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January 08, 2007

The Steps Not Yet Taken


Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Climate Change | Disasters | Energy Policy

Dan Sarewitz and I have a new chapter in press on climate policy:

Sarewitz, D. and R. Pielke, Jr., (2007, forthcoming), The Steps Not Yet Taken, Controversies in Science and Technology, Volume 2, edited by Daniel Lee Kleinman, Karen Cloud-Hansen, Christina Matta, and Jo Handelsman (publisher TBA). (prepublication version here in PDF)

Here is how we start off the chapter:

The climate system of the planet earth, and the energy system built by those who inhabit the earth, are today seen as the integrated elements of a single problem: global warming. In turn, scientific inquiry, public concern, and policy prescription have given rise to an international regime for controlling the behavior of the climate through management of the global energy system. In this chapter we explain why this regime, and in particular its codification through the Kyoto Protocol, is a failure. Our central point is simple: protecting people and the environment from the impacts of climate is a different problem from reducing greenhouse gas emissions to combat global warming. The policies that have resulted from combining these two problems are, as a consequence, failing to meaningfully address either problem. Policies to reduce global warming must be pursued independently of policies to reduce climate impacts.

First we explain why the Kyoto Protocol is not achieving its environmentally modest goals, a failure that has no connection to the refusal of the United States to sign onto the treaty, but rather reflects the complexity of energy systems and their management. We then consider the impacts of climate on society through the lens of Hurricane Katrina. Such impacts are unrelated to global warming, and cannot be addressed by emissions reductions. Instead, they require policies specifically focused on reduction of socioeconomic vulnerability to climate.

But emissions reductions are a key societal goal, and next we discuss the role of technological innovation in pursuing that goal. Current policies, embodied in Kyoto, are inappropriate and insufficient for making the necessary progress. A cornerstone of our argument is that much of the failure to date of climate change policy originates in a misunderstanding of the appropriate roles of science and technology in social and political change. Proponents of action on global warming have treated scientific evidence as the central catalyst for motivating necessary change, while technological advance has been viewed as a second-order consequence of such change. We argue that this reasoning is backwards, and that technological innovation is a much more effective scaffolding upon which to address energy policies than scientific knowledge.

The Kyoto Protocol is not effectively addressing the climate impacts problem or the energy technology problem. Although Kyoto is often portrayed as only a first step toward establishing an effective international climate change regime, we conclude that it is a step in the wrong direction.

You can read a prepublication version of the whole chapter here in PDF. Comment welcomed!

Posted on January 8, 2007 01:03 AM

Comments

You advocate reducing emissions by technological change boosted by increased government spending in energy R&D. And you say that such spending is politically palatable because people want their country to be a "global leader" in technological transformation. You wrap the idea with words such as "competition" among countries, "aggressive" innovation, avoiding being "left behind," or responding to the "rising economic might of India and China."

However, any informed rational person knows that it is in his best interest to leave spending in government-sponsored R&D to *other* taxpayers - basically to taxpayers in *other* countries. R&D investments by other countries are good for me, because innovation benefits everyone. Paying taxes, on the contrary, is bad for me.

On one hand, you are right. People are politically irrational and ignorant and do respond to nationalist messages that speak about international competitiveness and global leadership. These messages are useful to get increases in government spending.

On the other hand, feeding nationalist irrational logic does more harm than good. And government-sponsored R&D tends to be wasteful and inefficient.

Finally, the idea of taxes paying for energy R&D is not so different from the carbon tax idea. A substantial carbon tax would spur private investment in energy R&D. Given that governments are good at collecting taxes and bad at spending money, I think that carbon taxes would be more efficient than direct government spending in R&D. (I support neither, anyway.)

Posted by: Biopolitical at January 9, 2007 04:28 AM


Better yet, you could use your carbon tax revenues to pay for climate disaster prevention.

Posted by: Lab Lemming at January 10, 2007 08:46 PM


Roger,

I enjoyed the chapter. Found it stimulating and challenging. As usual I came away with a new understanding of the manifold relationships between science and policy. Unfortunately some of the challenging part was the challenge of understanding it.

I have a number of comments about the writing and organization of the chapter but since I don't know where you are at in the writing process or were looking for that kind of comment I'll mostly limit myself to questions the article raised for me.

Two major sections of the chapter makes sense if all societal impacts of GW related to hurricanes & storms. But what are your thoughts about non-storm related societal impacts?

The final paragraph is very powerful but leaves me with several questions:

By "distasters" what phenomena do you include? Rising sea levels? Drought? Major crop loss? If you mean losses from hurricanes then the point is well founded.
Are you suggesting that the conclusions taken from the Katrina frame also apply to most societal effects? If so I would like to hear your reasoning how one illustrates the other. How this points related to non-storm related impacts is unclear & left me with questions

Regarding storm losses I thought you well articulated a moral concern/observation that I also share.
--------------------------------
In the Introduction you write of "the appropriate roles of science and technology". Your arguments seem mostly to be pragmatical and utilitarian. Is that the sense by which you mean "appropriate"? Or is there some normative or other way that that the relationship would be appropriate.
--------------------------------
I am unclear about the causual relationship in:

The "first step" refers to Kyoto being "only a first step". But do you mean that Kyoto as a "first step" causes action to be framed in terms of the agreement itself? And if so how?

And wouldn't the debate be framed by this more than action? By action I assume you mean emission reductions mandates and/or actual emission reductions.
--------------------------------
You assert that:

The idea makes intuitive sense but is there theory and data to back this up? That is the kind of insight I hope to get from a social science presentation. Is it in the four souces cited in general for the section and if so which one? (Consider this an editoral comment more than a question for you now. But as a reader I would appreciate a reference.)
--------------------------------

Bush Saves Kyoto! (Page 2)
It seems to me that Bush delayed and drew attention away from the asserted "inevitable failure". He didn't save it.

Also, (editorial comment) are you making the case for this "inevitable failure" or assuming it? This is a different point from why it might be failing at the moment.
--------------------------------
Page 3.
How does Kyoto being only a first step frame action on climate change in terms of Kyoto itself? I don't get the connection. It makes more sense to me that perhaps it framed the debate instead of the action. The terms of the debate is the subject of the latter part of the same paragraph.
--------------------------------
Page 8

Huh? I thought this was the type of definitive conclusion that you have warned your readers of in many blogs. Certainly a marginal change will probably have marginal effects but it seems that here you assume the conclusion.
--------------------------------
Page 10

I think that, at miminum, that deserves a reference.


It may, but more to the point, as a social scientists and policy experts, historically how often does it work this way? You cite one example of wind farms on off shore oil platforms but how typical is this example?
--------------------------------
Page 11

The uncertain timeline means there is uncertainty about what? How long the "game" will stay in effect?

It would seem to me that if targets are expected to rise that the expectation would create a type of demand that should motivate technology innovation. How is this expectation unrealistic?
--------------------------------

I could argue that the point I made above about creating an expection of a demand is Kyoto's answer to the contradiction.

I would be very interested in light of these comments to hear your thought therefor on what you think the politics surrounding Kyoto are.
--------------------------------

Is it insensitive because of the fixed goals and time tables or something else?

What would be sensitive to the emergence and diffusion of technology? In other words how would you fix it?
Would you reject all mandated emission reductions because of this?
Are you suggesting that the level of mandated reductions be set in light of existing technologies?
--------------------------------
I liked the phasing of:
science-motivated convergence vs. technological pluralism
I like how it encapsulates that point.
I such you use that phrasing earlier in the chapter and create chapter sub-headings with them.

Posted by: Cortlandt [TypeKey Profile Page] at January 15, 2007 01:27 AM


Roger,

Woops. I enclosed my quotes in brackets and they were all stripped from my comments. So here again, with quotations, are my comments.

Two major sections of the chapter makes sense if all societal impacts of GW related to hurricanes & storms. But what are your thoughts about non-storm related societal impacts?

The final paragraph is very powerful but leaves me with several questions:

" By bringing disasters into the global warming debate to score political points, yet
refusing to embrace an agenda for actually reducing disaster vulnerability—indeed, by
rejecting the basis for such an agenda—climate change politics has explicitly turned its
back on the very people it exploits as rhetorical fodder to advance its cause. This is a
political strategy that robs the global warming movement of its moral legitimacy and
leaves climate change policy, after its faltering first step, facing backwards. "

By "distasters" what phenomena do you include? Rising sea levels? Drought? Major crop loss? If you mean losses from hurricanes then the point is well founded.
Are you suggesting that the conclusions taken from the Katrina frame also apply to most societal effects? If so I would like to hear your reasoning. How this points related to non-storm related impacts is unclear & left me with questions

Regarding storm losses I thought you well articulated a moral concern that I share.
--------------------------------
In the Introduction you write of "the appropriate roles of science and technology". Your arguments seem mostly to be pragmatical and utilitarian. Is that the sense by which you mean "appropriate"? Or is there some normative or other way that that the relationship would be appropriate.
--------------------------------
I am unclear about the causual relationship in:
" this first step has meant that action on climate change is framed in terms of Kyoto itself, where support for Kyoto means saving the world environment from catastrophe, and opposition means denial of the problem ".

The "first step" refers to Kyoto being "only a first step". But do you mean that Kyoto as a "first step" causes action to be framed in terms of the agreement itself? And if so how?

And wouldn't the debate be framed by this more than action? By action I assume you mean emission reductions.
--------------------------------
You assert that:
"Any effective strategy aimed at
mobilizing political action to forestall climate change needs to connect the abstract global
phenomenon to the local realities of felt human experience."

The idea makes intuitive sense but is there theory and data to back this up? That is the kind of insight I hope to get from a social science presentation. Is it in the four souces cited in general for the section and if so which one? (Consider this an editoral comment more than a question for you now. But as a reader I would appreciate a reference.)
--------------------------------

Bush Saves Kyoto! (Page 2)
It seems to me that Bush delayed and drew attention away from the asserted "inevitable failure". He didn't save it.

Also, (editorial comment) are you making the case for this "inevitable failure" or assuming it? This is a different point from why it might be failing at the moment.
--------------------------------
Page 3.
How does Kyoto being only a first step frame action on climate change in terms of Kyoto itself? I don't get the connection. It makes more sense to me that perhaps it framed the debate instead of the action. The terms of the debate is the subject of the latter part of the same paragraph.
--------------------------------
Page 8
"The problem isn’t simply that Kyoto’s marginal decreases in greenhouse gas
emissions will have no effect on long-term climate behavior, although this is the case"
Huh? I thought this was the type of definitive conclusion that you have warned your readers of in many blogs. Certainly a marginal change will probably have marginal effects but it seems that here you assume the conclusion.
--------------------------------
Page 10
" And even if scientists could confidently predict the societal
consequences of global warming (which they can’t), such knowledge would not dictate
any particular path of action."
I think that, at miminum, that deserves a reference.

" People holding diverse and even strongly divergent values and interests may
converge around a particular technology that can advance multiple interests. "
It may, but more to the point, as a social scientists and policy experts, historically how often does it work this way? You cite one example of wind farms on off shore oil platforms but how typical is this example?
--------------------------------
Page 11
"While the types of policy tools encouraged under the UNFCCC and Kyoto are meant, in
part, to stimulate adoption of more efficient technology, their overall effect is to
encourage states to work within the status quo and game the system to meet short-term
targets, rather than to reward long-term and high-risk investment aimed at encouraging
technological change over a highly uncertain timeline."
The uncertain timeline means there is uncertainty about what? How long the "game" will stay in effect?

It would seem to me that if targets are expected to rise that the expectation would create a type of demand that should motivate technology innovation. How is this expectation unrealistic?
--------------------------------
" a failure that can only be explained if the problem of stimulating technical
change is largely irrelevant to the politics surrounding Kyoto."
I could argue that the point I made above about creating an expection of a demand is Kyoto's answer to the contradiction.

I would be very interested in light of these comments to hear your thought therefor on what you think the politics surrounding Kyoto are.
--------------------------------
" Indeed, the whole idea of mandated national emissions reductions reflects an insensitivity
to the highly decentralized, historically contingent, uneven manner in which new
technologies emerge and diffuse."
Is it insensitive because of the fixed goals and time tables or something else?

What would be sensitive to the emergence and diffusion of technology? In other words how would you fix it?
Would you reject all mandated emission reductions because of this?
Are you suggesting that the level of mandated reductions be set in light of existing technologies?
--------------------------------
I liked the phasing of:
science-motivated convergence vs. technological pluralism
I like how it encapsulates that point.
I such you use that phrasing earlier in the chapter and create chapter sub-headings with them.

Posted by: Cortlandt [TypeKey Profile Page] at January 15, 2007 01:40 AM


Thanks Cortlandt for these detailed and thoughtful comments. I'll have a reply soon, but probably not today, Thanks!!!

Posted by: Roger Pielke, Jr. [TypeKey Profile Page] at January 15, 2007 08:41 AM




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