of the bedrock principles on which Western civilization was built,” namely that human beings are created in the image of God.

“Debunking the traditional conceptions of both God and man, thinkers such as Charles Darwin, Karl Marx, and Sigmund Freud portrayed humans not as moral and spiritual beings, but as animals or machines who inhabited a universe ruled by purely impersonal forces and whose behavior and very thoughts were dictated by the unbending forces of biology, chemistry, and environment. This materialistic conception of reality eventually infected virtually every area of our culture, from politics and economics to literature and art.”

The document describes a litany of horrors resulting from this infection, including the erosion of “objective moral standards,” the undermining of “personal responsibility”, and “a virulent strain of utopianism.”

Focusing on intelligent design, the Wedge Document states that it promises to replace the materialist worldview, as exemplified by evolutionary biology, “with a science consonant with Christian and theistic convictions.” (Emphasis added.)

Let’s put aside the obvious conclusion that the so-called “science” pursued by the institute is motivated not by a desire to seek the truth about nature but by a pre-determined political and Christian religious agenda, invalidating all claims to scientific legitimacy. The central point here is that evolutionary biology, as it is currently accepted by the vast majority of scientists, simply is not consonant with Christian convictions.

What’s so interesting is that polemicists on the opposite end of the political spectrum agree.

As Jacob Weisberg wrote in Slate recently, “That evolution erodes religious belief seems almost too obvious to require argument.” Claiming that evolution “destroyed the faith of Darwin himself” (a gross oversimplification see: here), Weisberg goes on to say that “the acceptance of evolution diminishes religious belief in aggregate for a simple reason: It provides a better answer to the question of how we got here than religion does. Not a different answer, a better answer: more plausible, more logical, and supported by an enormous body of evidence.”

Both Weisberg and his intellectual opponents in the intelligent design community are objectively wrong when they claim incompatibility between evolution and religion. To borrow a turn of phrase from Weisberg, that millions of Christians and Jews, including many scientists, believe both in God and traditional evolutionary biology, seems almost too obvious to require argument. And they suffer neither from utopian fantasies and moral degradation, nor from a diminution of their spiritual feelings and belief in God.

Owen Gingerich is one of many prominent examples of scientists who manage to hold their religious beliefs in harmony with their science. A Christian and a research professor of astronomy and the history of science at Harvard, he told this to NPR recently: “I believe in intelligent design, lower case I and D. And I do have a problem with intelligent design, capital I and capital D, because it's being sold as a political movement, as if somehow it's an alternative to Darwinian evolution.”

Concerning his religious belief, Gingerich says, “When we talk about the concept of God, it is such an infinity it's not really possible for us to wrap ourselves around it and come to terms with precisely what we mean. It's not a father figure sitting up there with the big `on' button and pushing it and the big bang happens.”

Contrary to what Weisberg argues, Gingerich believes that science and religion give different answers about existence. Science is like looking at music written out on a page, Gingerich says. “If you see it on the page, you can analyze all of the notes in great detail, but you won't hear the melody, you won't understand its aesthetic appeal. Without a capital I and a capital D, I am saying that I believe there is purpose and meaning in the universe, that it's not all just a macabre mechanical joke.”

Sir John Polkinghorne:, a theoretical physicist turned Anglican priest sees things similarly: “The fact that we now know that the universe did not spring into being ready made a few thousand years ago but that it has evolved over a period of fifteen billion years from its fiery origin in the Big Bang, does not abolish Christian talk of the world as God's creation, but it certainly modifies certain aspects of that discourse,” he writes.

Polkinghorne seems to be completely comfortable with biological evolution: “Mutations occur through happenstance,” he says. “That produces some new possibility for life, which is then sifted and preserved in the lawfully regular environment which is necessary for the operation of natural selection.”

Science, he says, reveals this duality of existence — chance, which makes all manner of things possible, and necessity, which arises from the fundamental laws of nature. “In every stage of the fruitful history of the universe there is an interplay between chance and necessity. Now, the question is, ‘What do we make of that?’”

Not that blind, stupid chance alone is important. Or that we live in the numbingly mechanical world of biblical literalists. “I believe that the Christian God, who is both loving and faithful, has given to his creation the twin gifts of independence and reliability, which find their reflection in the fruitful process of the universe through the interplay between happenstance and regularity, between chance and necessity.”

Polkinghorne clearly believes in an intelligent designer, but one who operates through traditional evolutionary processes: “To acknowledge a role for tame chance is not in the least to deny the possibility that there is a divinely ordained general direction in which the process of the world is moving, however contingent detailed aspects of that progression (such as the number of human toes) might be.”

Those on the left, like Weisberg, who insist that religion ultimately is incompatible with evolution, seem to have a laughingly naïve view of what belief in God must entail: Not Polkinghorne and Gingerich’s God but a bearded white guy sitting atop a cloud and throwing thunderbolts at us. It goes without saying that the bible anthropomorphizes God, and many Christians and Jews certainly do take it all literally. But in more sophisticated religious conceptions, both Christian and Jewish — including my own Jewish tradition — anthropomorphic descriptions of God are mere metaphors for something beyond real knowing in any kind of literal human terms. In fact, spiritual feeling for many people, myself included, is motivated in part by the realization that everything in this amazing cosmos rests on simple, elegant laws stemming from a singular, ultimately ineffable source.

Grist contributor Dave Roberts argues that it was science that forced God to "retreat" to what he derisively calls this “level of abstraction.” But this just isn’t true. Countless generations of rebbes and devout Jews have been motivated in their spiritual practice by the realization that everything is a harmonious manifestation of what is described in Judaism's central prayer simply as “The One.” In its own way, the prayer anticipates modern cosmology.

Stephen Hawking once wrote that probing the most fundamental mathematical order of nature was like “glimpsing the mind of God.” And it was Einstein who said, “I believe in Spinoza’s God who reveals himself in the harmony of all that exists, but not in a God who concerns himself with the fate and actions of human beings.” No Bearded One for him. And certainly this is not Polkinghorne’s God. But neither did the “abstraction,” if it must be called that, diminish Einstein’s deep reverence. Einstein himself described this reverence as "cosmic religious feeling," and he said it was motivated by a “spirit manifest in the laws of the universe – a spirit vastly superior to that of man.”

Another example of a scientist with a spiritual side to his scientific worldview is Joel Primack, a cosmologist who co-developed the 'cold dark matter' theory. He writes of a “sacred dimension to science.” And he once described the ripples observed in the cosmic microwave background radiation – the literal afterglow of the big bang itself — as the “handwriting of God.” These ripples are theorized to have given rise to all of the structure seen in today's universe (with a little help from some cold dark matter...). Primack writes, “When we interpret the ripples in the cosmic background radiation, we are reading God’s journal of the first days. What human action could be more sacred than that?”

There is no denying that an alarmingly large percentage of the population believes the Earth is some 6,000 years old, and that human beings and dinosaurs walked the Earth together. But it does not help the cause of enlightenment to be so anti-religious as to deny that science and deep religious feeling can not only coexist but flourish together.

Posted on August 16, 2005 08:03 AM View this article | Comments (47) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Others | Science Policy: General

August 11, 2005

Why ID Won't Go Away

Jacob Weisberg writes at Slate, "That evolution erodes religious belief seems almost too obvious to require argument" (Thanks Chris Mooney for the link). Chris Mooney author of a forthcoming book about how the right abuses science agrees, ironically enough enaging in his own abuse of science, "I agree that evolutionary thinking will tend to eat away religious belief "in aggregate " as Weisberg writes " and then Mooney qualifies this statement with "... but that's different from saying that it's because the two views are in irreconcilable, logical conflict. That's simply not true, as evolution is silent on God's existence." Mooney should have stuck to this last point, rather than trying to have it both ways.

Lets cut to the chase, so long as supporters of teaching evolution claim that this course of action "destroys" (strong version from Weisberg) or "eats away at" (weak version from Mooney) religious belief, then it seems "almost too obvious to require argument" to say that there will be a reflexive response by ID proponents to protect their religious beliefs from being attacked. Weisberg and Mooney would be wise to take a cue from the American Astronomical Society (just substitute "evolution" for "intelligent design"):

"It doesn't help to mix in religious ideas like "intelligent design" with the job of understanding what the world is and how it works. It's hard enough to keep straight how Newton's Laws work in the Solar System or to understand the mechanisms of human heredity without adding in this confusing and non-scientific agenda. It would be a lot more helpful if you would advocate good science teaching and the importance of scientific understanding for a strong and thriving America."

The teaching of evolution should not be presented by its supporters as having implications for mainstream religion. If it does have implications it only does so because people like Weisberg and Mooney are mapping their own religious preferences onto science curriculum, which is the exact complaint that they have made against the ID movement. Evolution is without a doubt solid science. But to suggest that it compels a particular religious perspective is as bad a misuse of science as the ID supporters are committing. Until supporters of evolution get this basic point straight, then expect the ID movement to thrive and the politicization of evolution to persist.

Posted on August 11, 2005 11:54 AM View this article | Comments (18) | TrackBack
Posted to Science Policy: General

Divergent Views on Science Policy

One interesting characteristic about science policy is that it does not map neatly onto the stereotypical liberal-conservative Manichean worldview. To take just one example, two columns in the past month over at Tech Central Station, a web site run by folks who espouse a "faith in technology and free markets," show wildly divergent views on science policy.

In an essay from 15 July 2005, Sallie Baliunas makes the fanciful suggestion that public demands for relevance from government-supported research have lead to increasing fraud among scientists. She describes how once Richard Feynman was "freed of the impediment of relevance" he was then able to conduct novel research into theoretical physics and collect a Nobel Prize. But Baliunas does not seem to recognize that federal funding for nuclear physics in the twentieth century was motivated by a very practical objective, winning the Cold War. Without the Soviet Union, federal funding for nuclear physics would surely have been considerably less. Just look at the funding trend for this area in the post-Cold War era. She expresses concern that if scientists are asked to perform research with practical applications, it might "drive away Feynman-type thinkers" and also lead to research misconduct by scientists upset that they have not been given a blank check and no accountability.

A very different essay comes from Iain Murray, who writes,

"The distinction between basic science and applied science (and its development) is, at heart, an elitist and artificial one. It is based on a misunderstanding of the scientific dynamic that was set in policy stone by Vannevar Bush, President Franklin D. Roosevelt's top science adviser, during World War II. It relies on what is known as the "Linear Model" of science, which states that "basic research" develops a pool of knowledge from which "applied research" draws practical benefits, which are then developed into economic goods... Science's role in the economy, it appears, is mainly dependent on the technological portion -- the applied research and development -- of the model. Basic research contributes far less than the linear model suggests." Murray's conclusion could not be any more different from Baliunas' view: "When it comes to science policy, the utility of the science is what is important."

On the other side of the political spectrum there is similar incoherence about science policy. And this is a good thing. It reflects the fact that we are in a period of transition from a post-World War II science policy to its successor, and views on science policy have not yet gelled. The exact characteristics of science policy in the 21st century remain unclear, but we'll get there sooner with people like Baliunas and Murray, and their counterparts from other points on the ideological spectrum, engaging in public debate and discussion on what science policy ought to look like. And without a doubt the issues of practical relevance, federal and private funding and, yes, the politicization of science ought to be at the core of any such dialogue.

For more on this subject see this paper:

Pielke, Jr., R.A., and R. Byerly, Jr., 1998: Beyond Basic and Applied. Physics Today, 51(2), 42-46. (PDF)

Posted on August 11, 2005 07:36 AM View this article | Comments (4) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

August 08, 2005

Paul Krugman, Think Tanks and the Politicization of Science

In his New York Times column last Friday, Paul Krugman makes the case that in recent decades conservative think tanks have focused on "a strategy of creating doubt about inconvenient research results." This interpretation is not quite right, and in fact actually legitimizes the strategies used by conservative think tanks to advance their agenda.

Krugman reinforces the idea that facts compel certain political perspectives, his in fact. He writes that conservative think tanks have "created a sort of parallel intellectual universe, a world of "scholars" whose careers are based on toeing an ideological line, rather than on doing research that stands up to scrutiny by their peers." This is self-serving and implies that peer-reviewed research supports only - surprise - the ideological agenda that Krugman himself espouses.

The approach taken by conservative think tanks, well described in a prescient 1986 essay by Gregg Easterbrook in The Atlantic Monthly ("Ideas Move Nations" available to subscribers here), was indeed focused on creating research that toed an ideological line but in many cases could also stand up to scholarly peer review. Easterbrook emphasized both of these points in his essay, "But now that conservatism is the fashion, the overlap of names and places suggests a society of like-minded people reinforcing one another's preconceived notions and rejecting any thinking that does not fit the mold--practicing what consultants call the art of "directed conclusions." ... [Conservatives] have created an intellectual competitor for the university system, which is good, and rendered it dependent on not offending corporate patrons, which is bad. They have produced a substantial body of worthwhile commentary but few true thunderbolts, considering the sums of money and time invested."

In other words, conservatives have succeeded in exploiting the "excess of objectivity" that characterizes the scientific enterprise, well described by Dan Sarewitz: "Science is sufficiently rich, diverse, and Balkanized to provide comfort and support for a range of subjective, political positions on complex issues such as climate change, nuclear waste disposal, acid rain, or endangered species." In just about every politically contested issue, from WMD in Iraq to the state of the environment, it is possible to start out with an ideological bent and go cherry picking for results that happen to support your perspective.

Krugman's use of the climate change example illustrates his own ironic attempt at cherry picking. He writes, "You might have thought that a strategy of creating doubt about inconvenient research results could work only in soft fields like economics. But it turns out that the strategy works equally well when deployed against the hard sciences. The most spectacular example is the campaign to discredit research on global warming. Despite an overwhelming scientific consensus, many people have the impression that the issue is still unresolved. This impression reflects the assiduous work of conservative think tanks, which produce and promote skeptical reports that look like peer-reviewed research, but aren't."

Too bad the facts don't support these claims. First, a large majority of people support U.S. participation in the Kyoto Protocol, and have consistently supported it (see here and this very recent poll). So whatever the public's views about science, it has not stood in the way of a strong political consensus. Second, a majority of people do in fact support the scientific consensus on climate change (data). Sure, some people doubt the existence of a consensus, and yes I've seen the Luntz memo. But if you look at trends in perspectives on this subject, there is a strong trend in recent years towards greater acceptance of a scientific consensus on climate change (data). You don't have to be a statistician to observe that the corporate campaign to "discredit research" seems to have had exactly the opposite effect. This case does not support Krugman's argument.

But Krugman needs a lack of acceptance by the public of a scientific consensus, so that he can argue that the science compels a particular course of action. If the public largely accepts the scientific consensus and even more strongly support the Kyoto Protocol, and yet policy makers have not taken the political actions Krugman wants to see then it is hard to argue that science compels a particular course of action. The inconvenient reality of public opinion on climate change shows that the current state of affairs is grounded in things like ideologies and values, and not in conservative success in sowing scientific or political doubt. In this instance, Krugman appears to be no different than the conservatives he is criticizing - taking an ideological stance and then searching for evidence to support it. In this case his use of "facts" is just as suspect as those he is criticizing. It is ironic for Krugman to write, "There are several reasons why fake research is so effective. One is that nonscientists sometimes find it hard to tell the difference between research and advocacy." Krugman's view that facts compel political outcomes is exactly the same sort of justification used by conservative think tanks, and sets the stage for partisan battles over facts, rather than the values which really underlie these debates.

Which brings us to intelligent design. To be clear and unambiguous, intelligent design is not science, but an effort by its advocates to smuggle religious teachings into public schools. The strategy that ID advocates are using is not as Krugman would have it, to "spread doubt" about evolution, but indtead to offer up ID as an equally valid, scientific alternative way to view the world (i.e., reflected in the call by ID supporters to "teach both sides"). The effort to secure a place for ID in education reflects the conservatives attempt to capitalize on the historically effective strategy of exploiting the "excess of objectivity." But the ID folks have miscalculated in this case. Unlike most areas of science, in the case of evolution there really is no "excess of objectivity" and Krugman is certainly right about that. But by making the general case that scientific facts compel particular ideological outcomes, Krugman is legitimizing the very strategy employed by conservative think tanks (and today also embraced by liberal think tanks) that debates that are really about values can be effectively turned into debates putatively about science.

On the role of science in politics, Krugman finds considerable room for agreement with his conservative opponents. As much as anything, this area of liberal-conservative agreement helps to explain the increasing politicization of science in the United States.

Posted on August 8, 2005 12:41 AM View this article | Comments (11) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

August 04, 2005

Unprincipled Relativism on Science Policy

The Boston Globe reported last Sunday weekend that science and political advocacy are becoming increasingly conflated -- "This dual role of advocate/researcher is becoming more common, especially as advocacy groups realize they can sway more opinions by asserting that their research is based on science, rather than simply on personal belief."

Readers of this blog will know that this is a subject that we've been concerned with for some time now. The Globe article focuses on a few conservative advocacy groups that "use scientific research to justify their opposition to abortion, the morning-after birth control pill and homosexuality," but using science to advance political agendas knows no ideological boundaries. It seems to me that while it is entirely appropriate to watchdog special interest advocacy groups that hide behind science, the area where we should have the most concern is when organizations supposedly working for common interests start advancing special interest agendas behind the fig leaf of science.

Two organizations that we have highlighted in this regard are the President's Council on Bioethics and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Interestingly enough, the reactions I've received to our discussions of these subjects fall pretty much into predictable political categories, with just a few exceptions (Iain Murray at TCS is one such exception, and here.). Those whose political leanings are in the same direction of the advocacy agendas put forward by the Council or the IPCC find little wrong with the advocacy stances taken by these institutions, and those opposed to their advocacy agendas find it improper. So it appears that not only are one's views on science a function of politics, but one's views on science in politics are also a function of political expediency. Too few proponents of action on climate change are willing to engage in discussion on the role of the IPCC in climate policy, and too few supporters of a conservative agenda on bioethics issues are willing to do the same with respect to the Bioethics Council. The result? Unprincipled relativism on science policy, and a general message from experts to the public and policy makers that, in the end, all that really matters is politics, not science, which opens the door for a continued politicization of science.

Posted on August 4, 2005 01:42 PM View this article | Comments (8) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

July 28, 2005

Trial Balloon from Barton Staffer

Yesterday The Toledo Blade published a letter from Larry Neal, Deputy Staff Director of the House Energy and Commerce Committee. In the letter Mr. Neal seems to offer a few olive branches, calling MBH "three honest men" and accepting that the world is warming. Read the whole letter here.

My sense is that the letter in a small newspaper by a staffer is a trial ballon. It may represent the possibility of a more conciliatory approach on this issue for Mr. Barton.

Posted on July 28, 2005 07:33 AM View this article | Comments (5) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Climate Change | Science Policy: General

July 19, 2005

Article on Democracy and Bush Science Policy

Eric Laursen has an interesting article on science policy in Z Magazine. Here is an excerpt:

"A good many critics on the progressive side - not so much scientists as public policy researchers who study scientific process and outcomes - argue that the U.S. scientific community is in denial since much, if not most, of its work is inherently political and pretending otherwise is only going to make it harder. Debates about genetically engineered food and the future uses of biotechnology and nanotechnology, not to mention the study of stem cell research and AIDS, have cracked open the protective shell that's traditionally allowed scientists to operate in isolation from most political scrutiny. Science is not just science anymore and if the work its practitioners cherish is going to go forward, they'll have to embrace a more democratic model for framing, approving, and reviewing projects and allocating resources. Otherwise, critics warn, the right will use government's control of the purse strings on most large-scale scientific research to mold a new agenda that decimates these fields and awards more and more of the kitty to projects with overtly military and commercial purposes. Moreover, the debate is not just about the utility of "pure" science and the social impact of sex research anymore. The rise of new fields like biomedecine and nanotechnology has shifted scientists' focus to the basic building blocks of matter and human life, potentially enabling them to radically transform the natural world. If a way isn't found to involve the larger community directly in the scientific decision-making process, "democracy" could be reduced to irrelevancy."

Read the whole thing here.

Posted on July 19, 2005 07:16 AM View this article | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

July 18, 2005

Palmer on Partisanship in Science Policy

The July issue of Ogmius, our Center's newsletter, is now out and it features an essay by Bob Palmer, recently retired minority staff director of the House Science Committee.

Bob's essay is titled Science Policy: The Victim of Partisan Politics and he writes in his essay,

"The Federal government is not responding to the many political challenges of the day - energy, environment, health care, global economic competition - whose resolution would greatly benefit from the wise application of S&T. When politics is overly fettered by partisanship, so is science - in the sense that its legitimate role in opening up more room for negotiations and the development of policy options is severely limited. This unfortunately is the niche that science policy occupies today."

Read the whole thing here. (We'd welcome responses to this essay either here on Prometheus or published as a letter to the editor in the next issue.) In our next newsletter, we expect to have a companion piece by David Goldston, current majority staff director for the House Science Committee. Stay tuned.

Posted on July 18, 2005 07:46 AM View this article | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

Column in Bridges

I have a column just out in the current issue of Bridges, a publication of the Office of Science & Technology at the Embassy of Austria in Washington, D.C. The title of my essay is "Science Academies as Political Advocates," a subject discussed here on Prometheus not too long ago.

Here is the opening:

"What role should national science academies play in policy and politics? One answer to this question was provided last month when eleven national science academies sent a letter to "world leaders, including those meeting at the Gleneagles G8 Summit in July 2005" advocating a number of specific policy actions on climate change. The letter, from science academies in Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, indicates that these national science academies perceive one of their roles to be overt political advocacy. As the public has demanded a closer connection of science with society, the action of the science academies is part of a broader trend for scientists and scientific institutions to become more involved in the political fray on a wide range of issues involving science. While each individual scientist has a very personal decision to make about whether or not to engage in political advocacy, the! re are real risks for the scientific enterprise when science academies become political advocates."

Read the whole thing here.

Posted on July 18, 2005 07:37 AM View this article | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

June 22, 2005

Abstaining on evolution

Yesterday, a New York Times article entitled “Opting out in the debate on Evolution,” described the abstention of many in the scientific community from recent hearings by the Kansas State Board of Education. The article’s author, Cornelia Dean, quotes Eugenie Scott, of the National Center for Science Education, as saying, “We on the science side of things strong-armed the Kansas hearings because we realized this was not a scientific exchange, it was a political show trial.”

Many of those who refuse to participate argue that the debate is not won over scientific content, but instead pits the science-based theory of evolution versus the faith-based idea of intelligent design, which stipulates that the only way to explain the complexity we see on Earth lies in the existence of an intelligent agent. Although the advocates of intelligent design might disagree, I would find the arguments of evolution’s backers, which deny classification of intelligent design as a science, quite convincing. One example can be found in an article by Dr. Kenneth Miller, here.

What is laudable in this case is the recognition by scientists that the arena of debate in Kansas is not a scientific one, and the conclusion this leads to, which is that there is less reason for scientists to participate. While the outcome of the Kansas State Board of Education hearings will unfortunately play out in science classrooms, which are locales that are ostentatiously devoted to science, those scientists who refuse to participate have done well in avoiding the debate since it does not involve a scientifically pertinent question. Instead, the argument is one of those who value scientific explanations versus those who value explanations based on other ideologies and values. Since the debate did not center on the validity of the science (as defined by most of the scientific community, but not those who want to teach intelligent design), and since many people thought the hearing was a “show trial” with a foregone conclusion of teaching intelligent design alongside evolution (which is how it ended), scientists planning on arguing the merits of evolutionary theory did well to stay home. As Eugenie Scott says of the issue, “We are never going to solve it by throwing science at it.”

The lesson to be taken from this might be that some debates, even some with considerable scientific content, may not be on issues where more scientific evidence or better explanation of the science will help policy formulation. Scientists in other fields might do well to recognize cases where scientific debate is not being used to move an issue forward.

Posted on June 22, 2005 03:38 PM View this article | Comments (2) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Logar, N. | Science Policy: General

June 15, 2005

Wise Words on Science Policy

I missed this March, 2004 speech given by Representative Sherwood Boehlert (R-NY), chair of the House Science Committee, but it recently crossed my desk and is worth highlighting. The speech (he calls it a "lecture" and you'll see why below) was given to DOE's Brookhaven National Laboratory. Here are a few interesting excerpts:

"First, don't start by assuming that folks in Washington are out to get scientists. Nothing could be further from the truth. Indeed, in the proposed fiscal 2005 budget, science agencies are slated to receive some of the largest increases - less than I'd prefer, but more than other agencies. Just about everyone on both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue would like to do as much as possible for science - especially for the physical sciences, which have been going through a period of relative neglect as funding for biomedical research has skyrocketed in recent years. So don't start by assuming that Washington's goal is to harm or ignore science. Here's another approach not to take. Don't tell Members of Congress that you're different because you're not looking to help yourselves in the short-run; you're looking for money that is a long-term investment for the entire nation. Sure, science funding is just that sort of investment. But so are education and road building and defense spending and human space flight; the list of possible investments goes on and on. And guess what? Congress is not besieged by groups asking for money that they describe as necessary to help their own narrow interests in the short run. The argument that science funding is a long-term national investment does nothing to set scientists apart. All that sets you apart is that scientists are the only group that thinks they're making a unique argument."

So what should scientists do?

"So you need to argue on the facts. I feel safe in saying, without insulting any of my colleagues, that most of them know even less about synchrotron light sources than I do. They need to hear from you - and especially from those of you in industry and your CEOs - why a light source, or any other piece of equipment or area of research, is important. They - we - need to learn from you what the nation will actually be giving up if you aren't able to succeed. That won't be the end of the story. We in the Congress will still have our duty to choose among competing priorities. The budget is always a constraint, and it's more constraining now that it has been in a long time. Right now, for example, as Science chairman, I especially have to wrestle with the President's proposed space exploration initiative. It's a thoughtful proposal, and no doubt would be worthy of immediate funding in a universe in which money was no object. But we don't live in that universe, and we're not likely to find one like it in the future. So I have to weigh that proposal against other priorities, and get more information about its costs and its benefits and its timing before I can make a decision on how I think we should proceed. As part of my decision-making, one matter I have to weigh is the relative merit of additional funding for NASA versus additional funding for other federal science agencies, particularly NSF, which competes head-to-head for funding with NASA because they're in the same appropriations bill. Believe me, this isn't an easy task. But I couldn't even begin to undertake that kind of analysis if I didn't know what the expenditures of the various agencies might mean to our country. I'm lucky; I've got dozens of staff on the Science Committee who give me that information and help me sort through these questions. But science isn't - and can't be - that kind of focus for every Member; they have to focus primarily on their own Committee assignments and district interests. They won't know anything about any of this unless they hear from people like you - and hear from you regularly, back home, and in a thoughtful manner. Now this may not be the kind of speech - or should I say, 'lecture'? - that you most wanted to hear today. And I'm sure the rest of this conference will focus, as it should, on the many exciting technical questions that designing a new synchrotron poses and on the mind-boggling opportunities that having such a machine would present. But please remember as you have those discussions that a new synchrotron will remain an example of very theoretical physics unless work is done to make funding for it a political reality. I will do everything I possibly can to help you, but I can't do it alone. The future of science funding will depend on many things beyond your control - the macroeconomic situation, the nature of competing needs, etc. But it will also depend on how actively you can make people like me understand why what you're about is important to our nation."

I don't think that he is calling for vacuous advocacy or platitudinal marketing of science, but substantive discussion of the significance of science - what it means in terms of real world outcomes. This is consistent with John Marburger's recent calls for a "science of science policy" and, in the 1990s, Congressman George Brown's provocative perspectives on the societal responsibilities of the scientific community.

Posted on June 15, 2005 12:22 AM View this article | Comments (3) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

June 07, 2005

Science Academies as Issue Advocates

Last week we asked about the role that science academies should play in policy making. Today national science academies from Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States provided one answer to this question in the form of a jointly signed letter (PDF) to “world leaders, including those meeting at the Gleneagles G8 Summit in July 2005.” The letter advocates the following actions:

- Acknowledge that the threat of climate change is clear and increasing.
- Launch an international study to explore scientifically informed targets for atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations, and their associated emissions scenarios, that will enable nations to avoid impacts deemed unacceptable.
- Identify cost-effective steps that can be taken now to contribute to substantial and long-term reduction in net global greenhouse gas emissions. Recognise that delayed action will increase the risk of adverse environmental effects and will likely incur a greater cost.
- Work with developing nations to build a scientific and technological capacity best suited to their circumstances, enabling them to develop innovative solutions to mitigate and adapt to the adverse effects of climate change, while explicitly recognising their legitimate development rights.
- Show leadership in developing and deploying clean energy technologies and approaches to energy efficiency, and share this knowledge with all other nations.
- Mobilise the science and technology community to enhance research and development efforts, which can better inform climate change decisions.

There are several issues to be raised here:

1. Whatever one thinks of the merits of any one of these advocated actions, it is fair to ask whether or not it is the proper role for national academies to take an explicit advocacy position on highly politicized issues, while at the same time seeking to provide scientific information to inform policy makers. In other words there is at least the appearance of a conflict of interest. The non-partisan position of national academies is an important reason why policy makers turn to national academies, rather than the Sierra Club or Exxon, to provide scientific assessments. By presenting themselves as issue advocates scientific academies are threatening their own authority and legitimacy. As we have written here frequently, one effective way for scientific organizations to serve as honest broker is not to hide behind science, but instead to openly engage and discuss a range of policy options.

2. In the case of the U.S. at least, the most recent study of policy options on climate change was completed in 1992, and did not address some of the options now being advocated. Thus, it does not appear, at least, that some of the issues (e.g., the focus on specific targets for stabilization) being endorsed by the academies are the result of any sort of systematic and transparent evaluation of policy alternatives, but instead, have been selected based on political expediency. In other words, the academies are picking a side in an existing political battle. The lack of attention to research on policy is important because the advocated policy (a) simply cannot work, and (b) is likely to be less effective with respect to its stated goals than other possible policy options.

3. Significantly, the academies uncritically accept the Climate Convention's narrow definition of climate change. "This statement concentrates on climate change associated with global warming. We use the UNFCCC definition of climate change..." even though this narrow view is questionable scientifically and limiting from a policy perspective (see this paper for discussion). Do the national academies have an obligation to evaluate the effects of a definition of climate change that is not used by the IPCC, before uncritically accepting it?

Bottom line: Do we want science academies to engage in issue advocacy?

Posted on June 7, 2005 12:05 PM View this article | Comments (25) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Climate Change | Science Policy: General

June 06, 2005

When the Cherries Don't Cooperate

Two recent cases, one on stem cells and one on global warming, suggest reasons for caution when cherry picking science to support a political agenda. Quite apart from the misuse of science, from the standpoint of political expediency, cherry picking can backfire.

Wired News had a story on Friday that illustrates some of the dynamics of politicizing science: whether a misuse actually occurs or not, cherry picking can be bad politics. Wired reports, “A spinal-cord patient has charged that Rep. Dave Weldon (R-Florida) used her image without permission and misled Congress and the public by suggesting that her case offers evidence that adult stem cells can help severely injured people walk again. Susan Fajt, who suffered a spinal-cord injury in a car accident in November 2001 that left her with little sensation from her chest down, e-mailed Weldon, who is also a physician, on Wednesday detailing her complaints and requesting an apology.” For its part, Rep. Weldon’s office says that its use of Ms. Fajt’s testimony and image are consistent with Senate testimony she gave recently. Fajt obviously disagrees. Weldon is the big loser politically in this instance, even if, as his spokes person notes, "Rep. Weldon's one-sentence statement regarding Ms. Fajt's treatment was completely consistent with Ms. Fajt's July 14, 2004, testimony before the U.S. Senate." Cherry pick with caution because sometimes the cherries talk back.

In another instance of cherry picking backfiring, two activists seeking to highlight the perils of global warming via a trip to the North Pole abandoned their trip because of "deep snow and drifting pack ice" (as well as polar bears). In this case the activist appeared to be seeking to exploit benign weather as an example of the effects of global warming. The fact that weather conditions are extreme in the arctic is of course not proof that global warming is a hoax, but nor would a successful trip to the North Pole prove the opposite. Some advocates opposed to action on global warming have already sought to use the failed expedition to further their own political agenda. For the explorers, their failed stunt provides some symbolic ammunition for their political opponents, even as both sides are playing fast and loose with the science.

Cherry picking is a tried and true approach to politicizing science, because, in many instances advancing a political agenda does not dependent upon getting the science “right.” But be careful, sometimes people and nature fail to cooperate.

June 03, 2005

Outstanding Article on Politicization of Science

Philipp Steger, editor of bridges -- a publication of Office of Science & Technology at the Embassy of Austria in Washington, D.C. that I have only just recently learned of – has published by far the best analysis I’ve seen (and I’ve seen a lot) of the debate over “scientific integrity” in the Bush Administration. Not only is the analysis nuanced, balanced and sound, but the article introduces some new information from main players in the debate. Below are some extended excerpts from the lengthy article.

[Note – For anyone interested in science and technology policy, I highly recommend bookmarking bridges. It is a high quality publication.]

On the future of this debate: “The persistence of the criticism, the continuous emergence of new cases, the introduction of legislation to "restore scientific integrity," a growing consensus within the most vocal parts of the scientific community that the administration is misusing science, and some prominent Republicans joining the chorus of critical voices, all make it likely that this issue will continue to pursue the administration throughout the President's second term. “I expect the concept of a conspiracy to undermine science's integrity in the Bush administration – whether right or wrong – to persist,” says John Marburger.”

On the persistence of the debate: “The persistence of the debate and the publicity it has received is also a result of how the debate was framed. From very early on, the debate focused not so much on the validity of the individual allegations, as on the overarching claim that the number of cases justifies speaking of a pattern of abuse of science in the administration’s policymaking. This has created an obvious impasse, because such a claim is as hard to refute as it is to prove, unless both sides sit down, agree on a methodology, and spend considerable time and effort at conducting a study that lives up to their agreed-upon methodology and the rigors of scientific inquiry. In this situation, the critics find themselves in the more advantageous position: they have the prima facie evidence in their support: no matter how many claims the administration sets out to refute, a question like why, if the allegations aren’t true, so many accomplished scientists have signed the UCS statement or why the criticism doesn’t abate, will stop the best-intentioned efforts at refutation in their track.”

On how John Marbuger saw his role in responding to critics: “Looking back at OSTP’s response to UCS’s allegations, John Marburger explains: “I did look into every case and I did not find either a pattern of abuse or even very serious cases. I found a few cases of poor judgment where people in agencies did things that ranged from undiplomatic to 'not smart.' But I didn’t see any reason to apologize for these things or even suggest that there was something wrong. For me to send even the slightest suggestion that there might be something wrong and that I am going to 'investigate' would have been a mistake in the charged political atmosphere of the time. Significance would have been attached to such a statement that would not be correct. I very deliberately avoided giving any suggestion that there was something wrong or needing to be investigated.””

Bottom line: “So far, the debate has come to this: the administration expects that the idea of the Bush administration misusing science will not disappear anytime soon. And Kurt Gottfried, on the other side of the fence, harbors no illusions about tangible outcomes of the critics’ efforts: “I doubt that we'll accomplish many tangible results with this administration, but by doing what we do, we create awareness in the scientific community and with the media.” Barry D. Gold, a former staffer at the House Science Committee who is now in charge of science-based conservation programs at the David & Lucile Packard foundation, sums it up well when he says: “Unfortunately, the issue of politicization of science, itself, got politicized.””

On the role of science in policy making: “[T]he debate has eclipsed a crucial issue, namely whether there really is a consensus on the appropriate role of science in policymaking. The debate, by focusing nearly exclusively on the question of whether or not there is a pattern of misuse of science across the administration, has created the impression that a consensus exists on the role science should play in policymaking… The critics are able to make their statements so confidently, without fearing that they will undermine their case, because they implicitly attribute more relevance and objectivity to scientific arguments than to other arguments, and feel that in most of the cited cases the science clearly indicated what the appropriate action was. Both the administration and the critics are using the same textbook model of how science in policymaking works. This model goes something like this: a policymaker, having to decide on a course of action, carefully weighs the various alternatives and the available information on each of them. If part of the information on the various alternatives and their consequences is of a scientific nature, then in most cases the science will clearly and objectively indicate what the appropriate action is. Apart from the fact that in reality decision-makers rarely are the wise, unbiased, and entirely objective people textbooks would have them be, this model fails to consider the real-world phenomenon of “an excess of objectivity.” “Excess of objectivity” is a term coined by Dan Sarewitz, professor of science and society at Arizona State University (ASU) who, in an interview for bridges, claims that “there is plenty of science to go around. You don’t really need to distort the science. All you need to do in many cases is find the right science. That is not an indictment of science or scientists, but a statement about the complexity of reality and nature and the difficulty of defining problems in very narrow ways.” Sarewitz’s statement suggests that the assumed consensus on whether science can objectively indicate the “right” course of action is an illusion. “The scientific finding never tells you what to do. That is always determined by what you are trying to achieve; and what you are trying to achieve is always guided by values and interests. So there is no formula that takes you from a fact to an action,” says Sarewitz, who is also the director of the Consortium for Science, Policy, and Outcomes (CSPO) at ASU. Of course, Sarewitz’s belief runs contrary to what is, if not the consensus, definitely the currently predominant view, namely that science does, indeed, indicate which action is appropriate. Says former science advisor Neal Lane: “We expect an agency to say what the scientific information on an issue is and to specify why they have taken a decision that’s contrary to the science.” This widespread expectation, while not demanding that the decision has to be in line with the science, does place scientific arguments on a level above other arguments in the policymaking process. The expectation that decisionmakers should explain a decision perceived as contrary to the science puts the decisionmakers in a situation where they can reasonably respond only by taking recourse to some other scientific information that supports their point of view which, according to Sarewitz’s “excess of objectivity”-argument shouldn’t be too difficult. The decisionmakers who decide to do otherwise and instead admit that the science is not in alignment with their ideological agenda, open themselves up to attacks of disregarding the science for the simple fact that they did not respond with an opposing set of scientific facts.”

Of course, with respect to the last point there are also examples of decision makers who mischaracterize or are mistaken about facts, perhaps because they want to be seen as appealing to some facts (any facts, even facts that are not facts) in support of their position. This then sets the stage for a criticism of their facts in order to under cut their position, and a follow-on debate about science, when in fact the dispute was really about ideology and values all along.

Bottom line: “As understandable and human as the wish to validate one’s arguments with science may be, it certainly doesn’t make political debates any more objective. The baffling debate on the teaching of creationism vs. evolutionism vs. intelligent design may serve as a case in point. What the critics of the Bush Administration’s handling of science in policymaking are saying in essence is that the credibility of science is being misused to further a political agenda. And the administration is responding by saying that it’s not abusing the credibility of science. Hardly anyone seems to wonder whether the tendency to give a priori credibility to science simply because it comes under the cloak of Science may be part of the problem.”

There is much more in the article, read the whole thing here.

Posted on June 3, 2005 12:02 AM View this article | Comments (2) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

June 02, 2005

What Role for National Science Academies in Policy?

A few weeks ago Richard Horton, the editor of the British medical journal Lancet, caused a stir when he published an editorial lambasting the Royal Society. Here is how it was reported in the Telegraph:

"In the latest issue, published today, under the headline "What is the Royal Society for?" Dr Horton argues that the eminent body has produced little of public value in medicine and public health in recent times, and calls for an immediate and radical review of its role. "The Royal Society began as a radical idea - a place to discuss the subversive subject of science and to witness remarkable experiments. "Today [it] is a lazy institution, resting on its historical laurels. Instead of being the intellectual hub of European scientific culture, it has reinvented itself as something far more self-serving and parochial. It is little more than a shrill and superficial cheerleader for British science. "Its modern mission is about domestic image rather than international substance.""

The Royal Society issued a response and Horton a rejoinder, and I would encourage interested readers to have a look. The exchange between The Lancet and The Royal Society raises some important and uncomfortable questions about the role of national science academies in democratic processes.

At Prometheus we have frequently commented on the role of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and its role in policy and politics. For example:

*We criticized a panel comprised to recommend a course of action on the Hubble Space Telescope as being comprised of experts who shared a common bias to save the instrument..

*We praised a panel comprised to identify the benefits to science of extending the TRMM satellite mission as clearly identifying its scope and mandate.

*We applauded the efforts of the interest group NRDC which looked behind the curtain of NRC empanelment processes to show some evidence of high-level influence of the Bush Administration in the composition of a panel looking at the risks of perchlorate.

*We expressed some concerns about the role of NRC in the Yucca Mountain controversy, where decisions putatively about science carry extraordinarily large political consequences.

The reports of the National Research Council (NRC) play a significant role in many contested political issues that involve science. And most such reports are funded by the public through federal agencies, but the NRC is not an agency of government. This situation raises some questions that are rarely asked. For example,

How should the NRC relate to the policy process?

Should it codify this relationship to foster transparency?

In what ways is the NRC accountable to the public?

Should the empanelment process be more transparent?

The charges given to committees are negotiated out of sight. Should this process be more open?

Who oversees the work of the NRC?

Though the analogy is not perfect, the spat between the Royal Society and The Lancet provides an example of what can happen when the role of an institution seeking to provide guidance to decision makers is left unclear. As the U.S. NRC moves to new leadership it would seem appropriate that a high-level consideration and clarification of its role in policy and politics would go a long way toward preemptively dealing with issues at the interface of science and politics such as listed above.

Posted on June 2, 2005 09:05 AM View this article | Comments (1) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

May 26, 2005

John Marburger on Science Policy Research

In last week's Science, John Marburger, science advisor to President Bush, calls (PDF, subscription required) for greater attention to science policy research:

"How much should a nation spend on science? What kind of science? How much from private versus public sectors? Does demand for funding by potential science performers imply a shortage of funding or a surfeit of performers? These and related science policy questions tend to be asked and answered today in a highly visible advocacy context that makes assumptions that are deserving of closer scrutiny. A new "science of science policy" is emerging, and it may offer more compelling guidance for policy decisions and for more credible advocacy."

In my view, the "science of science policy" is being practiced most explicitly at Arizona State University's Consortium for Science, Policy and Outcomes and our own Center for Science and Technology Policy Research at the University of Colorado. Dr. Marburger's Science editorial follows up on his recent AAAS speech on the same subject.

Needless to say, we agree about the need for more systematic study of science policy - that is, decisions made about science and decision made with science. Our mission (PDF) here at the University of Colorado is based on the assumption/hypothesis that science policy decision making can be improved by expanding the scope of choice available to science policy decision makers. Perhaps we'll prove ourselves wrong, but we'll sure have fun along the way.

Posted on May 26, 2005 10:31 AM View this article | Comments (3) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

May 05, 2005

Another Recipe for Politicization of Science

Nature reports this week that the U.S. National Science Foundation is moving toward limiting the number of proposals that a particular university can submit,

“In the past few years, the NSF has placed limits on the number of applications that a single institution can submit. Those limits will now become increasingly common, according to Arden Bement, the agency's director. He says the measures are needed to control the number of proposals flooding in to his staff, and to boost the success rate of applications. He stresses that the new policy will affect only large facilities and collaborative grants. "This would not be for individual applications," he says. But universities are starting to speak out about the proposals, warning that the changes are forcing them to become unwilling peer reviewers. Earlier this year, administrators at Princeton University, New Jersey, had to choose one of several proposals for a programme that funded international collaborations, according to Diane Jones, director of the university's office of government affairs. The proposals came from several disciplines and departments, making the choice far from straightforward. "Universities are not set up to do this kind of internal peer review," she says.”

In my experience universities are highly politicized places -- and I don’t mean here the Republican-Democrat sort of politicization, but the sort of politicization associated with turf, disciplinary status, personal feuds, professorial fiefdoms and horse trading and logrolling. Going further down the path of outsourcing peer review to universities is in my view another step towards a continued diminishment of peer review as an effective tool of decision making about science.

Posted on May 5, 2005 12:23 PM View this article | Comments (1) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

May 04, 2005

Fun With Cherry Picking

Two blog posts from recent days highlight the cherry picking of information to put a favorable spin on information.

Chris Mooney does a nice job showing differences between a press release on a recent paper by Hansen et al. issued by Columbia University and a version of the same press release issued by NASA. Mooney argues that the differences show that, “The tenor of these edits is all in one direction: Make the findings seem less alarming--i.e., less demanding of political action, and also less newsworthy.” Of course, the authors of the Columbia press release also had decisions to make about how to portray the Hansen paper.

At Climate Audit, a recent post makes the case that the IPCC selectively ignored inconvenient data when creating a graphed showing paleoclimate temperature reconstructions. Climate Audit then presents its recreation of the graph in question with the previously not-included data added and suggests that the IPCC did not include the data because it complicated its conclusions.

Both of these instances are great examples of the “cherry pick -- the careful selection of information to buttress a particular predetermined perspective while ignoring other information that does not. In other words, take the best and leave the rest.” NASA is allegedly trying to present the Hansen paper in a way that puts the current Administration’s climate policies in the best light, and the IPCC is allegedly trying to present data that best support its conclusions. If we get a bit reflexive about this, in a similar manner, Chris Mooney is selectively focusing on data and anecdotes that make the Bush Administration look bad (e.g., he has not vetted every agency press release), and Climate Audit is focused on holding the paleo-climate science community accountable (and similarly has not audited every IPCC graph). Here at Prometheus we selectively focus on examples and cases at the messy interface of climate politics and science (and we tend to focus on problematic aspects of that interface). But of course we should not expect to receive information that is not selective; it would be of little use. Weblogs are useful because they are selective in their presentation of information.

All of this is to say – to quote Dan Sarewitz -- all uses of facts and information are selective. Every single one. There is no alternative. Every time anyone makes an argument and invokes facts or information they have some agenda for doing so (except Michael Crichton, that is). That NASA or the IPCC (or Chris Mooney or Climate Audit or Prometheus) have agendas in not surprising. In neither case do Chris Mooney or Climate Audit allege (I think this is correct) that either NASA or the IPCC has engaged in scientific misconduct. What they are saying is that each organization has acted in ways to present information in a manner that further its own interest , perhaps revealing an underlying agenda, probably political.

Good for Chris Mooney and good for Climate Audit. Such close attention can help both the IPCC and NASA realize that people are paying attention to their use of information and facts. Knowing that people are paying attention will mean that NASA and IPCC may be less likely to go beyond cherry picking to providing information that is mistaken or mischaracterized. NASA and IPCC (and bloggers as well) should care because if people come to learn that their information providers are playing fast and loose with facts and information, then with some audiences their institutional legitimacy and authority may be placed at risk.

Anytime someone uses facts or information to make an argument, that use is selective. Cherry picking is inevitable. But it is important to recognize that how one uses information can either foster or damage legitimacy and authority (on this, see recent reports on use of intelligence leading to the war in Iraq).

Posted on May 4, 2005 05:37 AM View this article | Comments (1) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Climate Change | Science Policy: General

May 03, 2005

What Kind of Politicization Do You Want?

In Sunday’s Sacramento Bee Mark B. Brown and Ramshin, both of California State University, Sacramento, observe (free registration required) that while it is impossible to separate science and politics on the stem cell issue, we do have choices about how stem cell science is politicized. They write,

“The controversy over implementation of Proposition 71 is not about whether stem cell research will be politicized but how it will be politicized Prop. 71 was designed to counteract the politicization of science associated with federal science policy. The Bush administration had reportedly slanted the membership and distorted the recommendations of several of its scientific advisory boards. And the president's 2001 restrictions on publicly funded stem cell research have been widely criticized for sacrificing science to ideology. Seeking to avoid such political meddling, Prop. 71 made the institute's advisory committees largely exempt from conflict-of-interest and open meetings laws. It stipulated that the initiative's provisions could not be changed by the Legislature for three years, and then only by a 70 percent vote in both houses. And Prop. 71 declared, "There is hereby established a right to conduct stem cell research." Just as the Bill of Rights protects civil and religious freedoms, Prop. 71 sought to protect science from political interference. So far, none of these efforts to insulate science from politics has worked. But why would they?”

Brown and Ramshin make the case that the issue is not whether or not stem cell science politics will be politicized, it will no matter what. The issue is how it is politicized and Brown and Ramshin make the case that we have choices in this regard.

“Two lawsuits now challenge Prop. 71, and many former supporters have publicly attacked the secretiveness and cronyism at the institute. But even if it is impossible to get the politics out of stem cell research, there are ways to avoid the sort of politicization undertaken by the Bush administration. A constitutional amendment recently introduced by state Sens. Deborah Ortiz, D-Sacramento, and George Runner, R-Lancaster, and now in committee, offers one option. The amendment, which if passed by the Legislature would require approval by California voters, would make the bodies created by Prop. 71 subject to open meetings and public records laws, as well as conflict-of-interest and financial disclosure requirements. These are worthy goals. They would introduce a more accountable and transparent, and hence more democratic, form of politics into stem cell research.”

Read the whole article here to see Brown and Rashmin’s recommendations for how stem cell science might be politicized consistent with democratic common interests.

Posted on May 3, 2005 08:34 AM View this article | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

April 27, 2005

Text of Bob Palmer’s Remarks

Bob Palmer, recently retired after 13 years as Democratic Staff director for the House Science Committee, gave a talk here at Colorado last week. We now have online have an audio file of his talk and also his prepared remarks.

Here are a few teasers:

“…for many years, both in the executive and legislative branches, there has been no consistent or focused debate about the roles of S&T in meeting our broader national goals, as I believe there has been about the rightful place of other aspects of our culture… So regrettably, I’ve concluded that science policy is in anything but a golden age. It is rusty. It is stagnant. Engagement between the two branches and the two political parties is minimal. The great debates of the day are being held somewhere else. To the extent that they occur at all, science policy debates have gone underground. In short, it is an excruciatingly boring and unproductive time for the practice of science policy in the halls of government. Now I apologize to any students who came to this talk excited about their future careers in science policy. You could say that I’m just a bitter, retired-to-Florida, out-of-power Democrat and you could well be right. Let me try to explain why I’ve reached this rather grim conclusion.”

“Do I see any of this bipartisan, government-wide engagement now? The answer is virtually none, not even at the meso-scale level. Why? In my perhaps overly partisan view, the problem started in the late 1980’s, when S&T became politicized in Congress as part of a broader strategy by Republicans to seize back control of the Congress – a goal which they eventually accomplished in the 1994 mid-term elections. It may surprise some of you to hear that the public partisan fight over science policy – exemplified today in the reports by Congressman Henry Waxman and the Union of Concerned Scientists – did not start during this Administration. It has actually been going on in the Congress for about 15 years. There have always been a lot of specific fights on science-related issues on the Hill (for example, building the Clinch River Breeder Reactor in the early 1980’s). But partisan fights were largely non-existent until the late 1980’s when Newt Gingrich – ironically now an outspoken and highly entertaining advocate for science – stirred up his followers in the House of Representatives to fight the Democrats on everything, including science. I can go into specifics in the question-and-answer session if anyone is interested, but let me just say that beginning in the late-1980s, we fought on all sorts of issues and with a spirit of meanness, that had not been seen for decades.”

The whole talk is worth listening to or reading.

Posted on April 27, 2005 03:37 PM View this article | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

April 25, 2005

How Science Becomes Politics

The climate issue provides an incredibly rich and textured body of experience to explore issues of science and politics. All participants in the political debate over climate policy work hard to define the issue in terms of science. This by itself is of course not so surprising, as anyone who has seen the old television commercial claiming that "4 out of 5 dentists recommend Acme gum for their patients who chew gum" will be familiar with the appeal to scientific authority. What is most interesting to me in the case of the climate debate is the different roles that scientists might play in the political debate over climate, and how scientists have chosen to position themselves and their institutions on the climate issue.

An interview last week on Democracy Now helps to illustrate how advocates try to conflate scientific and political issues, but more importantly, it highlights some of the challenges facing the scientific community as providers of information to policy makers. If scientific debate equals political debate, then we will find that science has simply become another political battleground, and we will lose much of the positive contributions of science in policy (see this PDF for discussion). And as we have asked frequently here of late, should the climate science community position itself more like an issue advocate or honest broker?

The Democracy Now interview focused on the recent feature on climate change politics in Mother Jones magazine that we discussed here last week. In the interview, Ross Gelbspan, a vocal issue advocate, makes the following assertion:

"... the head of this intergovernmental panel on climate change, Dr. Rajendra Pachauri, said recently that we have about a ten-year window to make very, very deep cuts in our carbon fuel use, if, quote, "humanity is to survive." This is a scientist. He speaks normally in very conservative and measured language. So, to hear that kind of talk is very, very troubling."

I follow the IPCC pretty closely and we have occasionally commented on Dr. Pachauri's advocacy-oriented statements, but I am unaware of any statements made by Dr. Pachauri referring to the end of humanity if fossil fuel use is not dramatically cut. There are two possibilities here, neither of which is particularly attractive, and both imply choices for the climate science community.

Possibility #1 - Mr. Gelbspan is accurately quoting Dr. Pachauri, which would suggest that the IPCC is continuing down the path of transformation from honest broker (circa 1990) to advocate in support a particular approach to dealing with climate. We'd welcome a reference to Dr. Pachauri's quoted words by Mr. Gelbspan if any Prometheus readers are aware of it.

Possibility #2 - Mr. Gelbspan is not accurately quoting Dr. Pachauri, which would suggest that he is misusing the imprimatur of the IPCC in
pursuit of political advantage, by suggesting that the IPCC (or at least its leadership) has in fact endorsed the approach to the climate issue that Mr. Gelbspan prefers.

If for a moment we assume that Mr. Gelbspan is misquoting Dr. Pachauri, it would seem to be in the best interests of the IPCC to correct the misattribution, as Mr. Gelbspan is a well known and widely cited commentator on climate
politics. Under this scenario, if the climate science community were to simply ignore such misuse of their authority for purposes of advocacy, it raises legitimate questions about the role that climate scientists wish to play in the political debate. Context matters here as many climate scientists have shown little reluctance to speak out in response to certain commentators (compare, e.g., reaction to Michael Crichton). And the context becomes even more relevant when a climate scientist favorably invokes the work of Mr. Gelbspan, reinforcing a connection between climate science and a particular approach to climate politics. Under this scenario, letting misstatements stand while selectively correcting others contributes to the conflation of climate science and climate politics.

These dynamics help to illustrate how an observer (e.g., Gelbspan, Crichton, others) of the political debate on climate might come to (or even seek) the conclusion that climate science and politics are one and the same. From this vantage point, climate scientists become issue advocates whether they like it or not. For some climate scientists this outcome may be perfectly acceptable (see earlier reference to Madisonian democracy), but if climate policy needs consideration of new and innovative options (see earlier reference to Schattschneiderian democracy) then the climate community's collective actions may limit its future contributions to the climate debate to simply a tool of marketing for agendas now on the table. For issue advocates this may be a desirable outcome, but the question that I have for scientists is - is this the direction that you really want science to go?

Posted on April 25, 2005 12:45 PM View this article | Comments (5) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

Getting What's Wished For

Early last month a group of 750 scientists signed an open letter to the head of the National Institutes of Health protesting a shift in priorities toward biodefense research and away from some public health research. The letter, which was published in Science, stated, "The diversion of research funds from projects of high public-health importance to projects of high biodefense but low public-health importance represents a misdirection of NIH priorities and a crisis for NIH-supported microbiological research." In other words, the letter suggests that societal needs should play some role in setting research priorities. To support the claim of relative relevance, an appendix to the letter provided a comparison of the number of cases and deaths associated with diseases.

In last week's Nature a Columbia University researcher warns in a letter of the perils of appealing to societal criteria in justifying research priorities:

"I find it striking that those who protest against the funding of biodefence research are proposing instead that public-health menaces should be given the highest priority. By this standard, many of the letter's signatories should voluntarily return their funding for research on Bacillus subtilis, Escherichia coli and other non pathogens so that it can be appropriately directed towards the obvious public-health threats of HIV and tuberculosis."

He later states, "Using body counts ("Bioweapons agents cause, on average, zero deaths per year") may be useful in the short term to frame the debate, but I fear they will be damaging in the long run. How many of us want to be asked, when our next grant is reviewed: "How many people did your bug kill last year?". I certainly don't. If basic research is relevant to the health of the nation, then make the case that it is so."

Of course, the Columbia researcher is correct that if scientists start
invoking societal needs to justify research priorities, it won't be long before someone interested in targeting science on societal needs raises the notion of the "90/10 gap" (i.e., 90% of global health research funding goes to support research that affects 10% of the global population), and proposes some really dramatic changes to research funding priorities. Bloodless arguments for basic research allow researchers to dodge making any explicit claims about the societal benefits or outcomes research. This of course makes it difficult for policy makers to make effective judgments about competing scientific priorities. It also makes it difficult to target science on areas of societal need.

Posted on April 25, 2005 12:28 PM View this article | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

April 21, 2005

Science, Politics and Deer

The Philadelphia Inquirer has a nice article (free registration required) on the science and politics of deer management. The article observes,

“Science does underpin efforts to manage the deer population through hunting in every state. In practice, however, the science of deer management is no more immune to public pressure than is the science of stem-cell research. At one extreme are those who object to killing animals on moral grounds. At the other are what might be called libertarian hunters. They remember forests abundant with deer over much of the last half-century and blame overzealous government biologists for producing today's comparative scarcity. For their part, a broad consensus of scientists believes that for everyone's benefit, including the deer, hunters must adapt to a new role - as wildlife managers rather than just sportsmen - and game agencies must be willing to put up with the inevitable heat from constituents angry about their added civic responsibility.”

This is also a good example of the limits of “honest broker science.” In this case deer management depends critically on the work of wildlife ecologists, but such work cannot say what the single most appropriate course of action is – science alone cannot reduce the scope of choice. Consequently, any attempt of wildlife ecologists to “stick to the science” of deer population dynamics is bound to map onto one or another political agenda, and risk adversely politicizing science. One way out of this trap would be for wildlife ecologists to clearly link science with a wide range of alternative courses of action, ensuring that their views of the science are incorporated in any policy that is ultimately adopted.

Posted on April 21, 2005 09:27 AM View this article | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

April 20, 2005

Follow up on Food Pyramid

Last week we discussed the U.S. government’s “food pyramid” as an example of the impossibilities of “honest broker science” in cases characterized by conflict over values and uncertainty in knowledge. Yesterday the U.S. Department of Agriculture released its latest incarnation of its food pyramid.

Media coverage of the pyramid suggests a range of different perspectives on the relative success of the pyramid as a means to provide scientific advice to the public. The new pyramid is actually a number of different pyramids that can be tailored to an individual’s unique circumstances. This would seem to be a move in the direction of “honest brokering” of action alternatives. But not all observers see this as a good thing. Here are some examples of reactions from a Washington Post article:

“"The fact that almost all the information is on the Web is a lost opportunity, because only the very most motivated people will go to the Web and dig into this information more deeply," said Walter Willett, professor of nutrition and epidemiology at the Harvard School of Public Health.”

“"It's positive that what they released can be more personalized," said Elizabeth Pivonka, president of the Produce for Better Health Foundation, a nonprofit group that promotes greater consumption of fruit and vegetables. "And I like the way physical activity is included graphically. But from a negative side, the population most in need doesn't have access to computers, and from a big point of view they missed the opportunity to make a stronger message. . . . It's designed to not call any attention to any negative food group. I hate to say it, but what else would we expect from the USDA?"”

The last comment reflects the view of some who see the pyramid as a reflection of industry influence. The San Francisco Chronicle reported that, “Marion Nestle, nutrition professor at New York University, took one look at the new pyramid and asked: "Where's the food? There's no 'eat less' message here," Nestle said. "There's nothing about soda or snacks or about how many times you should eat."” And the Washington Post article included a similar perspective, “"The new dietary guidelines are the best ever," said Margo G. Wootan, nutrition policy director at the Center for Science in the Public Interest, a consumer advocacy group. "They're based on the latest science and they provide very strong advice, but it seems like the USDA dodged the difficult political advice once again and didn't clearly communicate what to eat less of. Given that obesity is the biggest health problem facing the country, that is what is most needed to be communicated."” Clearly, there is no “honest brokering of science” on this issue, even though by all accounts that I have seen the scientific basis of the pyramid is first rate.

I am no expert on food policy, but I would hypothesize that the differences in view on the efficacy of the food pyramid lie in differences in opinion about the role of the expert in a democracy. In other words, some will see the role of the scientist/expert to empower decision makers to take responsibility for their own choices by providing them with a set of options. Other will see the role to be something more along the lines of telling people what action they should take (i.e., narrowing the scope of choice). And of course such perspectives also reflect equity considerations, such as who wins and who loses among the users of the new pyramid (e.g., this is reflected in various comments on whether the expert target the informed and motivated public or the uniformed or otherwise disadvantaged public?). I’d pose the hypothesis that one’s views on the pyramid’s flexible structure will be closely correlated with one’s views on the role of the scientist/expert as an honest broker or issue advocate.

Clearly the pyramid reflects a compromise of perspectives, and there is no such thing as a pure “honest broker.” But it does seem that the present incarnation of the food pyramid reflects a move more in the direction of honest brokering than the previous version. The most important yet unanswered question from my standpoint is: Is there any evidence that the new incarnation better supports decision making than the past version or possible alternatives? The ultimate test of honest brokering and issue advocacy is the pragmatic test.

[If any of our readers is aware of or conducting research on the last question posed above, drop us a note. Thanks!]

Posted on April 20, 2005 10:06 AM View this article | Comments (1) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

April 19, 2005

On Basic Research

On 10 April 2005 Rick Weiss had a commentary in the Washington Post lamenting the apparent decline of basic research. He writes, “the U.S. scientific enterprise is riddled with evidence that Americans have lost sight of the value of non-applied, curiosity-driven research -- the open-ended sort of exploration that doesn't know exactly where it's going but so often leads to big payoffs.”

Daniel Greenberg suggests one way to view such claims, “You hear it repeatedly: The federal government is cutting financial support for scientific research, and America is losing its scientific supremacy. That ominous message, delivered to Congress by money-seeking scientists, is routinely and uncritically parroted by a gullible press. But it's self-serving nonsense.”

Weiss’ article is chock full of contradictions. How does one reconcile “non-applied, curiosity-driven research” with the promise of “big payoffs”? The former suggests that applications should not be the metric of success, while the latter says they should. Weiss cites DOD’s DARPA as an example of the trend away from “basic research.” But as John Giacomoni, a student of mine, points out for our class, the development internet was always driven by considerations of applications and deliverables. DARPA does not have “basic research” as part of its congressionally-mandated mission, only NSF and NASA have such a mandate. In every other federal agency research is a means to an end, not the end itself, or at least this is view from the Hill.

Weiss is similarly off base making reference to the U.S. Geological Survey, “… in geology, scientists have for years sought funds to blanket the nation with thousands of sensors to create an enormous, networked listening device that might teach us something about how the earth is shifting beneath our feet. The system got so far as to be authorized by Congress for $170 million over five years, but only $16 million has been appropriated in the first three of those years and just 62 of an anticipated 7,000 sensors have been deployed. Only in fiscal 2006, thanks to the South Asian tsunami, is the program poised to get more fully funded -- out of a narrow desire to better predict the effects of such disasters here.” It seems somewhat insensitive (at best) to me to suggest that a response to a disaster that claimed hundreds of thousands of lives represents a “narrow desire.” Historically, the USGS, and other earth sciences agencies, have always been motivated by supporting the needs of decisions makers and the public in areas such as weather prediction, resource extraction, pollution regulation and ecosystem management. Science has been central to their successes.

Weiss plays fast and loose with the facts when he claims that “The National Science Foundation in particular, the nation's premier supporter of physical sciences research and science education, has suffered repeated cuts in recent years and now demands that grantees spell out in unprecedented detail how and when their proposed work will pay off.” The NSF did in fact see a budget reduction from FY 2004 to FY 2005, but this is during an extended period of increasing funding of about 40% over 7 years (data here in PDF). And claims of demands for spelling out payoffs don’t square with experience (e.g., see this NAPA study in PDF which found that 73% of reviewers simply ignored the NSF broader impact criterion).

Weiss asks, “Why should we care about this demand for results before the research begins? Isn't exploration for exploration's sake a luxury?” His answer is suggestive of a Catch-22 “First, there are practical reasons to care. At least half of this nation's economic growth during the past half century has been the direct result of scientific innovation…” So research for research sake is justified by its societal benefits? If arguments for support are made in terms of societal benefits, then it would seem appropriate for policy makers to expect such benefits from the research they fund. Weiss also suggests a second reason for supporting curiosity-driven research is intrinsic, the value of knowledge itself (an argument I happen to agree with).

In the post-World War II era the phrase “basic research” has carried two contradictory meanings -- to many scientists it means “pure research” (i.e., no connection to the needs of society) while to most policy makers it means “fundamental to the economy and innovation” (i.e., a close connection to the needs of society). This strategic ambiguity served both parties well for decades, but no longer seems to work. As scientists appetite for funding has grown while government spending has become more tight, demands for public resources from competing interests has taken the form of claims of relative payoffs related to public investments. Scientists have been exceedingly skilled at playing the budget game. But as the scientific community has made claims of ever more benefits from research, it should not come as a surprise that policy makers hear such claims and expect results.

For further reading:

Pielke, Jr., R.A., and R. Byerly, Jr., 1998: Beyond Basic and Applied. Physics Today, 51(2), 42-46. (PDF)

Greenberg, Daniel S. 2001. Science, Money, and Politics: Political Triumph and Ethical Erosion. 528 p. (University of Chicago Press).

Posted on April 19, 2005 06:52 AM View this article | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

April 14, 2005

Honest Broker, Part II

In the first part of this discussion I outlined the notion of honest broker as contrasted with issue advocate. The former seeks to expand (or at least clarify) the scope of choice available to decision makers, while the latter seeks to reduce the scope of choice, usually to a single preferred alternative. I also made the case for why situations of conflicting values and political uncertainty make it difficult for "honest broker science" that exists completely independent of political battles over the scope of choice (I also pointed to a large literature that makes this case irrefutably). Now, I'd like to illustrate these concepts with examples, many drawn from the Prometheus archives.

NRC Hubble Report. Last July we commented on a report issued by the National Research Council. The report had the title, "Assessment of Options for Extending the Life of the Hubble Space Telescope." From my perspective this title would suggest an analysis more along the lines of The Lonely Planet guide than an advertisement for a single restaurant (read the earlier post if these analogies are unfamiliar). But the NRC report focused on advocating a single action alternative rather than any attempt to assess options. Last July I criticized both the NRC and the media on this, not only because the report took an advocacy stance, but also because it memberships was comprised of people predisposed to save Hubble, "Given that many of the members of the panel have at least the appearance of predispositions to preserve Hubble, it would seem that the NRC would be better served by having its panel present and evaluate the full suite of options open to NASA, rather than taking an advocacy position on a single option. At the very least it is time that the media takes a more critical eye on the composition of NRC panels who, with very little scrutiny, provide guidance that influences policy making." In this case, the NRC committee presented itself as an honest broker but acted more like an issue advocate.

NRC TRMM Report. In contrast to the Hubble Report a subsequent report on the scientific benefits of preserving the TRMM satellite. This report had a different sort of title than did the Hubble report, "Assessment of the Benefits of Extending the Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission: A Perspective from the Research and Operations Communities." Like the Hubble report this committee was also comprised of people with a clear stake in and perspective on TRMM. But a key difference is that the TRMM report clearly presented itself not as an honest broker, but as an issue advocate. The committee clearly would like to see NASA extend TRMM, and it tried forthrightly to present the strongest case it could for the scientific and operation benefits of doing so. This is an excellent example of well-done and appropriately-characterized issue advocacy.

IPCC. We've had frequent discussions of the Intergovernmental panel on Climate Change. It seems clear that the IPCC has undergone a transition from a stance more aligned with serving as honest broker to one more aligned with being an issue advocate (there is plenty of data to support this hypothesis, and I'll post a paper on this subject here as soon as accepted for publication). Last October I wrote, "the IPCC suffers because it no longer considers "policy options" under its mandate. Since its First Assessment Report when it did consider policy options, the IPCC has eschewed responsibility for developing and evaluating a wide range of possible policy options on climate change. By deciding to policy outside of its mandate since 1992, the IPCC, ironically, leaves itself more open to charges of political bias. It is time for the IPCC to bring policy back in, both because we need new and innovative options on climate, but also because the IPCC has great potential to serve as an honest broker. But until it does, its leadership would be well served to avoid either the perception or the reality of endorsing particular political perspectives." And I have occasionally pointed out the apparent conflict of the head of the IPCC endorsing specific policy proposals while simultaneously claiming to be "policy neutral." When it offered a wide range of policy options (honest broker) the IPCC was arguably out ahead of policy and politics. Now that it has adopted a much more narrow focus on the parameters of the Framework Convention (e.g., focused on "dangerous interference," mitigation, the FCCC definition of climate change) not only has the IPCC serving more as an "issue advocate" it has become a servant of politics and policy. This is particularly troubling when policy makers now need discussion of new and innovative options on climate policy.

Bioethics. A very similar dynamic has been taking place in the President's Council on Bioethics. The chair of that panel, which has a mandate suggestive of an "honest broker" role, has sought to lobby Congress to adopt a particular set of bioethics policies. I wrote of these dual roles, "If Kass wants to be a political advocate, then he should resign his position of the Bioethics Council and join one of the many conservative advocacy groups that are truly independent of the Bioethics Council. If he wants to serve as an honest broker to the nation as chair of the Bioethics Council, then he should recognize that this means deferring his desire to serve as a political advocate advancing special interests. But he does have to choose, because he can't do both." Presumably, when one agrees to help decision makers understand the choices and consequences associated with their action, they take on a different role than someone trying to sell the decision maker on a single course of action. This seemingly obvious insight is frequently missed, not only in the scientific community, but on issues as important and the role of intelligence in decisions to go to war.

Other discussions from the Prometheus archives are relevant to thinking about a spectrum between issue advocacy and honest brokering as well, including, various AAAS activities, empanelment of scientific advisory committees, science and the 2004 election, and the FDA and drug approval.

As usual, we'd welcome your comments and feedback. I very much appreciate the efforts of those, on the site and off, who motivated me to try to clarify these concepts in a more understandable manner. I am sure that these same folks will let me know how well I've succeeded in this effort.

Posted on April 14, 2005 07:49 AM View this article | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

April 12, 2005

Honest Broker, Part I

I have written that an honest broker works to expand (or at least clarify) the scope of choice available to decision makers. I have contrasted this with the issue advocate who works to reduce the scope of choice available to decision makers. These ideas have been developed in several papers of mine (e.g., in PDFs here and here) are central to a book manuscript which I hope to deliver this summer. More fundamentally the notion of the expert as honest broker derives from the writings of E. E. Schattschneider on democracy, and the notion of issue advocate comes straight from the view of democracy advanced by James Madison. Both roles are important to democracy, and they suggest that scientists (and other experts) have choices in how they relate to decisions makers. With this post I'd like to try to explain what I mean by honest broker and issue advocate through a simple analogy.

Imagine that a visitor has come to town for the first time, and wants to fine someplace to eat dinner. How might you provide them with information relevant to the decision where to eat? (Note that this analogy makes things simple by presenting a clearly defined problem with a clearly defined solution. We'll make things more complicated later.) There are several ways that you, the local expert, might provide information.

First, you might try to convince the visitor to eat at a particular restaurant. Maybe you think that the restaurant is really good, or your cousin works there or whatever. Such "issue advocacy" could be very strong if you are focused on advocating a single restaurant, or more relaxed, say if you were directing the visitor to some family of restaurants, say those with Italian food. The defining characteristic of the issue advocate is an effort to reduce the scope of choice for decision making (irrespective of motivation for doing so). More generally, such issue advocacy might be thought of as a kiosk of brochures, each telling you where to eat dinner, making the best case possible for why the restaurant advertised is the one that the visitor should choose. Of course, it is easy to see that this analogy is quite similar to James Madison's conception of democracy in which politics is about the efforts of competing factions to sway decision making in preferred directions.

Second, you might instead provide your visitor with information on all restaurants in the city, basic information on each (cost, menu, etc.) and let the visitor face the challenge of reducing the scope of choice (i.e., making a decision). Such "honest brokering" could also be strong (e.g., a comprehensive guide to all restaurants in the city) or weak (e.g., a guide to all those within a 5 minutes walk). The defining characteristic of the honest broker is an effort to expand (or at least clarify) the scope of choice for decision making. A good example of an honest broker for restaurants might be the Lonely Planet travel guides (or, at least, I'd argue that the Lonely Planet guides serve more as honest brokers than do a kiosk brochure). This analogy draws on the work of the twentieth century political scientist E.E. Schattschneider who wrote of "a realist's conception of democracy" in his book, The Semisovereign people.

A characteristic fundamental to both honest brokers and issue advocates is explicit engagement of decision alternatives (i.e., choices, policy options, forks in the road). It should also be obvious that as an expert, one cannot simultaneously act as an issue advocate and honest broker, though these categories are not black and white, but more of a continuum from strictly reducing choice to expansively presenting options. I'll make this more concrete with some practical examples in a subsequent post.

But at this point scientists and other experts might protest that there is a third category, that of the "honest broker on science." In the analogy of searching for the restaurant, scientists, might claim, is there not room for some one to provide guidance on scientific knowledge of food and health? The answer is that it depends. In some cases there is such a role, but in many cases there is not. Let's follow the analogy a bit further.

In the United States the federal government has come up with something called the "food guide pyramid" which seeks to provide guidelines on a healthy diet. It doesn't purport to tell you what restaurant to eat at, only the scientific basis for what constitutes a healthy diet. At first consideration (at least at my first consideration) the food guide pyramid might seem to offer the prospects of providing objective science to inform decision making which is separate from the process of actually making a decision about where to eat. But, things are just not so simple for two reasons.

First, it turns out that the food guide pyramid is reflective of political debates that take the form of food science. Marion Nestle, who is Professor and Chair of the Department of Nutrition and Food Studies at New York University, has written a book called "Food Politics" (University of California Press, 2003) that documents the battle of interests that take place through the guide of food science (e.g., interests of different food companies, the interests of the food industry as a whole). Professor Nestle served on the federal committee that developed the food guide pyramid and commented in the Los Angeles Times that, "Creating the [food pyramid] guidelines is still "political - from start to finish. It's science politics. It's politics politics. It's corporate politics."" The food guide pyramid doesn't tell you exactly where to eat, but for those who look to the pyramid to inform their decisions, the food guide pyramid suggests that some choices are more desirable and others less so. No one should be surprised by this, as scholars in STS have demonstrated in great depth the degree to which considerations of politics and values shape the work of experts seeking to provide guidance to decision makers.

Second, we should not be surprised to learn there are alternative food pyramids available, such as the vegetarian food pyramid, the vegan food pyramid , and the Atkins food pyramid among many others. The degree to which one of these is "better" than another depends upon the criteria one employs to evaluate them. If one values not eating meat, then the vegetarian pyramid may be favored over the U.S. government pyramid. Alternatively, if one values the advertised waist-slimming effects of the Atkins diet over concerns about its health effects that will influence the choice. The point here is that the expertise relevant to a particular decision - where to eat dinner - will in important respects be a function of what the decision maker actually values. Absent knowing such values, then any food pyramid will reflect either the values of those putting the pyramid together, or the experts' interpretation/expectation of what decision makers ought to value. Consequently, it is very easy for the food science expert to act as an issue advocate (e.g., should meat be part of the pyramid?) favoring one set of choices over others, and this is irrespective of their intention of doing so.

So are their any circumstances in which experts can provide "objective" guidance that is independent of the choices to be made? Again the answer is yes and no. Perhaps ironically, objectivity is more possible is cases where the decision context is highly specified or constrained. If you have narrowed down your restaurant choices to, say, three restaurants then you could ask your expert to comment on the healthiness (or vegan-ness, etc.) of each, according to criteria that you would like to see applied. In circumstances where the scope of choice is fixed and the decision maker has a clearly defined technical question, then the expert has a very important role to play in providing "honest broker science." But in situations where the scope of choice is open, decision makers do not have a sense of the values to be served by the decision, much less a fix on the technical questions derived from value commitments, there is very little room for "honest broker science" in the process of decision making and even good faith efforts to provide such a perspective can easily turn into a political battleground (which the technical expert may not even be aware of). (Of course, honest broker science can and frequently does point to the existence of a problem that compels action, but introducing reasons for possible action is quite different than providing guidance on what actions to actually take.)

Dan Sarewitz characterizes the resulting circumstances,

"In areas as diverse as climate change, nuclear waste disposal, endangered species and biodiversity, forest management, air and water pollution, and agricultural biotechnology, the growth of considerable bodies of scientific knowledge, created especially to resolve political dispute and enable effective decision making, has often been accompanied instead by growing political controversy and gridlock. Science typically lies at the center of the debate, where those who advocate some line of action are likely to claim a scientific justification for their position, while those opposing the action will either invoke scientific uncertainty or competing scientific results to support their opposition ... nature itself - the reality out there - is sufficiently rich and complex to support a science enterprise of enormous methodological, disciplinary, and institutional diversity. I will argue that science, in doing its job well, presents this richness, through a proliferation of facts assembled via a variety of disciplinary lenses, in ways that can legitimately support, and are causally indistinguishable from, a range of competing, value-based political positions."

In the absence of political action that restricts the scope of choice and clarifies the role of technical questions in policy, the way out of this circumstance is, as Sarewitz argues, not to appeal to the objectivity of knowledge or to wage a proxy political war through science (either implicitly or under a simple lack of awareness). It is, as I have argued here and elsewhere, for scientists and other experts to openly associate their science with possible courses of action. And the good news is that scientists have choices in how they make such an association. They can work to expand choice or reduce choice. Honest broker or issue advocate? Both roles are important and noble in a functioning democracy. But scientists do have to choose. On highly complex, politically ill-defined issues like climate change there is simply no possibility of successfully hiding behind science, because the choices made about science are unavoidably part of a broader social and political debate. Whether scientists admit, accept or are aware of it, climate policy (as compared to say ozone policy in 1984) is not yet sufficiently developed from a political standpoint to allow much room for the "honest broker on science," claims to the contrary notwithstanding (see this paper for discussion of the ozone case). Consider that even the definition of the phrase "climate change" leads to a bias of some policy options over others, as I have argued here.

In a post soon to follow I will illustrate the concepts of honest broker and issue advocate with examples. Comments on all of this welcomed.

Posted on April 12, 2005 09:18 AM View this article | Comments (3) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

Cure = Disease?

Over the weekend the Toronto Globe and Mail had a lengthy article on politics and science (courtesy Chris Mooney). The end of the article contains some interesting comments from Alan Leshner, CEO of the AAAS, describing how AAAS is organizing scientists to combat the politicization of science.

“Dr. Leshner, of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, believes firmly that scientists must expand their public role: "When all of this politics, ideology and moralizing started, everybody in the scientific community's initial reaction was to lament the situation. But whining doesn't help. What I believe, and what many of my colleagues believe, is that you need to go out to people where they are, not where we are." That means talking to reporters "as much as we can," he said, and writing commentaries in the mass media. "It's about finding out what [the public's] concerns are and trying to find common ground," Dr. Leshner said. "We need to change our strategy and engage with the public." And that means scientists mounting a political campaign of their own. Dr. Leshner said the AAAS now has an elaborate plan to develop "a cadre of ambassadors of science," to fan out across the country and visit "religious groups, churches, synagogues, mosques, Boys' and Girls' Clubs, Kiwanis and Rotary Clubs . . . to go to where the people are, listen to what they are thinking about . . . let them help shape the research agenda. "The truth is," he said, "they're paying for this [research]. They ought to get something out of it."”

While I am all for public participation in the setting of research agendas, somehow the idea of scientists “mounting a political campaign of their own” does not strike me as a productive way to address concerns about the politicization of science. It may instead result in the exact opposite.

Posted on April 12, 2005 07:36 AM View this article | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

April 11, 2005

STS Contrarianism

One of the great ironies of our recent debate with climate scientists at RealClimate over the possibility of cleanly separating science and politics in efforts to connect science with the public, policy makers and journalists is that there is a vast amount of peer-reviewed literature that says such separation is impossible. The irony of course is that a big part of RealClimate's activities have been to correct the misguided views of the so-called "climate skeptics" or "climate contrarians" who are at odds with more "mainstream" views on climate science. RealClimate's commitment to the primacy of mainstream, peer-reviewed knowledge seems to be fairly narrow in scope as they are perfectly comfortable and confident in dismissing the "mainstream" views of the field of science and technology studies (STS). In jest I wonder if we should we call them "STS contrarians"?

Consider the following excerpt from Shelia Jasanoff's excellent book, "The Fifth Branch: Science Advisors as Policymakers", (at pp. 230-31). In her 1990 book Jasanoff, a leading voice in the discipline of STS, focuses on science advisory bodies and organizations that bring science to decision makers and the public, and I think in 2005 it is fair to include as advisory bodies weblogs seeking to communicate science to decision makers, even though weblogs didn't exist as a means of providing scientific advice in 1990:

"Although pleas for maintaining a strict separation between science and politics continue to run like a leitmotif through the policy literature, the artificiality of this position can no longer be doubted. Studies of scientific advising leave in tatters the notion that it is possible, in practice, to restrict the advisory practice to technical issues or that the subjective values of scientists are irrelevant to decision making."

She also writes (at p. 249) "The notion that scientific advisors can or do limit themselves to addressing purely scientific issues, in particular, seems fundamentally misconceived ... the advisory process seems increasingly important as a locus for negotiating scientific differences that have political weight."

STS contrarianism is of course not limited to the climate debate (though, interestingly, it does seem to have a stronger presence in the earth and environmental sciences than in fields of the life sciences or engineering). But some in the STS community are not particularly concerned. For example, last year with Steve Rayner I guest edited a special issue of the journal Environmental Science and Policy that focused on the efforts of scientists to engage in a political battle over the implications of Bjorn Lomborg's The Skeptical Environmentalist implicitly through science and not overtly through political or policy debate. In the process of putting that issue together a reviewer commented (I can't remember for which paper) that the various papers seemed to be revisiting the now thoroughly discredited notion that science and politics can in fact be separated. This reviewer was of course from the STS community and simplistic notions of separating science and politics and to him was obviously no longer interesting from a research standpoint.

But this reinforcing set of circumstances - scientists who dismiss or unaware of STS and STS scholars who may be more in interested in the intellectual rather than practical aspects of their field - raises some interesting questions about the role of STS in the sciences, and its own political orientation and agenda. In other words, the same sort of questions that STS often targets at other scientists and disciplines are also applicable to STS.

Michael Guggenheim and Helga Nowotny ask these sort of questions in their excellent essay (PDF) critically assessing the current state of STS.

"STS likewise has never established its own research agenda of unresolved problems. Yet, if it does not want to become trapped in an unending present of joyful repetition, albeit in the guise of rebellion, it will have to create a future that is neither Sisyphus-like, and therefore closed, nor utopian or dystopian, as so many future expectations of other actors in society are when assessing the benefits and burdens of science and technology. In a caricature of its own theoretical stance that scientific problem choice is not the outcome of an inherently rational selection process within science, nor that Nature whispers into the ears of scientists which problems to choose, STS hardly ever showed interest in the functioning of its own processes of problem selection or which issues, originating in wider societal developments, it did take up or not. Nor did it delve into the processes through which contrasting theoretical positions within STS are negotiated or eliminated. What, if anything, did Society whisper into STS ears? If problem choice within STS is at least partly seen to be the outcome of larger societal processes, then a vision of the future would be needed which takes into account the processes of its own professionalisation and its likely effects. This implies the capability to select problems for their own - scientific and intellectual - sake and to transform them into research priorities which are seen as a collective, and not simply as an individual task. It also implies the willingness and capability to transmit the relevance of scientific activities to a wider audience and perhaps even to one's 'clients'."

Important questions for scholars of STS (and its close cousin, science and technology policy or STP, to which I am more closely aligned) are raised by the current state of STS coupled with the presence of STS contrarians in important positions on issues of significance to society. Among these questions:

1. Is it even worth engaging scientists on knowledge of STS? Our dialogue with RealClimate has taken place at the highest levels of professionalism, but my experience suggests that the professionalism of the RealClimate folks is not always the case in such dialogues. Raising issues of science and politics, science and society can be threatening to some scientists and downright offensive to others. At times such dialogues can devolve into ad hominem attacks of one sort or another. I have numerous colleagues who simply choose not to work with or debate scientists on such topics. It is probably no surprise that the areas in science which STS has the most traction happen to be those in which scientists are most open to STS perspectives, such as is the case in bioethics and the life sciences. It should come as no surprise (as Guggenheim and Notwotny observe) that many STS scholars converse among themselves and have little stomach for engaging with practicing scientists, particularly those who practice STS contrarianism. (G & N also raise the possibility that STS can become "captured" by its clientele.)

2. STS requires greater reflexiveness in its studies. This is a point that G & N make well. If STS scholars see their job as simply producing knowledge to be added to the great reservoir of knowledge (i.e., basic research in STST), are they then just buying into the linear model of knowledge production and use that they so often critique as neither descriptively accurate or normatively desirable?

3. STS has an overt political agenda, which is typically some form of the democratization of knowledge. But within STS there are many narrow and wide political agendas (as is present in any area of expertise). If separating science and politics is impossible, as STS scholars have shown, then this must also be the case in STS as well. How does STS handle this reality? (I'd argue that STS scholars need to serve as honest brokers on policy just like other experts.)

Our recent engagement on STS issues with climate scientists should be viewed thus as an experiment. How might we communicate the scientific community the knowledge and lessons learned from those who have expertise in STS (and STP)? Is it worth engaging with rank and file scientists or should the focus of such dialogues be on the scientific elite? What about the public and elected officials? The answers to these questions are not straightforward, and the actions that best serve common interests are not immediately clear.

What is clear is that the STS community has only begun to explore its own significance for science policy and as it broadens its reach, it is surely to continue to prod and provoke scientists who remain comfortable in their outdated views.

Posted on April 11, 2005 01:01 AM View this article | Comments (6) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

April 04, 2005

Dilbert on the Honest Broker

Here is a Dilbert strip about the honest broker.

Posted on April 4, 2005 09:11 AM View this article | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

Evaluation of Research Portfolios

On Saturday a New York Times article reported,

“The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency at the Pentagon - which has long underwritten open-ended "blue sky" research by the nation's best computer scientists - is sharply cutting such spending at universities, researchers say, in favor of financing more classified work and narrowly defined projects that promise a more immediate payoff… The shift away from basic research is alarming many leading computer scientists and electrical engineers, who warn that there will be long-term consequences for the nation's economy.”

And a few weeks ago Science reported,

“More than 750 U.S. microbiologists--including the president-elect of the American Society for Microbiology in Washington, D.C., Stanley Maloy of San Diego State University, and seven past ASM presidents--sent an open letter to National Institutes of Health (NIH) Director Elias Zerhouni this week, complaining that the current spending spree in biodefense is threatening the very foundation of microbiology. While budgets have skyrocketed for exotic agents such as plague, anthrax, and tularemia--each of them negligible as human health threats--research on widespread and perhaps mundane pathogens is falling by the wayside, the letter says, as is work with traditional model organisms such as Kiley's E. coli.”

Each of these stories refer to assertions that one particular research portfolio is somehow “better” than an alternative research portfolio. Such conflicts over different way to put together research portfolios raises what is (or should be) a fundamental question of science policy research: How might we evaluate (and according to what criteria) the relative worth of alternative research portfolios?

This sort of question about science policy decisions is too rarely asked or answered. . Not too surprisingly researchers whose funding may be cut by proposed change are against the changes and those whose funding might increase think the changes make good sense. As a result, we see arguments link the following:

A virologist justifying increased spending on bioterrorism at the expense of infectious diseases – "I'm personally very concerned."

A computer scientist explains why DARPA’s shift to more focused research is a problem, “The federal government is … killing the goose that laid the golden egg.” And another computer scientist explains, “This is the first time in 15 years that I have no DARPA funding.”

These sorts of arguments are not just self-serving, they are essentially content free. Consequently, science policy decision making depends a great deal on those whose funding depends upon the outcome of such decisions to make the case for their own research, leading to what is more often than not a political brawl fought through pressure politics in the budget process.

The Science article suggests the right questions: “Does biodefense deserve all this money? Apart from the five anthrax deaths in 2001, there have been no known bioterrorism deaths in the United States. Natural deaths from many other biodefense agents--such as smallpox, tularemia, and plague--are also low if not zero. Is it worth spending billions of dollars on these agents, when flu alone causes more than 30,000 deaths a year in the United States and food poisoning some 5000?”

Science policy research cannot answer these questions, but it can contribute to the information needs of science policymakers by providing a rigorous (dare we say scientific?) perspective on what alternative research portfolios might look like and their possible implications for decision makers and society more broadly. (And this is the focus of our SPARC project focused on climate change.)

Posted on April 4, 2005 09:06 AM View this article | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

March 31, 2005

Intelligence and Science for Policy

From the cover letter to the Silberman-Robb WMD report (PDF) released today is this paragraph:

"The Intelligence Community needs to be pushed. It will not do its best unless it is pressed by policymakers-sometimes to the point of discomfort. Analysts must be pressed to explain how much they don't know; the collection agencies must be pressed to explain why they don't have better information on key topics. While policymakers must be prepared to credit intelligence that doesn't fit their preferences, no important intelligence assessment should be accepted without sharp questioning that forces the community to explain exactly how it came to that assessment and what alternatives might also be true. This is not "politicization"; it is a necessary part of the intelligence process. And in the end, it is the key to getting the best from an Intelligence Community that, at its best, knows how to do astonishing things."

Seems to me that if we substitute "science" for "intelligence" in this paragraph it holds up equally well.

Posted on March 31, 2005 11:33 AM View this article | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

A Misuse of Science?

GovExec.com reported yesterday that "A House Government Reform subcommittee next Tuesday will examine whether alleged falsified government research documents compromised scientific justification for storing nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain, Nev." The investigation was motivated by the DOE announcing on 16 March possible irregularities in the data or models used to study Yucca Mountain.

At issue is the fidelity (or perceptions thereof) of the science used to justify the decision to select Yucca Mountain as a nuclear waste repository. The Daytona New-Journal editorializes,

"Mistrust has since accompanied any government claim that Yucca is the safe repository the government claims it to be. Mistrust intensified this month when Energy Department e-mails came to light showing that the department was falsifying scientific records at the mountain. Instruments designed to measure electrical, gaseous and liquid conditions inside the mountain were being certified as ready for use before the department even had them in hand, while a United States Geological Survey employee admitted to falsifying other work. The employee claimed he was not the only one doing so. The falsified documents were part of an application process leading up to the licensing of Yucca Mountain's readiness for receiving waste. The licensing is designed to certify that the science used to judge Yucca Mountain safe for receiving waste is reliable. But if the licensing process itself is a lie, what is there to trust about the government's science on Yucca Mountain?"

The alleged falsification of documents occurred 1998-2000 when the administration of Bill Clinton was pushing toward a decision on Yucca Mountain. President Clinton wrote in a 2000 letter to Congress,

"Since 1993, my Administration has been conducting a rigorous world-class scientific and technical program to evaluate the suitability of the Yucca Mountain, Nevada, site for use as a repository. The work being done at Yucca Mountain represents a significant scientific and technical undertaking, and public confidence in this first-of-a-kind effort is essential... There is no scientific reason to delay issuance of these final radiation standards beyond the last year of this Administration; in fact, waiting until next year to issue these standards could have the unintended effect of delaying a recommendation on whether or not to go forward with Yucca Mountain." (Although it is worth noting that since leaving office Clinton has apparently changed his mind and come out against Yucca Mountain.)

Next week's hearing should go some way toward clarifying the details of the current allegations and their political or policy implications for the future of Yucca Mountain and centralized nuclear waste storage. Meantime, I'd like to ask a question. Does the data thus far available suggest a "misuse of science" under the Clinton Administration, somewhat akin to recent allegations made of the Bush Administration? If so why? If not why not?

We'd welcome your thoughts in the comments.

[For background information that might be useful in thinking about this question, please have a look at this report (PDF): Pielke, Jr., R. A. (ed.), 2004. Report on the Misuse of Science in the Administrations of George H.W. Bush (1989-1993) and William J. Clinton (1993-2001). By the Students in ENVS 4800, Maymester 2004, University of Colorado, June.]

Posted on March 31, 2005 11:26 AM View this article | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

March 30, 2005

Science versus Society

Every spring the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) hosts a forum on science and technology policy. This year’s forum is April 21-22 in Washington, DC. The March 28 version of the agenda is online. The forum’s closing plenary session is titled, “SCIENCE VERSUS SOCIETY? WHEN SCIENTIFIC INTERESTS AND PUBLIC ATTITUDES COLLIDE” and is focused on evolution versus creationism, stem cell research and federal funding of research on sexual behavior.

The framing of this particular session is very interesting for several reasons. First, it suggests that science is not only separate from “society” but is somehow in opposition to society. On the evolution versus creationism the speaker is from the National Center on Science Education, and thus will presumably discuss efforts to include creationism or “intelligent design” in public school curriculums. While there is public support for such inclusion, there is also public opposition (see this nice review of polling results by Ohio State’s Matt Nisbet). There is a political debate going on in particular states and schools about education, and while it is entirely appropriate for scientists to take sides in such debates, to suggest that these debates are about science vs. society is just incorrect, not to mention poor public relations for scientists. The debate is about one part of society versus another, or in other words “politics.”

Second, to characterize the issue of stem cell research as a battleground of science versus society is also misplaced. There is some evidence (again from Nisbet’s work) that a majority of the public may support stem cell research. But even if not a majority, it is clear that “society” does not have a unified perspective that is somehow contrary to the perspectives of “science.” Any decision to fund stem cell research with public money is a political decision, not a scientific decision (see my op-ed on this here [PDF]). The third subject, federal funding of research on sexual behavior, is a bit more unclear as the AAAS has not yet identified a speaker, but here as well it is difficult to imagine that there is a unified perspective of “society” that is somehow contrary to a unified perspective of “science.”

If the issue is limitations on research funding or even the training of future scientists (i.e., in elementary education and evolution) then AAAS might consider renaming the panel “When Political Debates Limit the Unfettered Advance of Science.” But if the issue is that the AAAS sees its organization to be politically aligned with one side of each of these debates, then it should clearly come out and say so, e.g., with a panel titled “Political Advocacy Efforts of the AAAS.” There is some evidence that the latter is a motivation. For example, earlier this week the AAAS has taken a political position in a Washington state debate over stem cell research and took a similar political position last year in a debate in Georgia over evolution.

For AAAS to suggest that “science” has a perspective at odds with “society” on the teaching of evolution, stem cell research or funding of research on sexual behavior is to simply reduce “science” to another special interest group in society demanding that its values be served over others. It seems to me that the public is fairly comfortable with science playing such a special interest role in the context of seeking more funding for research (don’t forget what “AAAS” stands for), probably because science has always benefited from widespread, bipartisan public support. But it may be something else altogether when leaders of the scientific community seek to present “science” in terms of societal values shared by only a subset of citizens, and also clearly in opposition to the values of many others. “Science” cannot resolve political debates over what should be taught or what should be funded, only politics can. The AAAS might think carefully about the consequences of conflating “politics” and “science” in the public eye, because this is exactly what might occur with its closing plenary session. I am not 100% certain, but in any battle between “science” and “society” it seems likely that “society” will win out in just about every case.

Posted on March 30, 2005 08:36 AM View this article | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

March 29, 2005

30th Annual AAAS Forum on Science and Technology Policy

April 21-22, 2005
Loew's L'Enfant Plaza Hotel
Washington, DC

You are cordially invited to attend the 30th Annual AAAS Forum (formerly Colloquium) on Science and Technology Policy, scheduled for April 21-22, 2005. This meeting, held in Washington each spring, provides a setting for discussion and debate about budget and other policy issues facing the S&T community. Since its beginning in 1976, it has grown into an annual institution that draws approximately 500 top science and technology experts. The Forum is the major public meeting in the U.S. on science and technology policy issues.

This year's program will include sessions on:
- The Budgetary and Policy Context for R&D in FY 2006
- The Future of Scientific Communication (Formerly Known as Publishing)
- Young Scientists, Graduate Education, and National Needs for the S&T Workforce
- Science and Global Health Disasters
- The Role of R&D in the U.S. and Global Economies
- Science Versus Society? When Scientific Interests and Public Attitudes Collide

In addition, the meeting will feature:
- Keynote address by John H. Marburger, III, Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
- Invited addresses by eminent public figures at the optional luncheons on Thursday & Friday, and the breakfast on Friday
- The annual William D. Carey Lecture, given this year by Representative Rush D. Holt (NJ)

For an up-to-date agenda, fees, online registration materials, and hotel arrangements, please go to
www.aaas.org/forum.

Stephen Nelson
American Association for the Advancement of Science
Science and Policy Programs
1200 New York Avenue NW
Washington DC 20005
www.aaas.org/spp

For questions about registration, please contact:
Natalie Nimmer
Tel: 202/326-6601
Fax: 202/289-4950
E-mail: nnimmer@aaas.org

Posted on March 29, 2005 03:59 PM View this article | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Posted to Science Policy: General

March 28, 2005

Tragedy, Comedy and Axiology

In today’ Chronicle of Higher Education Thomas H. Benton (a pseudonym) relates (subscription required) his comedic/tragic experiences dealing with the consequences of Weinberg’s axiology of science.

“I was meditating in the men's room down the hall from my office, and it occurred to me that humanities departments often have the worst buildings and facilities on campus. Is your toilet paper a gigantic roll in a locked plastic case (to prevent you from stealing it)? Does the roller have a spindle so stiff that only one sheet of single-ply paper can be removed at a time (to thwart your wastefulness)? Do you use stringy soap that leaves long strands of bubble-gum scented goop between the dispenser and the sink? Do you have spring-loaded faucets that shut themselves off instantly, so that one hand must hold the water on while the other hand half-rinses itself? Do you dry your hands with an abrasive brown paper that seems to be made out of pulverized Egyptian mummies?

The building where I work as an English professor went up about 60 years ago as a state-of-the-art science center. Our small, liberal-arts college has built two new state-of-the-art science centers since then. One was completed just last year after a record-breaking capital campaign, and it is quite luxurious. The restrooms in that new science center have beautiful marble countertops. The chrome faucets do not shut themselves off against your will, and the soap dispensers put a precise dollop of something like shaving cream in your palm with the touch of a button. Even the toilet stalls are wider. It's like the difference between first class and coach. I half expect a washroom attendant to offer me a fresh towel and to brush the lint off my jacket.”

He concludes with suggestion of a few possible new career tracks for humanists:

“Still, even in my present position on the tenure track, I can't help thinking that the humanities faculty is rapidly descending into a stratum so far beneath the scientists that we can't mingle socially without awkwardness. I suppose the humanists look unclubbable. Some of us have taken to wearing denim in case we're called upon in an emergency -- perhaps to prop up a falling roof timber or to man a bucket brigade. Given the surplus of people with humanities Ph.D.'s, in the not-too-distant future the science faculty should be able to recruit our assistant professors as subjects for their experiments. After that, they could be set loose in the biology department's forest preserve, and administrators could hunt them for sport. But, before that happens, I plan to schedule all my classes -- and meditation -- in the new science center. I've already begun doing so. The students in my English classes don't always appreciate having to walk across the campus, but a few of them like the idea that the humanities are being taught in the very heart of the new academic hegemony. But there is a problem. After two semesters, the scientists are becoming aware that one of those vulgar humanists is up to something in their clubhouse. Last fall, they noticed that the desks in one of their orderly, high-tech classrooms had been arranged like a horseshoe instead of in rows. An e-mail memo quickly went around that "desks must be put back in straight lines." Several times I've found my classroom locked. Only scientists have keys to those rooms.”

Find the whole column here (subscription required). And on the less tongue-in-cheek side, have a look at a paper that I collaborated with Carl Mitcham and Bob Frodeman on the humanities as a subject of science policy analysis:

Frodeman, R., Mitcham, C. and R. Pielke, Jr., 2003: Humanities for Policy - and a Policy for the Humanities. Issues in Science and Technology, Fall 2003, pp. 29-32. (PDF)

Posted on March 28, 2005 08:31 AM View this article | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

March 24, 2005

Politics and Disaster Declarations

The Florida Sun-Sentinel reported on Wednesday that, “As the second hurricane in less than a month bore down on Florida last fall, a federal consultant predicted a "huge mess" that could reflect poorly on President Bush and suggested that his re-election staff be brought in to minimize any political liability, records show. Two weeks later, a Florida official summarizing the hurricane response wrote that the Federal Emergency Management Agency was handing out housing assistance "to everyone who needs it without asking for much information of any kind."”

Particularly interesting is an earlier finding by the Sun-Sentinel that a considerable amount of disaster aid was distributed outside where the hurricanes had struck, “FEMA has been under scrutiny since the Sun-Sentinel first reported in October that the agency was awarding millions of dollars in disaster funds to residents of Miami-Dade County, even though the county did not experience hurricane conditions. At Nelson's urging, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee is investigating. Earlier this month, 14 Miami-Dade residents who received assistance were indicted on fraud charges. As of March 16, FEMA had given $31 million to 12,891 applicants in Miami-Dade for damage claimed from Frances.”

Not surprisingly Democrats have sought to gain some political advantage, “Democrats in Washington said the records confirm suspicions that the federal government used the hurricanes to funnel money to Florida, a key battleground state in the presidential election. "They weren't really asking for information, yet they were just doling out this money like it was Christmas," said Lale Mamaux, spokeswoman for U.S. Rep. Robert Wexler, D-Boca Raton. "It's not surprising to learn that [Republicans] played politics with the hurricanes that tragically affected hundreds of thousands of Floridians last year," said Josh Earnest, spokesman for the Democratic National Committee.”

And for their part, FEMA and Republicans denied any link between election-year politics and disaster assistance, “FEMA officials, the governor and the White House have steadfastly denied suggestions that politics played a role in the distribution of hurricane aid in Florida. "The men and women at FEMA don't give a patooey about who the president is or who the governor is," FEMA Director Michael D. Brown told the newspaper's editorial board in October. "Whenever people say stuff like that … we're just offended by that because that's just not how we operate."”

News flash to both Republicans and Democrats – disaster aid has been politicized by both parties for a long time. In 2001 Mary Downton and I published a paper (PDF) titled, “Discretion Without Accountability: Politics, Flood Damage, and Climate,” in which we looked at a 30+ year record of FEMA disaster declarations on floods in the context of flood damage, climate and presidential administrations. What did we find?

Oddly enough, there were 50% more disasters declared in years in which the president was running for reelection that in other years. Also, there was no consistent partisan signal in the data. As you might have expected, Ronald Reagan did not like to give out federal money too quickly, but Jimmy Carter seems to have held an even stronger line on disaster assistance. Bill Clinton famously felt everyone’s pain, and this is reflected in his generous disbursements of disaster declarations, but his predecessor George H. W. Bush was also generous with issuing declarations.

Did the federal government play politics in its response to the 2004 hurricanes in Florida? We should only be surprised if this were not the case. But perhaps the current investigations can lead to improvements in the declaration process. As we wrote in our paper, “Presidential discretion without corresponding accountability may in fact place the disaster declaration process at odds with broader goals of hazard mitigation and sustainable development.”

You can find our paper here (PDF).

Posted on March 24, 2005 08:27 AM View this article | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

March 23, 2005

Science Advice at the UN

According to David Dickson at SciDev.net, “Kofi Annan, the secretary-general of the United Nations, has announced plans to create a high-level advisory panel to help integrate science and technology into the development efforts of all the member organisations of the UN system.”

Interestingly, the new advisory body will be called the “Council of Development Advisers.” The name of the proposed new council is worth noting because it places a focus on the end (development) not the means (science and technology). Too often efforts to integrate science and technology in decision making wind up substituting means for ends. That is, the focus is on science and technology, and not how we make decisions with or about science and technology to improve outcomes.

Dickson writes that “Annan has also announced that he is to appoint a scientific advisor to provide "strategic forward-looking" scientific advice on policy matters, with responsibility for "mobilising scientific and technological expertise within the United Nations system and from the broader scientific and academic community". One of the key roles of the science advisor will be to work closely with the new council.”

Dickson attributes Annan’s actions to recommendations offered by a task force of a task force of the Millennium Project focused on science, technology and innovation.

The tension between means and ends is sure to play out in this context. One interpretation of the task force’s recommendation is that “Eliminating global poverty, disease and hunger are "utterly affordable" but need concerted action from rich nations, including a massive increase in funding for scientific research addressing the needs of the world's poor.” Many scientists will be certain to pay attention to the phrase “massive increase in funding” however the real challenge is to connect the results of such funding to “addressing the needs of the world’s poor.”

As we’ve discussed here on numerous occasions (see, e.g., here and here) a fundamental challenge of contemporary science policy is not just in advancing science and technology but in making decisions about and with science that improve the human condition.

Posted on March 23, 2005 11:31 AM View this article | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

March 15, 2005

Transcript of Marburger Interview

We have up on our website a transcript of our 14 February 2005 public interview with John Marburger, science advisor to President George W. Bush. Here are some excerpts:

On climate change:

"After the President announced that he would not support the Kyoto Protocol early in 2001, there was a lot of criticism and the President turned to the National Academies and asked them to make a study, which they did in record time, informing him about the validity of the science in the documents that supported the Kyoto Protocol. And before his first trip to Europe in 2001, in July, I guess, or June, the President made a speech to which I commend to all of you. You should go on the White House website and look at the President's speech of June 11, 2001 where he states what the policy is very, very clearly. And he states in his speech, number one, the climate is changing, the surface temperature of the earth is warming, there is a greenhouse effect, Co2 is a greenhouse gas, it has increased substantially since the beginning of the industrial revolution, and it is caused by human activity. He goes on to say that the connection between this massive increase in Co2 and specific aspects of climate change that may impact humans is difficult to infer from the existing things. It requires modeling, the Earth's system. But, he goes on to say that is no reason not to take action. He says the U.S. is prepared to take responsibility for its emissions, and he announces the formation of two programs: one climate change science program, which re- focuses the climate change science activities that had existed there before that, into a sort of a goal- oriented program, and a second one, which is very little acknowledged but which is more important, to invest in a climate change technology program to develop technologies that will replace our existing energy technologies and reduce or eliminate the emission of Co2 into the atmosphere. All of those things are in the speech, and subsequently he has made proposals that have turned into approximately $2.9 billion dollars per year of investment in new technologies to reduce or eliminate the emissions of Co2 into the atmosphere. And yet people can talk about nothing but the Kyoto Protocol, and I think that's very frustrating to him. It's frustrating to me, because if the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol were totally implemented, even if the U.S. participated, it would make negligible difference to the climate by the end of this century that we're currently living in. In order to make a difference to the climate, you have to introduce a very different way of generating and using energy than we do now. There simply isn't any way to do it. You have got to change things very dramatically. We have a very big job ahead of us. Every country is going to have to use new technology, either to remove the Co2 from emissions from hydrocarbon burning power plants or to use some other way, some alternate method, of energy generation. So, this is what we have got to do and I think that we should get on with it and not get hung up over the Kyoto Protocol."

On the UCS and Waxman reports on the misuse of science:

"I didn't like the allegations. I thought they wrapped up a large number of disparate complaints into a, what I called at the time, a conspiracy theory. And that was my biggest objection. I just didn't think it made sense to wrap all of these things up into one big ball and try to draw a conclusion from it. It was not a scientifically -- it was certainly not a study that would have qualified for a good grade in a college seminar. It was not a thoughtful or complete study in any sense, and my response to it was an effort to indicate that there were lots of other things that were omitted from that study and that we needed to address these issues one by one in their context and try to understand them and deal with them. They were all over the map, and I was just offended by the statement."

On asking about voting in advisory committee empanelment:

"I think that it doesn't make sense to ask somebody who they voted for. We have secret ballots in this country, and I don't think that's a very good practice and I wouldn't advise it."

On the role of Scientists and Engineers for Change in the 2004 election:

"... to the extent that people use their common identifier as scientists to justify a non-scientific position, or a position that doesn't have too much to do with science, then that's -- I would question that. Before I would join such a group, I would want to know if, you know, are we saying that this is a position, the position we advocate is based on science or is that what we want people to believe? And so there is a little bit of a problem there, I think, and scientists have a responsibility to try to avoid misleading the public about the basis for their political or religious or ideological beliefs. I mean, that's separate from science. So we do have a responsibility, the scientific community, to try to separate the science from our beliefs or from non-scientific issues."

On the role of the public in science policy:

"... you don't want the public to be involved in telling scientists how to do their work. And, in general, I don't want the public to be telling us about discovery science and basic science and topics in basic research -- only the science community can say that. But the more applied the science is, and the more it relates to things like public health or environment or even military or Homeland Security, then I think that the public has more of a responsibility in defining its expectations. So there's clearly a gradation of types of science that the public should be involved in."

On the move of OSTP from the Old Executive Office Building to the New Executive Office Building:

"I don't think that where we are makes much difference. We are not, after all, in a day-to-day support mode for the President. The President needs people close to him who will support his activities during the day every day as he is challenged. That's not -- science is not a necessary part of that on a day-to-day basis. The time scale of science advice is much longer than that, and we tend to work out science issues with the other staff of people and the Agencies long before they every get to the President."

Other comments:

"I think it's very important for science advisors, the science advisory apparatus, and the image of science to be as non-political as possible."

"I really do think that while there are many societal implications of science and there are many issues, philosophical and ethical issues, associated with applications of science, at the core of it, science really is a method for continually making our ideas about how nature works or how things work around us less and less wrong."

"I wish that we had designed Hubble so that it didn't have to be serviced by a shuttle. We probably could have launched several Hubbles for the cost that we have invested in this one."

"DR. PIELKE: This next question has one word at the top, and would probably be enough to get a response, but I'll read the question. The one word is "evolution," and it says "Why doesn't the White House play a more active role in articulating evolution as good science?"

DR. MARBURGER: Can you really see any White House doing that? Evolution is the cornerstone of modern biology. Period. What else can you say?"

Read the whole transcript here.

Posted on March 15, 2005 07:51 AM View this article | Comments (1) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

March 08, 2005

Cherry Picking, CBA, GAO and EPA

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report yesterday critical of the cost benefit analysis (CBA) used by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as justification for its proposed approach to the control or mercury. The GAO found,

“GAO identified four major shortcomings in the economic analysis underlying EPA’s proposed mercury control options that limit its usefulness for informing decision makers about the economic trade-offs of the different policy options. First, while Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance directs agencies to identify a policy that produces the greatest net benefits, EPA’s analysis is of limited use in doing so because the agency did not consistently analyze the options or provide an estimate of the total costs and benefits of each option… Second, EPA did not document some of its analysis or provide information on how changes in the proposed level of mercury control would affect the cost-and-benefit estimates for the technology-based option, as it did for the cap-and-trade option. Third, EPA did not estimate the value of the health benefits directly related to decreased mercury emissions and instead estimated only some secondary benefits, such as decreased exposure to har!
mful fine particles. However, EPA has asked for comments on a methodology to estimate the benefits directly related to mercury. Fourth, EPA did not analyze some of the key uncertainties underlying its cost-and benefit estimates.”

At issue here is the inevitable conflict between having an agency responsible for developing an honest-broker approach to inventing and considering policy options while at the same time having a clear preference for one of those options. This sets the stage for a clear conflict between analysis and advocacy. It is a bit like putting an intelligence agency under the Department of Defense. As the Washington Post reported today, “the EPA had tipped the scales to favor the market-based plan.”

The GAO’s recommendation to EPA to reconsider their cost-benefit analysis does not appear to go far enough in dealing with the structural reforms needed to insure the institutional independence and authority needed to proffer analyses free from political suasion.

Posted on March 8, 2005 10:06 AM View this article | Comments (1) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

March 07, 2005

Indian Ocean Tsunami and NOAA's Liability

Today's Baltimore Sun contains an op-ed by Daniel Lyons, a Harvard Law School student, discussing the possibility of a lawsuit against the U.S. government for its role in warning countries affected by the Indian Ocean tsunami. He writes,

"Recently, attorney Edward Fagan announced he would file a class-action lawsuit in New York against the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Pacific Tsunami Warning Center. Incredibly, Mr. Fagan alleges the Hawaii-based research facility should be held liable for failing to warn the world about an earthquake that happened nearly 7,000 miles away in an ocean the institute does not study."

For news stories describing the lawsuit see here and here.

A few years ago Bobbie Klein and I collaborated on a set of papers that sought to summarize the issue of legal liability in the public and private sectors for weather forecasts.

(PDF) Klein, R.A. and R.A. Pielke, Jr., 2002: Bad Weather? Then Sue the Weatherman! A review of legal liability for predictions and forecasts: Part I, Public Sector. Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 83:1791-1799.

(PDF) Klein, R.A. and R.A. Pielke, Jr., 2002: Bad Weather? Then Sue the Weatherman! A review of legal liability for predictions and forecasts: Part II, Private Sector. Bulletin of American Meteorological Society, 83: 1800-1807.

We found that "In general, claims against the federal government based on weather forecasting or failing to issue weather warnings have been (and likely will continue to be)resolved in favor of the government on the basis of immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act." Before proceeding with a discussion of the tsunami, a disclaimer - I am not a lawyer and you are reading a weblog.

OK, here is my two cents on a "tsunami lawsuit." There are various jurisdictions in which a lawsuit might be filed against the U.S. government including federal court, state court and under international law. With respect to federal jurisdiction, history would suggest that the prospects for winning a lawsuit against NOAA are slim to none. Here is what we wrote in our paper,

"... the federal government continues to be immune from lawsuits based on the exercise or failure to exercise a discretionary function or duty, whether or not the discretion is abused (the "discretionary function" exception), as well as from lawsuits arising out of misrepresentation (the "misrepresentation" exception) [28 U.S.C. sec. 2680(a), (h)]. Courts will dismiss a lawsuit against the government without reaching a decision on the merits of the suit if one of these exceptions applies... if a mandatory statute, regulation, or policy leaves no room for discretion and the government complies with the mandate, it is shielded from liability. If the government violates that mandate, it is not shielded from liability. If the government is granted discretion, a strong presumption arises that its decisions are grounded in policy and thus the government is shielded from liability. To get around the discretionary function exception a plaintiff would have to show that the challenged decision, though discretionary, is not grounded in the policy of the regulatory regime. Gaubert made clear that decisions made at the operational level as well as those at the policy-making or planning level are covered by the discretionary function exception if they involve choice and judgment."

There are exceptions however, but they do not seem to be relevant in the case of the tsunami.

"However, it would be too strong a statement to say that the federal government will never face a liability risk in its forecasting enterprise. In instances where all discretion has been removed, if other FTCA requirements were met, the government's failure to follow a mandatory statute, regulation, or policy could expose it to liability... in U.S. v. Gaubert, the U.S. Supreme Court established a two-part test to decide whether the FTCA's discretionary function exception applies. The first part examines whether the challenged conduct was truly discretionary- that is, whether it involved an element of judgment or choice. This requirement is not satisfied-and the suit may therefore proceed-in circumstances where a "federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow," because "the employee has no rightful option but to adhere to the directive." If the conduct involved choice or discretion, the second part of the test requires that the court "determine whether that judgment is of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield." Because the discretionary function exception's purpose is to "prevent judicial 'second guessing' of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort," the exception "protects only governmental actions and decisions based on considerations of public policy." When a statute or regulation allows a federal employee to act with discretion, "it must be presumed that the agent's acts are grounded in policy when exercising that discretion." The focus of the inquiry is on the nature of the actions taken and "whether they are susceptible to policy analysis.""

In short, the lawsuit seems pretty far-fetched and frivolous to me. Though if its purpose is to get some publicity, then it has served its purpose.

Note: There is a separate issue currently being debated in the weather community and that is whether or not NOAA's performance could have better during the tsunami if they were focused more on their core mission. This claim has been raised by Barry Myers of AccuWeather and has received a response from the NWS. If debate continues on this subject we'll discuss it, but for now it looks like continuation of the decades-long squabble between the NWS and the commercial weather industry, a topic discussed in depth here.

For further reading:

Loper, R. B., 1988: Red sky in the morning, forecasters take warning: The liability of meteorologists for negligent weather forecasts. Texas Law Rev., 66, 683-713.

Posted on March 7, 2005 10:08 AM View this article | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

March 03, 2005

Senate Reorganizes

A few weeks ago I wrote about the reorganization of the House Appropriations Committee. This week, the Senate announced changes as well. In general, the Senate side mirrors the House changes. VA/HUD has been disbanded and its jurisdiction spread across the remaining subcommittees.

Of the main science agencies, NASA, NSF, and DoC science are found in Commerce and Science, EPA is now in Interior, and NIH remains in Labor/HHS subcommittee.

A few differences do exist. The Senate choose to keep the DC and Legislative Branch subcommittees and made no changes to Defense. More importantly, the Senate has placed the State Department in Foreign Ops, while the House keeps State with Commerce, Science, and Justice. State was appropriated $8.5 billion last year. This difference may cause some problems when the House and Senate reconcile spending bills, as the Commerce, Science, etc. and Foreign Ops subcommittees now overlap between the two chambers. Overall, however, the changes are similar enough so that the overall appropriations process won't be threatened.

As for the particular affect on science funding, my comments from last time haven't changed.

A full list of the new structure follows:

House Subcommittee	Chair	Senate Subcommittee	Chair
Agriculture	Rep. Henry Bonilla (R-TX)	Agriculture, Rural Development, and Related Agencies	Senator Bennett
Science, State, Justice and Commerce	Rep. Frank Wolf (R-VA)	Commerce, Justice, and Science	Senator Shelby
Defense	Rep. C.W. Bill Young (R-FL)	Defense	Senator Stevens
Energy and Water	Rep. David Hobson (R-OH)	Energy and Water	Senator Domenici
Foreign Operations	Rep. Jim Kolbe (R-AZ)	State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs	Senator McConnell
Interior and Environment	Rep. Charles Taylor (R-NC)	Interior and Related Agencies	Senator Burns
Homeland Security	Rep. Harold Rogers (R-KY)	Homeland Security	Senator Gregg
Labor, Health and Human Services and Education	Rep. Ralph Regula (R-OH)	Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies	Senator Specter
Military Quality of Life and Veterans Affairs	Rep. James Walsh (R-NY)	Military Construction and Veterans Affairs	Senator Hutchison
Transportation, Treasury and Housing	Rep. Joe Knollenberg (R-MI)	Transportation, Treasury, the Judiciary, and Housing and Urban Development	Senator Bond
		Legislative Branch	Senator Brownback
		District of Columbia	Senator DeWine

Posted on March 3, 2005 04:59 PM View this article | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Ryen, T.S. | Science Policy: General

February 23, 2005

Marburger’s Prepared Remarks from CU

We have posted John Marburger’s (President Bush’s science advisor) prepared remarks (PDF) delivered at the University of Colorado on February 14, 2005 during our first science advisor symposium. Here is an excerpt,

“The advisory arrangements have changed relatively little since 1950. Presidential science advisors are still mostly physicists known to each other, and national security is still an important focus of science advice (with a new homeland security angle). Given the enormous changes that have occurred in the landscape of science and the technical infrastructure of society, this invariance of the government machinery for science is mildly surprising. It speaks, perhaps, to the wisdom of the postwar policy architects, but it should also awaken a concern that the structure and practice of science policy today may diverge from the functions it needs to perform in a dynamic society...”

Marburger quotes extensively from “two of his favorite articles on science policy,”

“Daniel Sarewitz's 2003 essay "Does Science Policy Exist, and if so Does it Matter?" (available on the website of the Consortium for Science, Policy and Outcomes at Arizona State University www.cspo.org). At the far end, on the leading edge of the dramatic leap in federal science funding in the early 60's, is Alvin Weinberg's 1961 article "Impact of Large-Scale Science on the United States" [Science magazine vol. 134, 161 (1961)].”

He read an extended quote from Weinberg, making the point that we continue to have, “the need to understand the likely impact on society of different patterns of investment. Here are Weinberg's own words on the matter:

"…it is presumptuous for me to urge that we study biology on earth rather than biology in space, or physics in the nuclear binding-energy region, with its clear practical applications and its strong bearing on the rest of science, rather than physics in the Bev region, with its absence of practical applications and its very slight bearing on the rest of science. What I am urging is that these choices have become matters of high national policy. We cannot allow our over-all science strategy, when it involves such large sums, to be settled by default, or to be pre-empted by the group with the most skillful publicity department. We should have extensive debate on these over-all questions of scientific choice: we should make a choice, explain it, and then have the courage to stick to a course arrived at rationally."

Marburger continues,

“I think one of the important roles of OSTP and national science advisors is to introduce such considerations into the complex process of requesting and appropriating resources, and not simply to be an advocate for everything any scientist wants to do, or to go along with societal inclinations that may be shaped, as Weinberg put it, more by public relations than by an objective assessment of importance to society. The extraordinary flowering of technology in the post WWII period has produced an unprecedented frontier of opportunity in science fields that are strongly linked to societal needs. The expense of pursuing these makes Weinberg's plea even more appropriate today than forty years ago.”

This is strong stuff from any scientists, much less a science advisor. Read Marburger’s remarks here. As soon as we can, we will post on Prometheus notice of when the transcript of my public interview with Marburger is available, which gets into a wide range of issues such as climate change, politicization of science and evolution. Stay tuned. Meantime, keep up with our science advisors series and associated events here.

Note: Sarewitz’s article referred to by Marburger can be found here (PDF).

Posted on February 23, 2005 09:54 AM View this article | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

February 22, 2005

Politicizing Politicization

A widely run Associated Press article yesterday by Paul Recer reminded me how difficult it is to get good analysis from the media (or anybody else) on the issue of the politicization of science. The article included the following,

“The voice of science is being stifled in the Bush administration, with fewer scientists heard in policy discussions and money for research and advanced training being cut, according to panelists at a national science meeting [AAAS meeting in DC]… Rosina Bierbaum, dean of the University of Michigan School of Natural Resources and Environment, said the Bush administration has cut scientists out of some of the policy-making processes, particularly on environmental issues… Under Bush, said Bierbaum, the questioning of the proven science has become more important than finding ways to cope with climate change. One result of such actions, said Neal Lane of Rice University, a former director of the National Science Foundation, is that "we don't really have a policy right now to deal with what everybody agrees is a serious problem"…”

It seems to me that some important context was overlooked in this article. It should have noted that Rosina Bierbaum and Neil Lane were both political appointees in the Clinton Administration’s Office of Science and Technology Policy, with Lane serving as presidential science advisor and Bierbaum as one of his deputies. Of course, the following headline just doesn’t have the same zing, “Former Clinton Officials Criticize Bush Science Policies.”

Supporters of President Bush would be unlikely to point out this obvious conflict of interests because by doing so they would draw attention to some real concerns associated with the president’s handling of scientific issues (e.g., see here). Opponents of the president are even more unlikely to point out this conflict because the article was obviously written to score political points.

In 2003 I wrote an essay about the politicization of the politicization of science. Here is an excerpt,

“It has become fashionable for combatants engaged in political debate on topics such as global warming, genetically modified organisms, and stem cell research to highlight the negative consequences for both science and policy making of politicizing science. For example, in the United States Representative Henry Waxman (D-CA) recently issued a report alleging that the administration of George Bush systematically abuses science in support of its ideological agenda. And the Hoover Institution published a book – Politicizing Science – which disparages the alleged misuse of science in support of environmental regulation. Making sense of these sorts of accusations is difficult because the accusers are typically far from disinterested observers. Mr. Waxman is engaged in political battle with the Bush administration and many of the authors of essays in the Hoover book are long-time opponents of environmental regulations, as is the Hoover Institution in general… It is ironic that expressions of concern about the politicization of science have become another way for ideologues to advance their particular agendas. In other words, we are witnessing the politicizing of the politicization of science… Politicization of science is a problem, irrespective of the ideology of those doing the politicizing. Our scientific enterprise is too important to allow putative concerns about the politicization of science to become just another weapon in partisan battle.”

It is clear that there is an ample supply of people willing to use concern over the politicization of science as a political bludgeon to score points on the Bush Administration. It is also clear that there are plenty of others aligned with the Bush Administration willing to do exactly the opposite. The question I have is, where are the analysts (including reporters) who care about the politicization of science irrespective of possible advantages that are lent to today’s partisan political battles?

Posted on February 22, 2005 08:18 AM View this article | Comments (3) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

February 21, 2005

Data and Salt

Nature reported last week that a lawsuit is underway to force researchers to reveal the original data that was used in a study that was used to justify a recommendation that all Americans cut back on their salt intake.

“As early as this summer, for example, a US Court of Appeals will judge a plea from the Virginia-based Salt Institute, which represents salt producers. The institute wants direct access to the data behind a study that linked salt consumption to high blood pressure. The trial, funded by the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI), studied the impact of dietary sodium intake on blood pressure and the results were published in The New England Journal of Medicine, Annals of Internal Medicine and The American Journal of Cardiology. They showed that reducing dietary sodium lowers blood pressure in most people, and this led the government to recommend that Americans consume less salt. Researchers in the trial say that they have released all the data the Salt Institute could want or need — and that it is misusing the act. "It is trying to slice and dice the data set so it finds a group that seems not to have a blood pressure that's responsive to reduction in salt," says Lawrence Appel, a physician at Johns Hopkins School of Public Health in Baltimore, Maryland, and one of the trial's principal investigators. "That's blatantly inconsistent with a scientific approach to analysing clinical data." Last month, the Salt Institute and the US Chamber of Commerce asked the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals to overturn a decision by a lower court in Virginia. That court had ruled that the NHLBI was within its rights in refusing to release the data that had been requested.”

The lawsuit is being filed under the Data Quality Act (which we discussed here). One of the provisions of the DQA, according to a 2003 news article in Science is that, “According to the White House Office of Management and Budget's interpretation of the act, which took effect last October, agencies that promulgate "influential" results may have to provide enough data and methods for a "qualified member of the public" to conduct a reanalysis.”

The salt case raises some important questions about what is popularly called the “democratization of science.” Arizona State’s David Guston provides a definition,

“Democratizing science does not mean settling questions about Nature by plebiscite, any more than democratizing politics means setting the prime rate by referendum. What democratization does mean, in science as elsewhere, is creating institutions and practices that fully incorporate principles of accessibility, transparency, and accountability.”

Who should have access to data, analytical tools and results of publicly funded research? And particularly that research which is used to justify important decisions?

These are important questions of science policy and the salt case will go some way towards clarifying policy for (lack of) transparency and (non) disclosure in the scientific enterprise. However it turns out, one point seems clear. Demands for transparency and disclosure will increase with the degree to which important decisions are justified based on the results of scientific analyses. For researchers doing policy-relevant work, it is probably a good idea to keep good records.

Posted on February 21, 2005 01:39 PM View this article | Comments (3) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

February 17, 2005

House Juggles Science Spending

Yesterday, on a party line vote, the U.S. House Appropriations Committee approved a plan put forward by Chairman Jerry Lewis (R-CA) that makes major changes to the House budget process. Under the new plan, the House has rearranged the jurisdictions of its subcommittees, consolidating 13 subcommittees to 10. Among the changes, a large portion of federal science funding now falls under one subcommittee: Science, State, Justice, and Commerce.

This subcommittee will oversee science appropriations for NASA, the National Science Foundation and the Department of Commerce, including NOAA and NIST. Defense, NIH, and Department of Energy science funding remain separate.

Using AAAS estimates of the President's FY 2006 budget, the new subcommittee will oversee approximately 30% of $57.1 billion in non-defense R&D funding. NIH and DoE make up most of the remainder with 49% and 15% respectively.

The new subcommittee will oversee a total budget of over $55 billion. A look at last year's funding shows appropriations of $20.4 billion for Justice, $8.5 billion for State, and $6.9 billion for Commerce. NASA and NSF contribute another $22 billion.

This reorganization frees NASA and the NSF from their former home in the Veterans Affairs, Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies subcommittee. Instead of the VA and HUD, these agencies will now compete for funding with groups such as the FBI, DEA, and State Department. The Department of Commerce labs, which AAAS estimates will fund about $1 billion in R&D in FY 2006, will now compete directly with the much larger budgets of NASA and NSF.

Meanwhile, the Washington Post reports that Senate members "want changes kept to a minimum" bringing up the possibility that the Senate will keep the previous 13 subcommittees. Asymmetrical appropriations bills could cause havoc come October as the House and Senate try to reconcile their spending bills. The Post also reports that the Senate is not likely to make a final decision until after the President's Day recess.

The ranking member of the House Appropriations Committee Dave Obey (D-WI) has responded to the changes saying, the proposal "is not aimed at improving efficiency. It is simply payback" for Majority Leader Tom Delay to boost spending on NASA.

A reorganization of this magnitude will have effects on a number of areas, not just science. But from the narrow perspective of science funding, the changes appear to generally reduce downward pressure on R&D budgets. Whether or not the changes lead to better R&D outcomes is an entirely different question.

Posted on February 17, 2005 12:51 PM View this article | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Ryen, T.S. | R&D Funding | Science Policy: General

February 11, 2005

Long Live Mode 1 Science – Or Not

An editorial in this week’s science by Alan Leshner, CEO of AAAS, indicates not only that science is changing, but that change may here to stay. Specifically, Leshner writes, “…the relationship between science and society is undergoing significant stress. Some members of the public are finding certain lines of scientific research and their outcomes disquieting, while others challenge the kind of science taught in schools. This disaffection and shift in attitudes predict a more difficult and intrusive relationship between science and society than we’ve enjoyed in the recent past.”

What might we expect of the relationship of science and society? First a bit of background:

Helga Nowotny, Peter Scott and Michael Gibbons write that the role of science in society has changed dramatically over the past decade, a transition they characterize as moving from “Mode 1” science to “Mode 2 science,”

“The old paradigm of scientific discovery (‘Mode 1’) characterised by the hegemony of disciplinary science, with its strong sense of an internal hierarchy between the disciplines and driven by the autonomy of scientists and their host institutions, the universities, was being superseded – although not replaced- by a new paradigm of knowledge production (‘Mode 2’) which was socially distributed, application-oriented, trans-disciplinary and subject to multiple accountabilities.

Those with most to gain from such a thesis espoused it most warmly - politicians and civil servants struggling to create better mechanisms to link science with innovation, researchers in professional disciplines such as management struggling to wriggle out from under the condescension of more established, and more ‘academic’, disciplines and researchers in newer universities, other non-university higher education institutions or outside the academic, and scientific, systems strictly defined. Those with most to lose were most sceptical - researchers in those established disciplines and institutions who feared that the quality of science would be eroded if these levelling ideas gained political currency and that their own autonomy would be curtailed if more explicit links were established between research and innovation.”

Nowotny et al. are among a growing group of scholars and practitioners who argue that the “linear model” of science – from federal funding to basic research to applied research to development to application to societal benefit – is neither descriptively accurate nor normatively desirable.

In a telling passage from his AAAS editorial, Leshner suggests that most scientists want none of this “mode 2” business, “… historically science and technology have changed society, society now is likely to want to change science and technology, or at least to help shape their course. For many scientists, any such overlay of values on the conduct of science is anathema to our core principles and our historic success.” Of course, to see the absurdity of this statement, one need only observe the annual pilgrimage of scientists and their representatives to Washington, DC lining up to lobby for more federal funding for science because of its importance to outcomes valued by the nation (e.g., see this statement by AAAS, “[The AAAS Board] is particularly pleased by the acknowledgment by congressional leaders of the key role played by science and technology in improving the nation's economy and quality of life”).

But even while rejecting the notion of Mode 2 science, Leshner suggests that it is here to stay,

“Still, our recent experiences suggest that the values dimension is here to stay, certainly for a while, and that we need to learn to work within this new context. Protesting the imposition of value-related constraints on science has been the usual response, but it doesn’t work because it doesn’t resonate with the public. An alternative is to adopt a much more inclusive approach that engages other communities assertively in discussing the meaning and usefulness of our work. We should try to find common ground through open, rational discourse… Simply protesting the incursion of value considerations into the conduct and use of science confirms the old adage that insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting a different outcome. Let’s try some diplomacy and discussion and see how that goes for a change.”

If Leshner’s perspective is an accurate reflection of general views within the scientific community, then it looks like, while Mode 1 thinking is still strong, there is a window of opportunity for a greater engagement of Mode 2. Scholars of science and technology policy have an opportunity here.

Posted on February 11, 2005 09:32 AM View this article | Comments (3) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

February 09, 2005

The Cherry Pick

Last year I wrote “ … the cherry pick -- the careful selection of information to buttress a particular predetermined perspective while ignoring other information that does not. In other words, take the best and leave the rest.”

And in an examination of the misuse of science by the Bush I and Clinton Administrations I wrote, “When making an argument people often selectively choose or present information that makes their case look as strong as possible. Not only is this an effective tactic in argumentation; because there are (a) a diversity of perspectives on facts, and (b) many valid ways to understand “facts,” cherry picking is inescapable.”

Along these lines the team at RealClimate has a great post that describes some of the pitfalls of cherry picking: “… for some critics, any argument will do - regardless of its coherence with the argument they had before, or the one they will pick next.”

Dan Sarewitz argues that “…when cause-and-effect relations are not simple or well-established, all uses of facts are selective. Since there is no way to “add up” all the facts relevant to a complex problem like global change to yield a “complete” picture of “the problem,” choices must be made. Particular sets of facts may stand out as particularly compelling, coherent, and useful in the context of one set of values and interests, yet in another appear irrelevant to the point of triviality.”

But what the folks at RealClimate remind us is that if you are cherry picking, be careful, because if you are not careful, the resulting bowl of fruit might also contain some apples and oranges.

Posted on February 9, 2005 09:06 AM View this article | Comments (1) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

February 08, 2005

A New Blog on Science Policy

A new blog has just come online, The Post-Normal Times. It is run by an impressive and diverse group. It is worth a bookmark. Here is how they desribe themselves:

"Who We Are"
Controversial public policy decisions that affect many people are unlikely to be accepted unless they are justified, somehow, by those who make them. Often, this is done by invoking some form of authority. For example, in a senate hearing, James Watt - former US Secretary of the Interior - once invoked the rapture when he said "after the last tree is felled, Christ will come back" to explain why he was giving away public lands. Others invoke science, which is at its best when, like Galileo, it challenges existing beliefs, and debunks myths, and, also like Galileo, gets corrected when wrong, as was his theory of the tides. At its worst, science provides support for decisions that have already been made, resting on hubris and on myths that must also be debunked, such as the delusion – also attributed to Galileo - that given enough resources, it can explain all things and provide certainty. It is also important to recognize that science is just one of many ways of understanding a world in which changes are increasingly a consequence of human beliefs and behavior. The capacity to respond to complex problems rests on an understanding of this changing context, without which scientific explanations and technical solutions are likely to be irrelevant no matter how precise.

Clarifying various forms of uncertainty is critical to managing public expectations, and maintaining or re-establishing public trust in science. It is also expected to better engage the public, as citizens, in democratic decision-making processes, in which a major area of uncertainty is whether their participation will even make any difference in the final outcome. When science supports high stakes policy commitments, this kind of broader engagement is also what makes it possible to detect and correct errors.

The Post-Normal Times is dedicated to improving the quality of public participation in science-based policy decisions related to the conundrums presented by problems of environmentally sustainable development, by providing multiple and constructive perspectives on complex and controversial science and policy issues. A central focus will be on justifications provided for controversial high-stakes decisions that pertain to complex problems such as climate change, in which the disadvantages of making trade-offs fall disproportionately on those excluded from the decision-making process. But we will also cover post-normal aspects of culture and politics that are the context of science. We particularly seek out the kinds of information often missed in formal reports and normal news sources, for failure to fit into standard categories and established story lines.

Special themes preliminarily identified for coverage include:

• Demythification of science used to support specific and selected policy decisions.
• "Ignorance of ignorance" – i.e., blindspots
• Uses and abuses of uncertainty in decision-making, such as the use of science to avoid actually making a decision
• Paradox and contradiction in existing policies
• Living in Post-Normal Times- a space for reports and commentary on the social and cultural context of science and policy.

This may include essays, reviews of selected books, movies and artists that present emerging perspectives, and scenarios of the future.

Submissions are welcome. Interested contributors should send an e-mail inquiry in advance to the editor at submissions@postnormaltimes.net, presenting a proposed angle for the contribution, so as to insure it fits within the scope of the PNT, and brief biographical information. We also encourage readers to participate by commenting on already posted material."

Posted on February 8, 2005 11:14 AM View this article | Comments (3) | TrackBack
Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Science Policy: General

February 07, 2005

A Climate of Staged Angst

Author: Hans Von Storch and Nico Stehr in Der Speigel

The following essay by Hans Von Storch and Nico Stehr was originally published in Der Spiegel, a German newspaper, on 24 January 2005. We are providing an English translation with the permission of the authors and Der Speigel.

The days are gone when climate researchers sat in their ivory towers packed to the rafters with supercomputers. Nowadays their field has become the stuff of thrillers, and they themselves have risen to take on the leading roles. The topic is so hotly contested, the prognoses so spectacular, that they are no longer merely the subject of media reports; now the specialists in staged apocalypse have moved in. Last year Roland Emmerich depicted a climatic collapse provoked by humankind in his film "The Day After Tomorrow." Since last week the belletristic counterpart has been available in German bookstores: the novel "State of Fear," by the best-selling author Michael Crichton.

The thriller is about the violent conflict between sober environmental realists and radical environmental idealists. For the idealists, the organized fear of abrupt climate change serves as a handy weapon. They interpret every somehow unusual weather event as proof of anthropogenic global warming. "You have to structure your information so that it's always confirmed, no matter what kind of weather we have," the P.R. consultant for the environmentalist organization advises. The realists, who protest that the evidence that human activity has increased meteorological extremes is thin, are fighting a losing battle. Their dry scientific arguments are unable to gain any ground against the colorful, horrific visions of the climate idealists.

Film and novel have certain aspects in common. Where Emmerich holds out the prospect of a threatening climate catastrophe, the book prophesies an economic collapse. In both cases, greenhouse gases produced by humankind are the culprit - in the film, because the emissions themselves are too much; in the book, because the fear of them is. The idealists are so obsessed with their mission that ultimately, in order to rouse the public, they themselves bring about the foretold catastrophes.

Despite a good deal of factually untrue - and thus all the more striking - compression, Crichton has quite correctly observed the dynamic of the paths of communication among scientists, environmentalist organizations, the state and the civilian population. For there is indeed a serious problem for the natural sciences: namely, the public depiction and perception of climate change. Research has landed in a crisis because its public actors assert themselves on the saturated market of discussion by overselling the topic.

Climate change of man-made origin is an important subject. But is it truly the "most important problem on the planet," as an American senator claims? Are world peace, or the conquest of poverty, not similarly daunting challenges? And what about population growth, demographic change or quite normal natural disasters?

In the U.S., only a very few remain interested in the greenhouse effect. At the end of the 1980s, the situation was still different. That was the era of the great drought of 1988, the Mississippi flood of 1993, and the climate capers ought by rights to have taken off in earnest from that point. But that never happened in the U.S., and interest petered out. According to a survey by the CBS television network in May 2003, environmental problems were no longer ranked among the six most important subjects; and even within environmental problems, the topic of climate came in only in seventh place. In Germany, so far, things are still seen differently. But for how much longer?

In order to keep the topic of "climate catastrophe" - a concept nonexistent outside the German-speaking world, by the way - continually in the public eye, the media feel obligated, exactly like the protagonists in Crichton's thriller, to keep framing the topic "a bit more attractively." At the beginning of the 1990s - severe hurricanes had just swept through the country - one could read and hear in the German media that storms were due to become ever more severe. Since then, storms have become rarer in northern Europe. But no notice is taken of this. The fact that barometric fluctuations in Stockholm have shown no systematic change in the frequency and severity of storms since Napoleon's time is passed over in silence. Instead, there is now talk of heat waves and floods. Very much in the style of Crichton's instigators of fear, the story is now that all manner of extreme events are on the increase. Thus even drought in Brandenburg and deluge on the Oder fit the picture without apparent contradiction.

Add to this - besides normal floods and storms - other, more dramatically threatening, scenarios: the reversal of the Gulf Stream and the resultant cooling of large areas of Europe, for instance, or even the rapid melting of the Greenland ice pack. The question has already been publicly raised whether perhaps even the Asian tsunami can be attributed to the disastrous effects of human activity.

This will not be able to hold the public's attention for long. Soon people will have become accustomed to these warnings, and will return to the topics of the day: unemployment and Hartz IV, Turkey's entry to the E.U. or whether Borussia Dort

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